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
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


George G. Bassow













# THE VALIDITY OF THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

*A PRELIMINARY STUDY IN THE  
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION*

BY

GEORGE A. BARROW, PH.D. (HARV.)



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
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TO  
MY MOTHER



## NOTE

Acknowledgment is due the *Journal of Religious Psychology* for kind permission to reprint as the latter part of Lecture II an article which appeared in the *Journal* under the title of "The Reality of the Religious Experience."



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## LECTURE I

### THE PROBLEM OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

The problem of the validity of the religious experience is essentially modern and recent. Problems connected with what we call the religious life there have always been, both as to its practice and its implications. Men have questioned whether it was an experience of God or the Devil, and have sought to regulate it. Others have claimed their inspiration from their possession of an abnormal religious life, and asserted that peculiar knowledge of God or of life was given to them in that experience. Being practical men, the leaders of religious life have sought to restrain this phenomena within limits, and those limits have been laid down by the normal life of the time. Mystics, perhaps the only ones who have realised religion as an experience different from the other experiences of life, have never won a large following. Quakers remain few, even though their first quietism has been largely lost. The effort to keep the contemplative orders true to their first ideal has often seemed impossible of success. The normal life which does not recognise sharp distinctions between the experience of religion and other experiences has dominated the Church. Hence the practical spirit of the Church has expressed itself in restrain-

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ing the expression of religion as a thing distinct from life's other activities. On the theoretical side theologians have been much more concerned with the revelations made and the ideas drawn from the religious experience than they have been with that experience itself. The official teachers and leaders of Christianity have therefore paid little attention to the religious phenomena for its own sake. The terms used in describing it are not drawn from an analysis of the phenomena, but from assumptions, many of them crude and carelessly used.

Outside of official Christianity there has been, of recent years, considerable study of religious phenomena. The history of religions, comparative religion, together with the science and the psychology of religion, though naming fields whose boundaries are only very roughly defined, outline the modern interest in the subject. By contact with differing forms of religious expression, and especially by contact with the East, where attention has for centuries been centered on these phenomena, our western world has been aroused to a careful objective study of religion. This has not yet gone far enough to give us new terms, since it has hardly yet formulated clearly even the principal problems. We cannot look to this objective study for clear definitions of our terms, or for unambiguous terms. Nor would they serve us for more than a start. Valuable as the results of the scientific study of religion will be for the future theologian, these studies will be, even for him, merely descriptive. The determination of the normal age of conversion, or the solution of the relative consistency of differing forms of religious expression, can

give to the theologian only more material and new problems. None of these modern studies concerns itself with the meaning of the religious experience. If it is proved that there is no distinct experience of this type, then its only meaning will lie in its relations to the physical life of the race, but the determination of this point can not be found in the science of religion, whether genetic or descriptive. Only a philosophic study of the implications of the normal religious life can even point the way to a solution of such a problem.

The philosophical study of the expression of the religious life is newer even than its scientific study. By philosophy of religion in even recent times has been meant the application to religion of the metaphysical concepts. While this is valid, and means much for theology, it can not take the place of a study based on the experience itself. Independent studies of this latter kind have been very few. Many semi-popular adaptations of modern theology to modern religious needs there have been, and it is significant that men like Eucken and Royce have attempted this. Yet this is not a philosophical study of the experience itself. It has its relation rather with the practical problems of the Christian leader, than with the logical analysis of the Christian philosopher. Besides the present condition of religious thought, there is such a complex situation in philosophic thought generally that we are to-day unable to reach any general agreement on terms. Each thinker must define for himself and his readers the meaning he gives to his words, else only confusion results. When the students of philosophy dispute as

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fiercely as they do over the definition of consciousness, it is useless to attempt to assume an agreement on the definition of the religious consciousness. Some agreement, however, is necessary, and this present attempt will be justified if the religious experience can be so defined that in the further study of it, whether for the practical churchman or for the scientific worker in the history or the philosophy of religion, there may be some basis of agreement as to what is the religious problem.

In defining the problem of the religious experience we cannot assume agreement even on the terms which we have been using. To say that the problem is concerning the validity of the religious experience is to beg the question in each word of our statement. Men are not agreed in what sense they shall use the word experience. So in dealing with the experience of something which is unlike any other experience in the world — if we are to take the word of those who claim to have that experience in its fullest form — then the first question is whether this is an experience or an hallucination. We must begin at the beginning. The beginning is with this word experience. If anything that is in our consciousness is an experience, then a man who has any religious ideas has a religious experience. To use the word in this sense would not imply anything further about the experience than that there was some meaning to the word religion; there was a state of consciousness which we could identify as the consciousness of religion. That men do mean something when they speak of religion we may take for granted. Whether the religious state or feelings or consciousness is the same as other con-

scious states is a debatable question, but the existence, and material success, of religious organisations proves that men believe in them enough to support them, and they would not give as largely as they do of their means unless that meaning existed for them. Whether we call it fear or love, men do think they accomplish something by their support and pursuit of religion. Even if it is merely the effort to live a moral life, then that effort is what we call religion. The very fact that religion is to-day the object of such widespread serious study shows that men have a consciousness of some meaning to the word "religion."

The fact of the existence of a religious consciousness does no more than make possible the various problems. To define the terms of these problems we must analyse this consciousness. Anything may be analysed in many different ways. With differing motives the directions of the cuts which separate the resulting parts will be different. The scientific and historical analysis of the consciousness of religion has been often undertaken in these days. The result of the historical analysis is to define what men have meant by this term "religious." The contents of the religious concept become more and more definite as this history of religion portrays what men have thought that religion meant. What it does mean is, however, not the province of history to inquire. That is left to science and to philosophy. The recent modern development of the scientific study of religion has done much towards the description of the religious phenomena. We have a far clearer idea to-day than ever before what the psychological and



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physiological elements of the religious consciousness are. This scientific analysis, however, must content itself with the objective side of consciousness. It can tell what a man is thinking about when he prays, or it can correlate his desire to pray with certain physiological conditions. What it cannot do, so long as it remains a science, is to consider the implications of the experience. It can test the questions of fact, as in perception it can decide whether the perception has relation to something we call the object of perception; it can distinguish in terms of the knowledge relation between true perception and false, between vision and hallucination; but as it cannot decide whether the object is real or conceptual, whether the test is one of knowledge or logic, but must leave that to metaphysics, so the science of religion cannot decide whether the religious consciousness has objective validity or is purely subjective. The consideration, even, of the application of these terms to the religious consciousness belongs not to the science but to the philosophy of religion. The analysis which we have to make is therefore the philosophical analysis. We are concerned not with questions of fact, but of meaning. It would not serve our purpose, therefore, to define religion in terms of its content. We need neither to make a parallel to the scientific analysis, nor do we need, except incidentally, to take over its results. In raising the question of validity, whatever we may mean, we do not mean to question the fact of its existence or what its existence includes. We do not ask whether any given case of religion is or is not a true religious experience. We are concerned only with the form of

the religious experience and the questions we ask are questions of possibility and of implication. Our analysis is therefore to be an analysis of concepts. Given the existence of something we conceive to be the religious consciousness or religious state, we seek to analyse our conception of it.

In this analysis, the first term to be questioned is the last of our titles. So far a number of terms have been used in speaking of the religious phenomena in order to avoid the implications of any one of them. The concept which we will find ourselves forced to consider most is brought to us in the word "experience." To assume it in any one sense would be dangerous, so we must ask first what is meant by the term as applied to religion. At the start, and from whatever point we make our start, the application to religion must be carefully examined. The widest meaning is therefore the best to bring out the most general implications. The widest use is that already referred to, when anything which may be the object of a man's consciousness is called his experience. Dreams, insight into artistic activities or values, as well as the perceptual facts of everyday life, are in a man's experience. Even in this widest use, however, there are limits. It is a question whether a man experiences his own purposes, or his own will. The question might be put in the form as to whether there can be a subjective experience. Ordinarily the assumption would be that there could not. What a man experiences, though it may come to him from his own body or even his "subconscious life," is usually assumed to be something over whose coming, or at least over the complete determination of whose

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coming, he does not have control. Even the artist, in seeking to realise and make possible the experience of his ideal of beauty, must discover, at least in part, rather than create, that beauty. He deals with a world not completely under his power. The experience of the moral struggle leads to the same discovery of weakness in the will to do right. The experience comes because the action is governed by other forces besides and in addition to the ideal. The problem as to whether the God of ordinary theology can have a moral experience, since his omnipotence can feel no limits, illustrates the ordinary use of the term. A man experiences that which in some way or other is not subject to his will. Our ordinary activity, the direct result of our will, can, however, and does become the object of knowledge and of subsequent will activity. Just as we speak of a man experiencing anger, when we refer primarily to the presence of the angry feelings in his consciousness, so we can and sometimes do speak of his experience of an ideal. Especially is this true of religion. In the popular devotional literature, whether of revivalist or mystic, the effort is made to concentrate attention on the active side of a man's nature. He is asked to pay attention to his motives, or, with the Indian mystic, to ignore his desires. In either case motives or desires are treated as something in his consciousness which may be objects of attention. The philosophic use of the word "object" as opposed to "subject" has led to the danger of ignoring the fact that in ordinary usage the same consciousness often has applied to it both words. When a man becomes conscious of any purpose, whether "the will to believe"

or the will to do right, or the will to seek the abolition of desire, in so far as he is conscious of what he is seeking, in ordinary language we say that he experiences that desire. In the very nature of self-consciousness the experience of the self is involved. The metaphysical difficulties which surround the problem as to how the subjective will can be objective need not, however, concern us here. As we are now dealing with the meaning of terms, it is enough to point out the implication of applying to religion the word "experience," used in this most general sense. The two elements we have been discussing may be brought together in the statement that a man experiences anything which is the object of attention, and so far as it is, he does not have it completely under his control. This is true of the very case of self-consciousness, a man by no means controls his consciousness of his own will. Often he will seek very earnestly in some direction, only to some day awake to the consciousness that that was not really what he wanted, or that what he did want was not consistent with this other thing for which he was equally anxious. A man, in the common use of words, may be said to find out what it is he wants. He experiences his will when it comes to consciousness in his mind, and that will may be one that his whole self does not control. This is, as I understand it, the attitude of the Buddhist toward desire. There are purposes that the true self must cast off if it is to be true to itself. So long as they exist, they are not subject to the true self. Whether or not correct as a hasty statement of the Buddhist position, such a statement illustrates the possibility of the union of the two ideas in the

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use of the word experience. To say that a man experiences something is to say that he is conscious of something over which he has not complete control.

When this meaning of experience is applied to religion the religious phenomena are described as objects of consciousness over which the man experiencing them has not complete control. Taking the first half of this statement first, when religion is spoken of as the object of consciousness something more is meant than that it is studied as we are now studying it. Any concept may be the object of inquiry, even though that concept has no content. The concept of a round-square, though it has properties that can be studied can never be an experience, for since a round-square can never exist, it cannot be the object of consciousness. A study of the conception of a thing is not the study of the thing. To be object of consciousness religion must exist. There must be states of men's minds which can be studied and known under the concepts of religion. Granting that this is the case, since the material devotion proves that men, as we have already said, mean something when they speak of religion, the assertion comes to the form that religion, assuming it to exist, exists as an object of consciousness. Remembering in what sense we used the term object as applied to experience, including in it experience of will and value, we come to the assertion that religion is a possible content of consciousness and the subject or focus of the attentive consciousness. This is by no means self evident. If we should follow many of the mystics in their statements of the impossibility of describing or adequately coming to con-

sciousness of the religious experience we should have to conclude that it is not a possible focal center for clear consciousness. The fact that Buddhists are by no means agreed as to what terms are applicable to Nirvana proves that to assert that in this sense of "object of consciousness" religion is an experience is not accepted by many who call themselves religious. Accepting experience as conscious experience, and religion as existent, the whole character of the relation between them remains to be examined. Therefore for this first meaning of experience we have the problem of the possibility of the religious state being in any sense focal and clear. In this it shares in the present condition of any problem which seeks to define the consciousness of the subject of knowledge, or to describe in logical terms self-consciousness. To a certain extent it must share the fate of the outcome of such attempts, yet a negative view here is conceivably possible whatever be the conclusion as to self-consciousness. If self-consciousness is agreed upon as something existent which cannot itself be focal in consciousness, but only a condition behind consciousness, then there is the possibility, if religion is also in its nature non-focal, that religion and self-consciousness may be closely related. Undoubtedly there is a certain tendency in this direction observable in the work of the absolute idealists. The religious union with God, for the Hindoo as well as for many of our own thinkers, is often spoken of as the true self. On the other hand, if the student of philosophy does allow the focal nature of self-consciousness, he may still, whether by relegating religion to the subcon-

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scious realm, or by exalting it to the ineffable regions beyond even self-consciousness, conceive it as not possibly an experience of our conscious life, and therefore in this case very different from self-consciousness. This question must be met, therefore, by the student of religious concepts. He must ask whether from their nature they are or are not possible focal centers in consciousness.

If with this question of presence in consciousness we come into deep waters, we must swim in even deeper when we consider the latter half of our preliminary definition of experience. If experience is something over which a man has not complete control, then we are met at the very outset by conflicting ideas among those who profess to have the religious life. Whatever religion may be, this question is as fundamental as the issue between Augustine and Pelagius. It is really this that was the issue between them. If we are to call or acknowledge the possibility of an experience of religion, we must face the problem they faced. If man can by his own will and in his own strength attain to the condition of union with God which is another name for what we have called the religious phenomena, then, in the extreme case where that union remains completely under his control, it cannot be called in our sense an experience. If that religious state comes to him even partially as the result of forces outside his own will and not subject to him, then it may be an experience. The whole theology which must be the result for a believer in religion from the study of his religion will differ according to the answer given this question. It is not merely, however, the prob-

lem which faced Augustine. Taking the religious state apart from its relation to morality, the problem is just as acute. To a certain extent the Yogi, in laying out for himself definite exercises, assumes that he can control that which will result from the course he is taking. While he may not assert that when it comes he has complete control over it, still he tends in this direction. The acme of the religious state, as it occurs in the consciousness of Brahma, would seem always to be conceived in terms which do not allow of the application to it of the word "experience." Brahma or the Christian God, if described in the terms which are often used, cannot be said to have in consciousness anything over which he has not complete control. Absorption in him, therefore, would be union with a being who has no experience. In this the Indian thinker is often more consistent than the Christian. If religion is something which a man can ideally consider as under his complete will and control, then ideally, and as he conceives its nature, it is not an experience, whatever else we may call it. If it is thus conceived as not an experience, the whole question again arises of its relation to self-consciousness and takes corresponding forms to the results that we have seen were possible in the consideration of the first half of our definition. Another result of the assertion that religion may be experienced must be noted. Whether or not the result of man's will, as against God's, it may be conceived as the result of physical forces over which, as we know in other departments of life, a man never has complete control. If religion is physiological or subject to "natural law,"



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it must, if it can come into consciousness, be an experience. This is true whether the contents of religion be more than emotions or not. As we have seen, ideals and values, which are not mere emotions, because they are often the result of physical conditions and therefore not completely subject to man, are for that reason possible experiences. To conclude that religion may be experienced leaves the way open for the physiological and psychological studies which are the fashion to-day. A negative answer means that what these men are studying is not religion. If religion is what a man wills then those states and actions which are the result of material or natural forces cannot be called religion. Our present problem, therefore, is logically prior to any scientific study of religion. If religion is to be studied as an experience, it must first be shown to be by its very nature not completely controllable by the will of the man experiencing it.

The general definition of experience with which we have been working so far cannot lead into the heart of the problem. In what we have been considering questions of validity have not entered. However we may answer the questions as to the position in consciousness and of control of religion by the will, we have not defined any implications of the experience. At the most we have merely defined something of its nature. Our description may be true or untrue, but the experience itself, if it be an experience, cannot be said to be either. Before the question of validity is raised, there should be something recognised as implying connections beyond itself. As long as the religious experience is defined

in terms that, even though objects of conscious thought do not imply relations with objects or beings outside consciousness, we cannot say that the experience is true or false. A dream may be consistent or inconsistent, but it cannot, unless used for divination, be true or false. No question of validity can logically be raised by the modern man in regard to even a consistent dream. It is to further definition or limitation of the idea of experience that we must look for a clearer idea of the limits of our problem. The next step in such a description is the question of the source of the experience. Here again ordinary language is a guide. It differentiates two kinds of experience, inner and outer. A man experiences within him whatever comes from his own body; he experiences objects outside of him by perceiving them through some one or more of his sense organs. This distinction between inner and outer which causes the philosopher so much trouble causes none in the world of ordinary conversation. A man's experience of an illness is assumed to be different from his experience in seeing or hearing a horse. The ordinary mind jumps at once over the intermediate steps, which may be somewhat alike in the two cases, to the question of source, and because the source of the sickness is to be found within the body and the cause of the perception of a horse outside, in the horse, the two experiences are held sharply apart. Both are experiences, and the word is used of both, but they are different. A clearer illustration of the difference is given in the difference between the sensation of heat resulting from or accompanying a fever, and that of drawing near some heated object.

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The sensation may be much alike in the two cases, but because the cause is different the two are distinguished. One, the latter, is perception, the other we may call a physiological experience. In this distinction we are no longer concerned with the relation of the experience to the simple facts of attention or control, that is, to its relation to the subject of consciousness (using the philosophical terms without defining them) but with the relation of the experience to the world of which it is part. The subject or will is ignored in the ordinary differentiation of inner and outer experience and the difference thought of in terms of the physical world. The relation between the body and its parts, and the relation between our body and other material objects are the objects of concern. The terms of the experience-relation are now of the same kind, both clearly objective if not always so clearly material. As long as the only question was whether a given possibility could or could not be in consciousness, and whether it was controllable by the individual will, no false implication was possible, for with the first part of the definition, either the religious state is in consciousness or it is not. The state itself considered simply as experience does not point to any other experience or object. The same is true of the question of control by the will. From this point of view the religious state does not lead to any inference to things beyond itself, the question is simply one of (logical) fact. When we deal with relation within the same world, however, inference is at once possible. "Is the sensation of heat due to fever or a hot object" is a question as to what the sensation or conscious-

ness implies. The experience is conceived as pointing out from itself, and the thing or act to which it points may or may not be the real cause of the experience. Any experience may be said to be valid when the object to which it points is the real or in a general sense the sufficient cause of its existence. The validity of an experience involves therefore two things, an implication as to the cause, and the truth of the implication. In examining any experience as to its validity, we examine the implication — in the case of the fever patient we make sure that it is heat and not cold that he feels — and then examine the truth of the implication — in the case above, the feeling that the room has become hot. These two things, the existence of an indication as to the source of the experience, and the truth of the indication, are the essential factors in this present phase of the question.

The first of these problems as it applies to the religious consciousness may be defined as the discussion as to the physiological or non-physiological origin of the religious experience. The first question would be whether there is an indication of source. In putting it this way we must remember that what the crux is, is not what is the source, but what indications as to source are there in the experience itself. If here are no such indications, then whatever the cause of the experience may be concluded to be, the question of validity is not raised, for the experience made no assertion or implication whose validity could be judged. The confusion on this point has led to fruitless controversy as to the relation of emotion to religion. Unless the religious

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state implies that it is *not* a matter of emotion, then religion's validity or truth is not impugned by the assertion that it is merely emotion. If, on the other hand, religion seems to imply that it has emotion as its starting point, as some revivalists' methods seem to assume that it does, then the denial of emotion as its cause is a denial of its validity. Again we must remember that our examination is an examination of the concept or form of the experience. Not what the contents of religion, or the assertions of the religious man are, but what the form or conception of the possibility of the experience whose possession he asserts implies, is the question. The experience must be examined to find if it gives any indication of its source. An occurrence always at the age of adolescence, and at no other time, would point to some connection with the physiological conditions of that period as its cause. There would then be possible an examination of the truth of that indication. Indications of an exterior will power, such as the description, if it always came in that form, of experiences like that of St. Paul or St. Augustine would be plain indications, which again would have to be examined, of origin in some supra-personal power. These are crude illustrations of the problems as to the existence of implications in the experience. An examination as to the presence of such implications is the first step in the consideration of the validity of the religious experience.

The second, and main question, in regard to validity is the question of the validity or truth of the indications. The chief danger here is that we shall regard this phase as including the whole question.

This it does not do. Unless the indications are so clear and full that they include every question that might be asked in regard to the experience and its source, agreement that the indications so far as they go are true does not carry us the whole way. What it does do is to give a firm basis on which to stand. In any case, even were the indications of source unmistakable, so that the examination of their correctness became a mere form, what would be known would simply be the relation of the experience to its source. Referring again to the illustration of the fever, the indication of the experience, even if it is clear enough to convince the sufferer that it is he and not the room that is hot, yet no deductions from that fact can be assumed. The physician may be at a loss to know what is the cause, or he may see in the indications or symptoms which the patient has told him evidences of further and more remote complications. Yet the question of the validity of the conclusion that the source is bodily and not perceptual is not involved in these further questions. The relation of the sensation of heat to the blood vessels is clear. In the same way, the present phase of our problem applies only to the first step, to the immediate implications of the experience, not to what may be deduced from them. Only when this step is clear can the next be taken without danger. The indications of the experience must be judged as to their truth in their primary significance. It is the disregard of this that has made theology, in the eyes of philosopher and scientist, seem to be walking on air, and erecting its building without first constructing a strong foundation on the earth. An assumption

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that because the religious experience or the assertions of religious men assert the presence in them of the power of God, so long as it remains an assumption and unexamined, does not warrant even the raising of the question as to the truth of God's presence in that man's life. The deduction is usually taken step by step from the idea of God to that of his revelation in man. It is just as necessary to take step by step the deduction from the analysis of the experience. The question at this point, therefore, is to be limited to the primary indications of the form of the religious experience as to its source. It is, as was said once before, almost reducible to the question as to the perceptual or physiological origin of the religious state. Is that experience the experience of perceiving something outside the body, or is it due to causes within the body, is the general form of the question. If there is an answer to this preliminary question, it must be obtained before we can go very far.

One important difference between the sensations which arise from causes within the body and those which are the results of the excitation of the sense end organs, is that the former are vaguer than the latter. Pain or pleasure may be definitely referred to the body, or even to some definite part of the body, and this localisation may be entirely correct yet nothing more be given in the pleasure or pain than this. If nothing more were given in ordinary perception than this vague localisation we should have little knowledge of the world beyond. Our sensations of sight, especially, are very definite in what they tell us in regard to the source to which

we refer them. Not merely what is the source, but what it is like, is given in the sensation. An inquiry into the validity of an experience, if that experience is a sensation or based on a sensation, must therefore ask not merely whether the source is correctly pointed out, but also whether what is said about it is true. As the question of origin of the sensation may be said to be the problem of psychology, so this present one is the problem of science, or if psychology is a science, the difference is between the psychological and the natural sciences. Even if the experience is not of the type of sensation, but is emotional, the same questions confront us. If the sight of some one man arouses in me anger, the feeling of anger is not merely referred to him as the exciting cause, but it is recognised that it is anger and not affection that he inspires. The question of the validity of the anger at the sight of this man is not merely whether the sight of him does arouse the angry feelings, but also whether there is sufficient reason in the sight of him to explain and justify the hostile feeling. The question of validity here takes, then, two forms: first, is there any indication as to what the source is like, and second, is the indication correct or true.

In applying this question to the religious experience we have to remember again that it is not the implication or statement itself that we have to consider, but the form of the experience and the possibility of the statement being correct. The religious experience is not ordinary perception, else it would not have a separate name and be studied as it is as a separate phenomenon. The first question therefore



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becomes, is it so different that no direct indication of the nature and qualities of the source is given. The answer of primitive religions to this, with their vivid and detailed descriptions of their gods, would seem to be that detailed knowledge is possible, while the theologians, from the time of the rise of scholasticism, certainly, have, in basing their description of God on abstract arguments, seemed to assume that the experience of God gives little or no direct knowledge of his nature. On the answer as to this possibility depends the form of theology. If there is a possibility of direct knowledge, much like that of ordinary perception, then theology becomes a science, and the religious experience is to be studied as or nearly as we study natural or psychological phenomena. To assume, however, that theology is a science akin to psychology is to assume the answer, not to prove it.

There is also the possibility that the form of the experience does not make possible any assurance as to its truth. The indications or seeming assertions may, though caused by events or objects outside the body, not be at all representative of the objects which gave rise to them. The thunder may impress upon the religious mind the sense of awe, and then the worshiper imagine that he experiences the presence of some awful or awe-inspiring being. We are too familiar with attacks of this kind made upon ordinary religious ideas to need any insistence on the necessity of meeting the issue. Yet we cannot say that modern theology has met it. Probably because it has not seen that this question of the possibility of direct information coming under the form of the religious experience is so fundamental, it has not

met the resulting problem of the possibility of the exciting cause being different from the report of it in the experience. This problem as to the perceptual or non-perceptual form of the religious experience is so central that it cannot be passed over. The approach, though, to a solution is not easy. Not only must we distinguish the assertions made by religious men from the ground on which they make them, but also in examining the form of their experience, we must hew out a path that will lead us clear of the ambush of modern philosophical warfare. As we are not constructing an all inclusive metaphysical system, the more we can avoid conflict the stronger and more useful the results of our work will be for any system that can use them. This means that we cannot start with idea of knowledge and ask how the subject-object relation applies to this relation of a worshiper to his God. We must start from the other side. In examining religion we have to trace the possibility of the conveyance through the religious consciousness of facts about the outside world, and reach some conclusion as to what kind of fact can be known in this consciousness.

The problem then takes the form of laying down the method of the test as to truth of those indications or revelations that are judged possible. We leave to one side the problem of fact. But as this would only be the question about a given experience, whether it is true or false, it does not concern a philosophy of religion. The inquiry into the details of the revelation made in the experience is the problem of a scientific theology. Such a science would test and judge the differing experiences and ask

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which is true, and what the resulting truth is. Before such a science can be accepted, however, we must ask whether it is possible. So it is not the scientific criteria that we seek here, but the broader problems which must give some result, even if but temporary, before a science can be logically established. On the result of this question as to method depends also the character of such a theology. If the indications of the experience are best studied by methods akin to those of psychology, our theology will be of one form, a form which has hardly yet been to any extent developed; while if the method must come nearer to that of the historical sciences, we have, only now accepting it with a clear understanding of its nature, something nearly like the method of traditional theology. In such a case the line is not over well marked between the science and the history of religion. There remains the third possibility, more largely present in primitive religions than elsewhere, that theology is much like the natural sciences. Here the god and the natural phenomena are to be studied by methods closely alike. Perhaps the application of the theory of evolution to religion marks the growth of such a system of theology. Each of these three tendencies is represented by conflicting claims to exclusive right over the field of religion, yet few of the schools of thought have made the preliminary inquiry. Not till we know the method, can we know what the science is to be. The religious experience must be studied to see what form the indication of the world beyond it takes.

In studying any experience, after we have reached some conclusion as to how the information about its

source is conveyed, we have still, before the inquiry has a firm basis, to ask whether these indications can be tested. It is the argument of the agnostic that confronts us. We must realise that it is just at this point, and in connection with the arguments for God's existence, and concerning the divine attributes, that the agnostic position presents its strongest front. The problem is not for us, however, the epistemological one, not the problem of knowledge, but that of scientific method. In examining the general concept of experience this comes out more clearly. While the question of knowledge centers around the conception and office of consciousness, and the subject's relation to the thing known, we are here at one with science in ignoring the conscious and subjective side as far as we can, and in putting the question in the objective form. That is, we are not asking what is the possibility of knowing God or man, but only what is the possibility of knowledge coming through the religious experience. The terms in which religious people often describe their experience present what is perhaps the strongest argument for the philosophical agnostic. When the experience of religion is conceived and explained as a miracle, the scientist tends to reject its claim along with those of all miracles. If God reveals himself always in sudden wonderful moments, whose genesis none can trace, a scientific test can not be worked out. The phenomena may be catalogued and studied as, for instance, the varieties of insanity are, but no more than is true of mental aberrations could they be used as a pathway to knowledge. There have been times when the miracle of God's appearance in

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a human soul has been judged almost to need no other argument than the suddenness of the conversion or realisation of his presence. To faith the source is clear, but unless that faith allows of the pathway over which it came being known, we cannot, to use the language of religion itself, know whether the experience is from God or the devil. The test of this has been sought outside of the experience itself. "By their fruits ye shall know them." To conclude that this must be so is to assume that the religious experience does not furnish a test by which we may judge of the accuracy of its revelations. To this conclusion, largely held though not always recognised, is due the depreciation in many quarters of undue devotion, especially among the "sane" men of all ages. The mystics have seldom been the leaders of the church. Yet if we are to gain knowledge through the religious experience, and not rest in a semi-Christian agnosticism, the issue must be squarely faced. We must inquire whether the experience can be tested by some sure method.

Whatever comes unexpectedly, must, if the scientist is to make use of it, be so related to what has gone before that it is seen to be the inevitable outcome of the preceding events. This is true of psychological, natural, and historical science equally, as far as ideal goes. The whole purpose of the parallelistic theories in psychology is to make possible some connection, if not between, at least involving, the successive parts of the stream of consciousness. The main effort of modern historical study is to work out the underlying movements in order to connect what seems at first to be unrelated

events. With the natural sciences this has been practically completely successful, each event or experience is so related to every other, that for science there remains no chance, no single element of the universe which is not at least claimed as acting under some general principle. Everything is related to everything else. When an experience presents itself, therefore, for scientific study, the effort is made to bring it under these general laws. If no law at present exists, a new one is formulated, but some general principle there must be. Every experience can be studied scientifically, that is not questioned, but not every experience can be brought under any one set of natural laws. Insanity is to-day being very largely the subject of scientific inquiry, but not in the same way that the normal brain is studied. One relates itself to changes in the brain centers, the latter, while it may be studied in its relation to the brain, has also relations to the objective material world. This is not the difference between historical or psychological and natural sciences, but is a difference in the way in which any one of these sciences would approach the given experience. In addition, therefore, to asking to what scientific method the scientific study of religion is to be akin, we have the harder question to answer of what point of view shall be used in any study of the experience. Knowledge will be attained, generally speaking, by any method, but the chief value and results are attained from any experience when it is taken at its highest possible value. The experience of the insane is exhausted when the causes for the difference from the normal are explained, but the normal ex-

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perience is used to its fullest extent only when the knowledge that comes in it is tested. A study of a dream is ended when the psychology of it is complete, while the real vision of man's waking hours is completely studied only when the things seen are examined. If agnosticism is to be overthrown in any science, it can only be by the working out of the full value of the experience.

In the case of the religious experience this becomes very important. If we take the valid or real experiences which form the basis of spiritualistic claims, orthodox religion rejects them,—though again the reason is not always recognised,—for this reason, that the inferences drawn from them are not justified. The experience is held not to reach to the revelation of such things as are asserted. No amount of argument as to special instances of seemingly otherwise unexplainable predictions or knowledge can shake this rejection. If we believe that the experience can not give the knowledge, then what may come, even if it turns out to be true, will not be called knowledge. Before we can ask what revelations from the realm of the dead are true, we have to ask whether the experience does not reach its full value without including this kind of knowledge. This is the scientific principle that the simplest theory that will explain the facts is the one to be adopted. Unless the experience is not sufficiently explained by the theory that denies validity to its assertions, we must reject its claims. The burden of proof against the agnostic, in the religious as in every other field, rests on the students of that science. In the case of the religious experience, we have to be sure that

studies such as are now frequent, from both the historical and the psychological side, do not exhaust the problems of this experience. If it does, then a theology such as has been based on it becomes impossible. If, however, we find that religion can be reduced neither to the resolution of interior crises within a man, nor to that and a combination of emotion and ethics, we will have to attack directly the question of knowledge. On the result of this will depend the course of our inquiry. If we should find that prediction, as our forefathers thought possible by inspired prophets, is a possibility, we should have to trace the method by which such foreknowledge could come to the individual. It is logically possible that we could trace it. If so, we could build up a critique of prophecy. If we should come to the conclusion that in the religious experience there is nothing to warrant foreknowledge, but that it does point to influences from beyond the life of the individual, and we find that we can trace the path of such influences into the consciousness of the believer, we should have a firm basis for our theology.

As in many fields, so probably in this, we shall find limits to our method. The knowledge that comes may very likely be only partial. In that case agnosticism is partially justified. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the logical outcome of agnosticism whether complete or partial. To take an illustration apart from our field, skepticism as to the possible knowledge of the other side of the moon does not deny the existence of that other side. It only points out the limits of truthful assertion. Study



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can go on, and the attempt be made, by indirect means, to reach some degree of probability. The logic of such cases will therefore yield a positive result for our critical method. Agnosticism applies to those cases where existence is possible, or suspected, or even proven, but where all else is uncertain. It is evident that the arguments for such bare existence are different from the scientific measure of direct perception. A physicist tests directly colors and sounds, but the atoms or the electromagnetic ether he can never see or touch. Their existence for him is the result of inference. Certain happenings are explainable only by the existence of something unseen and otherwise unknown. This unknown cause or basis has neither shape or size. It is purely conceptual. Avoiding the questions of the nature of conceptual reality, we may say that such ideas as to the atoms or irons are formal. All we know of them is the form under which their presence is made known to us, but we also have strong reason to believe that they are themselves different from that form. In such cases a partial agnosticism is the necessary scientific attitude. So long as the unknowable is the necessary result of implications in what is knowable and known, agnosticism only points out to us our method. Our problem becomes limited to the form of the unknowable reality. That this does not by any means stop our work is shown in the case of space and time, the greatest, perhaps, of these conceptual realities. Some explanation of spacial and temporal relations there must be, so in some sense we must conceive the existence of something to give the explanation. Yet in

themselves and apart from these relations which they help to explain, we can know nothing of space and time. This does not stop the development of the geometrical sciences, nor even their application to practical problems, even though they deal with a purely "formal" subject, one with no material content. If the result of our conclusion in any field be a complete or partial agnosticism, it may mean merely that we are dealing with one of these formal or conceptual forms of necessary existence.

This is not so remote from the ordinary position of orthodox theology as it at first seems. When the Trinity is spoken of as a mystery, and we are told not to question but to accept all on faith, it is on the ground that certainty can not be won by questioning. To the request to see God much the same reply must be made as to the request to be shown empty space. God is, for orthodox theology, to be known in his manifestations, especially in Jesus of Nazareth, just as space is to be seen in its manifestations as the space you and I and each part of the world occupies. We cannot say, though, that orthodox theology has held this position consistently. At the same time that it asserted the inadequacy of "natural religion" it made other assertions on the basis of "revealed religion" which it required men to accept as completely known and certain. This inconsistency we must carefully avoid. If the religious experience is found to yield valid conclusions only as to the conceptual truths about God, then the theological method must so use the conception of faith as not to include in it assertions of direct knowledge. This much becomes evident. So

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far as the limitation on the religious experience holds, theology is not a science but a philosophy, basing its assertions on deductions from experience, but unable to put them to the test of experiment. The result of the complete refusal of scientific method to theology is however not particularly pleasing to the modern theologian. It would shut him off from the whole field of direct contact with God, so far as the study of God is concerned. He could not appeal, for instance, to the presence in Jesus of the love of mankind, as a proof of the nature of God as love. If Jesus reveals God to men so that seeing him they see God, then that knowledge is direct, not a matter of inference. If no direct knowledge is possible, then not even from Jesus can that direct knowledge come. The love of God would have to be, if we completely distrust the religious consciousness, a deduction from the conceptual nature of God, not an induction from our direct knowledge of him. Orthodox theology, therefore, must face clearly this question, as to the extent of the limitation of religious knowledge. We cannot rightly at the same time limit and assert the existence of no limits. So far as there is a limit, direct knowledge is impossible, and God a result purely of conceptual and logical necessity.

In analysing any type of experience, we have next to go into more detail in regard to the source. This time it is not so much a question of the type of knowledge, as of the objective status of the source of the experience. To relate this experience to other experiences, we have to find out the relative place of the source of this to the sources or objects

of the rest of our conscious life. In the effort to place rightly our sensation of heat, physicists teach that the sources of heat and light are identical. The relation is purely in the objective world, but every point refers itself to the experience. So far as the cause does lie outside of the consciousness which experiences it, we must seek this source also outside. The connection of red and heat is not explained until it is referred outside the consciousness to a fire either seen or remembered. The importance of the experience for knowledge depends on this proper placing of its source. So long as heat and light are unconnected, knowledge of one gives no knowledge of the other, but the moment we connect the two, each increase of knowledge about heat gives us some new information, even though small, on the problems of light. In answering any such problem, we are concerned still with the experience, though not as an isolated bit of consciousness. We are still analysing, but now it is the relation between the varying sensations that is central in our thought. Account is taken of the rest of our conscious life. So long as the relation which is being studied is spacial and temporal, and nothing more, the source or relation in the objective world which is the origin of the related experiences will be found to be of the type of natural science. If the relation is purely temporal, it may prove to belong to psychology, while if it is connected with questions of past time, whether spacial or not, it will be history. This is the necessary result of the fact, that we are dealing with analysis of relations. The result of the analysis merely brings out what is already in the

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consciousness. We are dealing, therefore, in such a case, not with facts as we generally understand the word, but with scientific relations. The determination of the general place of a given experience in the whole field of life is a "normal" matter, in the sense in which we have been using the word. It does not affect the correctness of the analysis of the relation of light and heat if some one case of supposed light be found to be an hallucination. Once established, the relations within the field of experience are independent of whether special cases of them are found or not. What men mean by light and heat are related in the way physicists assert, and the deduction resting on scientific experimentation gives general information about the nature of the thing or process which causes or produces the sensations and the experience. It is to analysis of this type that we must turn for further information about any experience.

With the religious experience, such an analysis cannot be immediately undertaken. This results from the fact that we are really dealing with a whole group of related experiences rather than with one narrowly limited type. Within a narrowly limited group of relations, the place is to be found, of any one of them, by certain limited methods. Where we are dealing with sensations such as light and heat, their interrelation is to be studied by the method we know in physics. Where, however, the group itself is uncertain, the methods are equally uncertain. If we could say offhand with any assurance that the religious experience was of the psychological type, then the psychological methods would

be used, and only such results obtained as they permitted. If instead, it is an historical experience, only the result that historical methods allow would be reached. To the failure clearly to see this is due the jumble of methods that one often finds used in theology. As we are not making what might be called theological experiments, but only considering what those methods should be, the important problem before us is to define the issue, and find what kind of results the methods which can be used will bring. If we are limited to the microscope and the telescope, then the only God we shall be able to find will be one in material form. If we can use only psychological experiments, then our deity will inevitably be one related solely to the realm of consciousness. If our methods are those of ethics, then our God will be the source of morality. On the method depends the results.

While leaving the detailed study of possible methods for fuller consideration later, one general question stands so plainly at the outset that it should be indicated here. With an experience whose source is unknown to us, the first question is, is it real? By this is usually meant, is it the product of man's brain or does it represent and reflect and give us knowledge of something outside of man? This is not quite the same as the question we considered a while ago, as to whether there were in the experience any indications of its source. We are now asking whether, when the source is indicated as outside of the particular experience, it is also outside of the whole consciousness. This is also not the problem of idealism against realism. By either idealism or

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realism, there must be recognised the difference between dreams and real vision. Each is in consciousness, but while the former points only to a former experience, as does memory the latter points to relations outside the present field of consciousness, to what we ordinarily call the real world. It is a question of the independence of the source. Is it subject to the laws of the individual experience, or is it, partially at least, free from them? If free, the interrelations to be studied are those of the world outside the individual consciousness. If not free, the methods used must be those which are applicable within the individual life. This is true of any experience. Ethics is to-day fighting out the question of its method along this line. So far as it is a matter of individual choice, as with the Utilitarians, the methods used can give no other result than a dependence on the individual will. The moment we appeal to the history of the race, however, we allow the use of historical methods, and wider results are possible. It is the experience itself that must decide what methods are possible. As color-blindness can not be studied as are the atoms, so one experience can not be assumed to allow the use of methods fitted to another. The questions must be raised for each, what relations it has to things outside of the individual consciousness, and on the answer to this will depend largely the methods to be used.

With the religious experience, this is not so much the question between the material and the dream world, as between the limitations of humanity, and the more general relations of the universe. On a

first glance the religious experience is seen not to be of the type that natural science studies. It is more like ethics, and the science of morals. Limitation in a case like this means something different from what it does with sensations. If my sensation of sight does not bear the test of relation to the flower I think I see, but which is not there, I call it a memory or an hallucination, and no more need be said. When we deal with forces of more general character, such as influence the whole life of man, the consequences of limitation are more important. If the religious experience has no relation outside of individual human life, then the source is human, and the experience brings no new power into human life. It could then be described only as we describe the successful outcome of an inner struggle, purely human. Something like this it often seems to be. St. Paul and St. Augustine are familiar examples of this type of experience. If the incentive or impulse to such an experience came only from their individual life, or only from the individual life of some other man, and gives no indication of a source further back, then no theories as to God's nature or powers can be deduced from it, or if there are such deductions, it must be of a God limited to human capacity. This is the Comptean position, so far as it is consistent with itself. It is evident that we cannot go on and ask about the validity of the revelation of God to man, of a revelation of an outer realm, if in that inner experience there is no indication that it comes from any higher source than itself. This becomes very important for the relation of religion to ethics. If ethics has to deal, as modern ethics does deal,



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with such questions as the working out in man of the great natural laws of the survival of the fittest, it can have little concern with an experience which goes no deeper than limited human life. Unless the religious experience points also to a root in the great underlying universe, the connection of religion and ethics is very slight. Ethics, dealing with general laws, relations which include all existence, and a limited experience such as religion would then be, could have little in common in methods or results. The problem is therefore important, as to the indications in the religious experience as to the human or super-human nature of its origin.

The consequences of the other possible result to this particular problem need to be noted if we are to understand the place of our problem in current thought. If the source of any experience is outside the individual, the explanation of the experience involves other than individual phases of existence. If the source is also beyond what we may call human limitations, then the explanation must also go beyond. An explanation of physical life in terms of inorganic matter and energy, if it ever is satisfactorily done, will involve in its explanation all existence. Once pass the bounds of organic life, and we can stop only with those principles which are at the basis of both organic and inorganic. So an inorganic theory of organic life in order to explain the relations between the experiences of an organism and of "dead" matter involves the recourse to a world outside of organisms. This involves also the relation between the organism and the matter which composes it. The analysis of the total experience, and

the part which the limited experience under discussion has to the whole, therefore involves the assumption, or rather, proves the existence, of forces which are superhuman, or perhaps we might say, more fundamental than humanity. Proof of this sort is still "formal." It is not a deduction from assertions in the experience. The material principles to be used need not be clearly defined. It is only that some principles beyond what we call human life would be logically necessary.

If a result of this kind becomes necessary to explain the place of the religious experience in life, then the existence of some superhuman power becomes necessary for thought. This is the place, valid to this extent, of the arguments of a "natural" religion for God's existence. To a certain extent the conception of God has always been used to contain the unexplainable remnant from the constructive work of systematic philosophy. So far as there is such a remnant, instead of saying that recourse is to be had to a *deus ex machina*, we would rather say that the thinker has realised, even though but very imperfectly, that some recourse to powers or principles beyond man was necessary. If his system could not explain everything in human terms, then the criticism should be of that system, not of the logical conclusion that something unexplained must be referred to another source. We cannot, however, afford to fail to distinguish between the arguments from the religious experience itself and those from its place in life. The first concern the definite statements or intimations in the experience. These must be tested as science tests any statements. The second deal with re-

lations, and are to be judged as propositions about relations. It is therefore not a question of what any man's experience is, whether heathen or Christian, but what is the relation of that experience — whether Christian or heathen — to the man's other experiences. The difference between revealed and natural religion, if the terms apply here, is not the distinction between man's unaided discoveries about God and those things which God reveals about himself, but it is the difference between a study of definite experiences and assertions, and the study of the form of the experience. In this particular problem, of the existence of the superhuman, we have to do entirely with the form. However God may be known in the life, a study simply of the moments in which his presence is most strongly felt can not yield any conclusion as to the inclusion or exclusion of this experience from our ordinary life. We must examine the relation between the two classes of experience, and the moment we do so we are dealing with form, not content. This removes from the science of theology the whole question of the proofs of God's transcendence. Not, however, from theology as we know it today, for our modern theology is an inconsistent mixture of science and philosophy. The two must, for clearness, be sharply distinguished, and the arguments for the existence and presence in man of a superhuman power be kept strictly to questions of form and logical necessity. The relation of such a course to the problems of a living faith can not be rightly judged until our constructive work is complete. It needs only be said here, however, that in the problem of the experience, faith or conviction as

to the relation between itself and life must be taken carefully into account, and judged as valid or invalid. We are therefore not slighting faith in making this distinction. The religious experience must be carefully studied, if we are to regard the faith which it contains or expresses in a superhuman being as valid.

The next and final problem of the religious experience which we must define before we proceed is that of the relation of the religious experience to the will. In general our experiences may be divided into two types, the normative and the passive. Where the will is involved the will or desire seeks to control. Anger, for instance, can not be experienced without affecting the motor system. A man can not be passively angry. Any emotion, even one such as melancholy, is in this class, for they all either increase or diminish action. The motor element is present. The best example of the other type of experience is ordinary perception. While we are more or less active in perception, it is rather in order to prepare for the reception of an experience which we realise as coming from outside of ourselves than as being conscious or experiencing the motor forces at work. This is the vital difference. The motor side of our life is always active, but with the normative experiences we are conscious of its activity, while in perception and the passive experiences our attention is focused on the results of the activity. In the one case the experience points or gives knowledge of the activity, in the other of the inciting cause of the activity. This distinction, of course, means a large difference in an inquiry into the validity of the experience. If the function of the experience is centered around the

source, the questions we are asking must be as to the validity of the information which is given of the source. If the experience is involved mainly with the activity of the organism, then the main question, at least of validity, is that of yielding a valid knowledge of human motor activities, and also, in the ethical field, the problems of how efficiently the experience helps or hinders those activities. The experiences of the insane may yield true information of the state of the insane mind, give us valid knowledge of this, but still not be valid in the ethical sense as not allowing the normal activities of life full play. We have come upon another meaning of the word validity. We must raise the question, in considering any experience, as to what is really the meaning in the special case, is it the effect on the normal activity or on normal knowledge which is under examination?

In applying this problem to religion we reach the statement of what for the modern man is perhaps the most debated problem of religion. In these days we are willing to admit the presence in man of forces which are superhuman, but what we do not admit, except under compulsion, is the presence of a moral element outside of humanity. We conceive the basic forces of existence just as far as we can in non-moral terms. Any problem which connects itself with this issue is bound to be of interest. From the arguments of the past generation to prove God righteous in spite of natural catastrophes, to the present day questions of the moral element in economic conditions, the same general problem is present. In our study of the religious experience we do not need to

deal with this question in its wider aspects. Only as regards the relation of the religious experience to the will to do right must we be clear. Applying the distinction between normative and passive experiences, we have to classify the religious life under one of these heads. It is sometimes assumed in these days that the religious and the moral experiences are the same. The fact that in name they are distinct forces us to accept such an identification only after very careful scrutiny. The problem demands the examination of religion as to its effect on the will. The identification in some religions and in other ages of knowledge and goodness would lead us in paths contrary to the modern trend. If the religious experience is mainly passive, and is the revelation of knowledge, then it can not at the same time be mainly normative and powerful in directing the will. The old conception of revelation led to the definition of a type of experience which was preëminently passive, else it could not receive and transmit the revealed truths which God gave in and through it. If this was its function, then for the individual it had little directive force. It might have results eventually, but in itself it left him passive. Very different from this is the modern conception of religion as a power that makes for righteousness, a moral dynamic. If the older view was a necessary consequence of the belief in the revelation of abstract dogmas direct from God, the new is often an equally unthinking result of the reaction against such "revealed truths." The correctness of either view can be established only after a careful study of the experience with reference to this distinction of passive or normative.

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To understand the issue, it will help if we draw out some of the consequences of defining an experience by either of these terms. With the passive experiences, the source must be outside the individual. If the immediate excitation comes from the body, then the source behind that must be the one which is outside. We have to remember that in some of his bodily experiences man is passive. Perception itself is one of these. Heat and cold, pain, and many of the organic sensations are passive so far as the result on the will is concerned. On the other hand, pleasure and dislike, which are essentially motor, are often referred outside and placed in the pleasant object. The cause seems to be outside. Yet, after all, it is the effect of the pleasurable object on us which constitutes the pleasure, while with the perception of, for instance, the beating of our own heart, it is the fact of perceiving, and not the result of perceiving, which is focal. If we have thought that we had heart trouble, and are pleased to find our organ working regularly, then the experience changes. The change is due to the change in the function of the experience. In the latter case the experience calls attention to itself, in the former to something outside of itself. It is therefore not to the source being inside or outside of the body, but to its being contained or not contained in the experience, that the distinction arises. What we mean by the self is really the will. So long as the body is simply physical it is simply mechanical. Those things which affect only the body do not affect the self. This is well illustrated in certain cases of fear. Fear may be felt in the presence of harmless reptiles. The reason rejects the fear, and

if necessary may overcome it. In one sense the fear is motor, yet as long as it is instinctive it is really passive. The man is led to avoid the snake by a force of which he is not conscious. It is only when he makes the effort to go nearer, that is only when some other experience constrains him, that he becomes conscious of the instinctive repulsion. The motor activity before this was purely reflex or without consciousness except that it occurred. It was only when something else brought to him the consciousness of a will or desire to draw near the snake that the avoidance came to be seen and felt as opposing the approach. This is closely allied to the Pauline doctrine that except for the law there would be no sin. Except for the presence of a motor consciousness or normative experience action is not realised as the result of will or desire. We can not well say, on the other hand, that it is the conflict that brings the consciousness of desire. It may possibly be true that the first awaking of the consciousness of normative experiences is due to the strong shock of opposition, as the child finds its will thwarted by the will of those around it. However this may be, in after life the experience of the desire to serve some one in distress is clear as a desire or normative experience even without opposition. An experience which is not normative, even though it may affect action, does not affect the desires. It does not come into the sphere of man's interest. The fear in the presence of harmless snakes is of no interest except to be overcome. The sound of one's heart beating is of interest when connected with the desire to be or find one's self well, and not otherwise.



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It is not a question of how fundamental and necessary the experience may be to the physical life, but of how it may enter into the interests of human life. To say that an experience is mainly passive is therefore to say that it is not one that in itself is central in human life. The work of our internal organs becomes of interest only when they are out of order. The normal experience of them is not central in our life. To classify an experience as passive is therefore to classify it as outside the direct field of influence on human life. This is true of perception. It is not the sensations that are important, but our reason for attending to them. If religion is passive, it is the object, not the incentive, to desire. It may be studied, but it does not, if this be true, affect our life interests.

The consequences of this for religion would be, if proven, very great. If the religious experience is as some theologians and perhaps all of the Buddhist thinkers have taught, essentially passive, the inpouring into man of truths about God, then that experience does not itself enter vitally and immediately into man's life. According to their tendency on this point mystics have differed among themselves. So far as the experience is the abolition of desire, then the true self or self of ordinary life is lost. Orthodox Christian theology, in differing with the mystics on this point, yet keeping their idea of a passive experience, has not been consistent. Emotion would have no place in such an experience. If God is known only through the reason and through what the reason may deduce from a passive perception of God, then action can follow only because of the will to live

up to what is thus made known. This will, if it does not enter into the experience, and it can not if the individual desires are destroyed, can not be part of the experience or a direct result of it. This experience will be on a par with the logical experiences of the theologian. He may believe a God exists, but not will to serve him. So long as the religious experience is a revelation of the being and existence of God, and no more, the man, as the devils are said to, may still believe, but not will to serve. The experience will have no coercive force. If this is true, the appeal to the emotion and to the sense of the presence of God, in the effort to arouse men to their duty, becomes useless. The more use there was of religion, only more knowledge of God would result, not more will to obey him. This would put God on the same footing as the natural laws. We experience the laws of nature, and know that to live we must follow them, but those laws or this knowledge of their existence does not inspire a desire to act. Fire burns, but so long as it does not burn us our knowledge of a fire elsewhere does not rouse us to any action or desire. If we want to use the fire, or learn more about it, desire exists, but the experience is then not simply of the fire, but of our desire to cook, or for more knowledge. To make the religious experience entirely passive is thus to make whatever force and power there may be in religion something akin to natural forces, not entering into man's life, controlling man, yet not human because not arousing human desire and will. Whatever God there would be would be a blind force, indifferent to man.

The normative experiences touch directly the cen-

ter of human life. The experience of loyalty, which Royce stretches to include the whole religious experience, in its narrower manifestations can fill the whole of life. The patriot, whether a soldier or a statesman or reformer, can be so under the sway of the desire to serve his country that no obstacles will stop him. The desire to gain knowledge, which is not the experience of knowing, but the preliminary to it, may so fill and envelop a man that he gives his whole life to it. On lower planes the desire for social recognition, which is truly an experience, the realising of the want, and the conscious striving for social advancement, does affect for many every act of their lives. The personality is vitally changed by the entrance of the consciousness of any one of these needs into a man's life. These experiences affect us so closely that, once experienced, they become part of our nature. A man's nature may be defined in terms of the influences which mold his actions. The conscious striving for wealth is such an experience, a power within which seeks to control action. Any such influence must by its nature be personal. This is recognised in our modern use of the word "social will." Society, many would argue, is even more personal than the individual. It is super-individual, and, as such, more intensely human than the individual. As the source of many of these influences which make man what he is, this social will enters closely into every part of human life. For good or ill a man is a social creature, hence the social will is essentially, in its result and operation, closely connected with human life. In no true sense can it be said to be blind to the individual. Instead of acting

equally for man and matter it concerns itself directly with man, and exists in consciousness only as it succeeds in entering men. To these normative experiences, since they do seek to affect action, man can never be indifferent, as he is to the natural forces. To a power which seeks to rule him he must either yield or offer all the resistance of which he is capable. Another feature of these experiences is that they come without individual incentive. A man may see in life something unexplainable and seek a general principle to account for it, and so come to know and be conscious of some general law, but a normative experience does not make itself known except by influencing him; hence until it does touch him he can not know of it even enough to seek it. He may seek to learn something about it, as a physician may study some mental disease of which he himself can not be conscious so long as he is sane, but the experience itself can come to the student of a normative experience only when it influences him, only when he is subject to its sway. Out of the sphere of its influence he can not come to consciousness of it, and within its influence, once conscious of it, he must either accept or oppose it; he can not be indifferent. Hence the normative experience may be said to have a will of its own. It comes when it will, and not when we will. A man can not make himself patriotic, or create in himself the desire for artistic expression. The experience of that desire, so far as he is concerned, just comes. It is a law unto himself. In this sense any such experience is the experience of a personal power.

To conclude that the religious experience is to be

described in terms of the normative experience is to conclude that the source of the experience is a personal power. It is the result sought by theists. We must remember that this is independent of the results of our attempts at classification under other sets of terms. To classify God as personal, that is as the source of a conscious personal power in human life, is not to say that he either is or is not almighty. It only asserts that he is revealed as one who concerns himself with affecting human action. Examining, as we are, the form of the religious experience, such a conclusion would not involve the determination of what the influence on morality was. As we might say, it would not reveal what kind of a God we have. Only one thing would be certain, that God acted directly. Whatever might be the channel through which the influence came, church or sacraments or human society, in the experience which the believer has, he would feel immediately that power. Any revelation of what God is like, as far as definition of intellectual truths go, would not be given. When we see a nation tending unduly to seek expansion by force of arms, the knowledge in its formulated aspect is not given in our experience of hostility to their designs on us, but is the later result, in our quieter moments, of reflection on our experience. This is especially true if we are members of such a nation. The influence sways us; then later we reflect on its meaning. The knowledge that comes may well be true and valid, but it is not immediate. So if the religious experience is mainly normative, the truths about God, though based on the experience, are the product of constructive thought. Not the

dogmas, nor the formulas about God, but the very personality or nature of God would be given in the experience. Such an examination, which must precede any sure and firm confidence in the methods of theology has rarely been even thought of by theologians. In their arguments in behalf of God's personality they have at times attempted to use immediate revelation. Such revelation there is in a normative experience, an intimate revelation of what the personal influence which is in the man's life is, but any revelation of this kind must be of the type of the consciousness of God as love, or as a fearful being, of him as helping or opposing man's natural desires, or whether he influences toward or from asceticism. Such revelations would be made just as clearly, however, if the examination of the source, as we have pointed out in our earlier classifications, should show that the religious experience has no origin outside of the individual. In that case the revelation of personality goes for nothing. Or even if the source, that is God, is proven to be outside the individual, he may still be known in a passive experience as punishing certain acts of man, as natural law does, and yet not be a personal being. The fact of our conviction that if we do right he will help us no more proves that God cares for us than does the fact that if we keep on firm ground we will not fall proves that the earth is friendly. It is only if in the religious experience God is revealed to us as a power striving to bring men to do certain things that we can call him personal.

To examine the full validity of the conclusions of Christian theology we must ask whether the Christian

religious experience or the religious experience in its full meaning is exhausted in the experience or points to a source outside, whether it allows of the truth of its implications about such a source being tested, whether what it does give is objective detail, and whether the test can be completely applied to all that is implied. Besides this, we must examine the place of this experience in general experience, especially with reference to the question whether it goes beyond human limitations, and, finally, whether it affects the will or is a passive revelation of knowledge. This is an outline of the task belonging to a philosophy of religion. Far reaching in each result attained, it has an important place in philosophy. Not merely the application to religion of an already completed system, it is rather the pioneer toward such a system, examining one of man's experiences as all must be examined, independently, to give a valid metaphysical system. The philosophy of Religion is thus a distinct critique.

## LECTURE II

### RELIGION REAL AND UNIQUE

If we are to experience religion, it must be possible for religion to be in consciousness. It must be possible for us to be conscious of the contents of the experience. In very many cases there is no doubt in the believer's mind about his perception and knowledge of what he has experienced. In the visions of the Jewish prophets, so far as we can take the accounts as truly representing the personal experience of the prophets; in the accounts of the experience of St. Paul on the road to Damascus; in the story of the conversion of St. Augustine; and in our own day the many instances that might be brought to mind of strong belief in definite revelations, there can be no doubt of the existence of the religious consciousness. Into this category must be brought those cases of "divine call," where the assertion is made that God has given definite assurance or definite command about some detailed matter. It is not, however, merely those cases which can be adequately described in simple terms that show the religious experience often to be very definite. The mystic who asserts that the experience "passeth knowledge" or description is very certain about that experience. It is so definitely in his consciousness that he has no doubt that ordinary words and ideas do not ade-



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quately portray or define it. It is a very definite experience which makes him so certain about this. At those times when language seems so very insufficient that paradox becomes the only possible figure of speech, as frequently happens with St. Paul, it is the definiteness of the experience that makes the believer so sure that the seeming paradox, which at other times would be meaningless, is now the best statement of the fact.

To say that at times the experience is thus plainly in consciousness is not to conclude immediately that always the religious man is sure of what he experiences. It does, however, prove that religion can be experienced, and in very definite forms. Whether we should call those things which can not thus be in consciousness true religion is another question. Taking for the moment only the definite forms, we can here be sure that, whatever else they may be, there is such a thing as a definite religious experience. Such an experience may have very definite content. St. Paul spoke of his experience on the Damascus Road as the appearance of the risen Jesus, and as a proof of the Resurrection. Though it may be that not the whole of religion can be experienced, yet a part can enter into consciousness. It is this part which becomes our study. At this point we do no more than draw out the consequences of this experience so far as we find it to exist. So far as it comes into consciousness it opens to us the possibility of study. Even the mystic experience, since it asserts that ordinary language can not describe it, challenges us to try the impossible, and it must in turn meet our challenge to it to prove its assertion.

Being in experience in any of these ways, and becoming an object of study, at once it must yield its claim of exemption from criticism. If it were not in consciousness, we could not put it to the test, but being there, at least in those cases where definite assertions concerning it are made, we can test it. Even revealed truth, therefore, subjects itself to test. On the other hand, we have put religion in the world of reality. What kind of reality it may prove to have is a further question, but when it is an experience that can be tested it is no longer possible to put it aside as something imaginary.

However wide may be the variety of cases where definite assertions about the contents of the religious experience are possible, there are undoubtedly many cases where no such definiteness exists. For the "modern man," especially the man of our western civilisation, religion takes usually neither the mystical nor prophetic forms. Cases of the type of conversion which James has used in his "Varieties of Religious Experience" are rather rare and exceptional. Yet the modern religious man is by no means unconscious of his religion. We are inclined to call religious those great common impulses which, whether the same as the moral movements or not, are to-day more in the fore front of consciousness than perhaps ever before. Great movements there have always been, but we understand better where we are being led than did our forefathers. To take movements which are not clearly moral — the present efforts, widespread and growing, to convert the world to Christianity and to bring about Church unity, are each of them definite, and brought forward as the re-

sult of religious experience. Whether they should properly be called religion might be questioned, but so long as they are in consciousness religion is also. When a man is on fire, as we say, with missionary enthusiasm, his religion seems to most people to be very real. In his own mind at least, and this is the test, it is his religion which gave him the impulse. This is even clearer with the great moral reform movements where they are connected in consciousness with religion. The man gives his life to destroying injustice with the full conviction that it is his religion which is impelling him to do this. What he calls his consciousness of religion is his consciousness of this impulse. And because he is conscious of the impulse he is conscious of what he takes to be his religion. It is not a valid objection that the consciousness has no clear content. Neither has the consciousness of desire. We often long for we know not what, and we know that the desire is vague. There may be a very distinct consciousness of a very vague thing, and the experience be very definite just on this fact of vagueness. This type of religion, which is largely in men's minds to-day because it is in consciousness, is an experience, and because it is connected in its nature and in men's minds with religion it should be accepted as a type of the religious experience.

The definiteness here is not in the object, but in the direction of the impulse. The experience is of the active type. What that may mean and how far it can be shown to be true of all types of religion will be our last task. At this point we need only to note that this type can be studied and tested equally well

with the preceding. An impulse of this type is even more real than the command to St. Augustine if we are to judge by modern standards. To what is active we tend to give a higher place than to the passive. So to these conscious religious impulses, and so to religion we must assign a place in the real world.

There are instances of religion where neither does there seem to be any definite object nor any great impulse. In many of these cases, as in some of the preceding, we find that the religious feeling, or whatever it was, came at a definite time. A man may be distressed and torn by conflicting desires, and while thus in turmoil a sudden peace come upon him. Not always is this peace ascribed to God, but often it is, and spoken of as true evidence of God's peace in the soul. At some definite time, perhaps a moment or just as likely a day or even a week, the inconsistent and warring impulses are quieted, and discord ceases. This is not a case of impulse coming from the religious experience, for the incentives to action are here limited, not increased. The man looks back on that day or hour as the point at which the internal warfare of impulses ceased. He is sure that that time does mark a dividing point in his conscious life. He is conscious of the discord that preceded and of the peace that followed the coming of the religious experience. The contrast here is what marks his consciousness. There may be nothing additional in his life except just this realisation, that he is at peace. This is not to be put aside on the ground that it is negative, and that we can not call it conscious. When a man is conscious of a lack, that

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lack is in his mind. If religion at times is to him the absence of something, then that consciousness, though consciousness of something negative, is itself positive and real.

At other times religion comes under just the opposite form. With the awaking of what Christians call the sense of sin, there results an inner conflict. Where there had been self-complacency there now exists the realisation of this struggle, conflict between ideal and performance, and between one's own ideals and those of society or of God. In many cases the necessary effort of one who is seeking to convert another is to make that person conscious of his sins. This occurs often just as suddenly and just as definitely as does the cessation of struggle. The man may later come to feel that the struggle against sin was only a passing phase of the religious experience, yet still it was a true phase. The struggle portrayed in "Pilgrim's Progress" is proof enough that, for many, religion consists just in such a struggle. That struggle often can be dated in its beginning as accurately as any other event of life. This, as before, requires that the experience be in consciousness. That the struggle in each separate case takes a different form is no objection. It might even be that men grouped under the religious experience moments of quite different and irreconcilable character. Still our problem would not be solved until we found out what it is that such moments have in common. For our present purpose we are pointing out that however else different they may be, they all alike involve consciousness. We are dealing with conscious experiences. When we date a mental ex-

perience, we imply that we are conscious of it. Definite dates for the beginning of conversion, and of its ending or completion, prove that at times religion can be very definitely in consciousness.

To date an experience is to give it a very real place in existence. It is, however, not necessary always to know its exact date. If we can say that this month we realise our sin, and last month we did not, we date the experience, even though not to the exact moment. We assign it a place among the real and vital things of our life. As such it must be reckoned with. Even those who declare that religion is either ineffable or purely subjective can not pass by this consciousness of time. Whether or not religion reveals anything about the objective world of space outside of our bodies, so long as it has a place in the stream of time it is real. Being real, it is open to questions of the accuracy of the time element, but unless it has its definite place in the stream of time it could not be said to be in consciousness. In showing that at least in many cases it may be dated we have therefore made possible the assertion that it is a conscious experience, and so a real experience. )

There is still another large group of religious experiences which comes under none of the types we have mentioned. Where emotion enters largely into religion it comes to consciousness neither because of its definite assertions about something outside of itself, nor is it always to be grouped as a moral or religious impulse, and not always is there any clear consciousness of its date or place in time. Emotion has its own laws, and comes into consciousness for its own reasons. A man who is lifted up into the high-

est realm by great church music, or finds his devotion to religion strengthened by gorgeous ceremonial, as well as by the crude emotion of the back country revivalist, is conscious of something. It is true that not always does he recognise that it is emotion which is chief in his experience. Always, however, he knows that he is pleased with religion. The actions which follow from his experience are not always conscious, and very often he does not realise the direction in which his emotion is leading him. Yet the emotion itself is in consciousness. The controversy about the function of the organism in emotion has no place here. Whatever may be the relative priority of body or mind, what he is conscious of is the emotion. It is true that such experiences are not so clearly seen to be distinctively religious as those we have been discussing. Yet that too does not concern us. If religion should prove to be simply emotion, then what we find to be true of religion will still be true, though applicable also to emotion. Since emotions are in consciousness, so far as religion includes or unites with emotion, it too is in consciousness.

As we are not arguing that religion must be subsumed under any one of these heads, we do not need to make our classification exhaustive. All that we have done is to show that under the forms it usually takes religion is in consciousness, and hence is a conscious experience. Being an experience, it is subject to study. So we have a basis for the rest of our work. The differing types of consciousness show us that the kind of reality this gives to religion is either different from that of any one of these types or differs according to the type. An emotion is not

in consciousness in the same way or same sense that the perception of a tree is, nor do we know or study our impulses as we study the tree or the perception of the tree. There is the possibility that underneath these differing forms lies something which is common to them all, and that this constitutes religion. It is evident that we have not yet come to any definition of the experience which we are studying. To say that it is real and is a conscious experience is therefore not to define what type of reality it has. It has simply met the first test. We have a clearer idea of what we mean by the religious consciousness. When we said that men must mean something by the word religion we had to act on faith. Now we have certain experiences before us which include nearly all that men do mean by religion. They may include more than just the religious elements, but if we are to study religion we shall find it somewhere in these experiences.

As we look more carefully at the different types, we find each one constantly changing. While some revelations from God seem at times to be very distinct, yet often one which may be just the opposite is just as distinct. The multitude of gods is as great almost as the number of men. With savage tribes each clan has its own religious experience. They are consistent in assuming that this means that there exist various gods. In higher religions they are frequently able to distinguish which god it is which appears to them by the form of the appearance. This is still a difference in consciousness even in cases where we may suppose the form is influenced by what others have told of their experience. The stories of



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the god constantly change, and this points to a changing experience. The gods of one race are very different from those of another. Even where their functions have come to be similar their form remains distinct. What holds true of visual or other appearances of the gods is still more true in regard to their utterances. In all ages there have been false prophets, men whose experience of the god has not met the approval of the best religious tests. In the experience itself there is given no test by which these may be ruled out of religion. The reported wariness of the Delphic oracle is not more suggestive on this point than this disagreement as to what is revealed truth. Theologians have recognised this and sought outside of the experience their arguments to support their views. The fanaticism of the Mohammedan, which leads him to believe that God commands a holy war, must be equally included as religion with the passive resistance which the Quaker offers to being drafted for military service. It is equally a sense of divine command which leads the Indian fanatic to seek death under the wheels of Juggernaut and the English authorities to prevent it. The experiences of each must be included under the head of the religious experience. From these examples it is evident that the content of the religious experience is not constant. Forever varying, the revelations given through that experience can not define religion.

This varying content means that the religious experience is far different from the types of ordinary perception. Men see material objects slightly differently, but never, if they really see them, so differently that we can not identify the common object. When

words are spoken, though they may be heard slightly inaccurately, yet it is possible, if they were "really" heard, to find what the words were. A chance of agreement on the basis of the experience exists. When in theology the defenders of religion or of orthodoxy must defend their views, not by an appeal to Christian experience as direct evidence of the truth, but to analogy and deduction, it is evident that we are dealing with an experience whose own evidence is not sufficient proof. With perception there can be no evidence outside of itself. If a man tells us that he sees something, the only way of disproving his statement is for some one to assert that he sees in that place something else which is not the thing the first man sees. The test lies within the experience or at least within the type. With the varying forms of religious consciousness where those forms are most definite there is no such test. To tell the man who asserts that a god is speaking to him, that I see no god, makes no difference to him. Or if I tell him that the god spoke to me in a different way and with a different command, he may either doubt my experience, or he may, by referring it to another god or to a devil, give it equal validity with his. Even self-consistency does not seem necessary. The gods, especially those of primitive tribes, are often very willful in their commands. Yet we must include these experiences among the evidences of the religious life. To say that they are not the highest type of that life is only to erect a division within the field; it is not to exclude any experience as unreligious. This is evident with the passive experiences of the true mystics. Never are these experiences described

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twice alike, and the definite assertion is often made that they are not of the type of the perception of physical things. Words which describe material objects will not apply to this experience. We have come practically to this conclusion independently of the mystic. Whatever it may be, religion does not consist in the perception of definite objects.

In reviewing carefully the second type of religious experiences we see that the same indefiniteness or variability exists. Great common impulses such as the movements toward church unity or the missionary movement were taken as types. Yet for many people, especially at the time of the Reformation, religion consisted in the destruction of church unity, and for others to-day in the at least passive opposition to foreign missions in order to work at the social problems of our great cities. If we had taken other impulses, just as truly religious, but not so widespread, this would be more evident. For one man the religious impulse requires self-denial, while for another such denial is foolishness, not religion, and he teaches the satisfaction of every normal desire. Celibate or married, the religious leader is equally strongly convinced that religion impels him to do the thing he is doing. The religious element is recognised by St. Paul in his treatment of those who believed and those who did not believe in keeping the Mosaic law. Though the religious impulse led in just opposite directions, both were religious impulses. The conception and conviction that God is behind our present social order, and against lawlessness is met by the equally strong conviction that this order must be destroyed. Each in his determination is

partly at least religious, so far as the idea of divine sanction enters in. That neither will grant this to the other is no reason for our refusing to see the religious element in both. Whatever they may mean by God, they both assert that their experience of him is such that they are convinced that he wants and impels them to act as they are acting. The impulses are antagonistic, yet both are to be classed as religious.

If for any reason we take some one line of action as moral, and all that opposes it as immoral, it is evident that religion is neither. If it is right to attack the present economic order, then religion, which seems equally to sanction such attack and to condemn it, is not identical with morality. Again we may say that the test of morality is within the experience, and for religion outside of it. The religious leader, in defending one or the other conviction does not, at least not in these days, appeal to that conviction, but to moral arguments, or arguments from ethics or some conception of divine law or man's destiny. With the moral experience that test is within. Not attempting to define morality, we only need to point out that social morality is a test in itself. So far as a man is moral he shares the experience of his fellows. He can test his ideas of right by theirs. Again, the experience is one that can be communicated, or at least described in unambiguous terms. With religion, while the direction of the impulses may be evident, there is no such test. A man will not accept his neighbor's word that his religious impulse is not as fundamental as his neighbor's religion. The impulse itself he feels whether he al-

lows it to act or not, and argument or comparison does not destroy this first character. Again and again, when uniformity has been decreed in religion, has a great mass of men broken over the bounds. Dissent in England is a standing protest against applying coercive measures to the religious experience. It will not run for all in the same channel. Men will not accept another's experience as the guide and measure of theirs. It is clear, therefore, that religion and morality are not identical. One is social, allowing and seeking a test at the hands of society, the other rejects such a test, and goes its own way. Yet that way is itself constantly changing, for the individual as well as between individuals. A man may to-day believe religion to be impelling him in one direction, and to-morrow become convinced that it is impelling him in another. Religion cannot be defined in terms of direction.

We find this same negative result in the last of the types of religious experience which we examined. While very often the experience can be dated, this is by no means always true. While Protestantism seems often to assume that religion is to be aroused at some definite time, the Catholic churches, Roman and Anglican and Eastern, base their whole scheme of sacramental life on the opposing assumption that religion has no special time as its beginning, nor is it normally marked by crises which can be easily dated. In a certain sense it has a date if we have the experience now, but the dating does not come into consciousness unless something explicitly calls it here. For those for whom no such datable crises exist, the religious experience is as it has always been, and no

changes have been so sudden as to force a consciousness of date. Any experience which consists or may consist of a gradual development shares this feature. Life itself, the consciousness of physical existence, since we have always had it, can have no date in our life. The man who is always well is hardly conscious that he is alive. Where the consciousness of a given type permeates the whole stream of time it cannot be given a special place within that stream. The more natural and all pervading, therefore, that religion becomes in the individual life, the less can it be dated. The more gradual and inevitable the growth in the religious life, the less will it consciously assume definite dates.

This does not invalidate our former argument. In those cases where the consciousness of date does appear, religion thereby becomes, in some sense or other, real, but there may be equally clear cases of religion which do not thus win reality. What religion is in its essence remains therefore unanswered. It is, however, something that *may* be dated. At times it involves very plainly the consciousness of change. These particular experiences are in so far, then, experiences, that is, focal in consciousness. The other cases of which we have spoken are instances which usually come under one of the other heads. When a man has a religious experience, or, to avoid the word "experience," recognises that he has a religious nature, and that nature grows as any other part of him does, he is conscious either of the impulses that come from it, the habits in which the church and Christian society have trained him, or he thinks of the definite teachings of God and His work which

have been told him since before he could remember. Hence these cases get their recognition as real without the need of the consciousness of date. No one of these classifications, however, fits the whole of the religious phenomena in consciousness. It might be said that this means that there is not possible any one definition of religion, but that its reality is of many irreconcilable types; that in reality there are many religions. This is not a valid conclusion from our discussion. At any time any religious experience can be dated. Let it cease, or change abruptly, and the consciousness of that change takes its place in the stream of time. Or if it does not change, and the question of date is raised, we can always come to a consciousness, if that be the truth, that we have always been religious. It is true that in these cases it is some other interest which brings the consciousness of time, but when it is once brought, that becomes part of the religious consciousness. We have therefore not two types, mutually exclusive, of religious life, but only a varying degree of temporal consciousness. By union with this time consciousness religion may be proven to be real, but the union is not a vital part of religion. Religion is therefore not something of the type of the perception of time. We can not rightly define it as the perception of the incoming into man of God's grace. Such a definition would imply that there was in consciousness always a sense of a time when we did not have that grace, and then a sense of a time when we did have. Since this is not always true, the definition is not adequate. Religion does not depend on the sense of time.

In each of the cases we have examined we have found similar results. While often the religious experience is proven real by its definiteness in content, in direction, and in date, just as often it does not possess these characteristics. It is possible, even, that at times, as in some of the mystic trances, it possesses none of them. Since it can possess them, it is real, for if it was not real, it could not have this definiteness in consciousness. It can be focal, hence it is an experience, yet the definiteness may remain only a possibility. This possibility consists in its relation to other experiences. For no one, however much they assert that religion should fill the whole of life, does the consciousness of religion ever do this. By this consciousness we mean something distinct from the general consciousness of life. Man may be always religious, but he certainly is not always conscious of it. Therefore there are other things or experiences in our conscious life. The moment that these other experiences touch and mingle with the religious consciousness, it takes on the same reality they have. When a man seeks to make assertions about that experience, he is able not only to make the assertion definite, he can test its truth, at least for himself. If his assertion is that the religious consciousness is vague in definite commands, then that vagueness can be tested by him the next time he comes into this religious mood. Because it can be tested, it has a hold on reality. In the same way, we have seen that although it does not always involve a consciousness of time, yet it may always be dated, at least as existent now. In relation with these other experiences it appears equally real, for it takes them



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into itself. The possibility consists therefore in this relation of possible inclusion. It is always possible to give this reality to religion, therefore always possible, at least, to find it to be a true experience, which may be focal in consciousness.

To define it in these terms is to say that it is very different from perception. Perception is or it is not real. We either perceive or we do not perceive. At times that perception may be on the fringe of consciousness, but if we are not at least dimly conscious of it before, when our attention turns to it, then the perception comes for the first time. A perception is the consciousness of something, not the possibility of that consciousness. A sensation may be defined as the permanent possibility of perception, but perception itself, if unconscious, is non-existent. There is nothing left to it, if we take away consciousness. Nothing mental remains, only organic movements and states of which the mind knows nothing. With religion we have found this to be reversed. While it may have the reality that perception has, such reality is not necessary to it. There remains something to our conception of religion even when we take away all that there is in our idea of perception. Whether perception of things, of truths, of moral movements, or of time, religion is something more than any one of these, or all of these put together. It satisfies our test as to consciousness, for it may be in consciousness, but it does more than this. Hence it is very distinctly different from perception.

Around the second part of our definition of experience centers more important, because more disputed, questions than around the part we have considered.

We here approach the first of the controversies which yield or deny to religion some form of objectivity. In the case before us, it is rather simply the question of control by man. If not controllable at all, it can hardly be called a normal human experience, as we have defined experience. We have, therefore, to ask how far it is, and how far it is not, controllable by man.

The existence of religious phenomena few or none dispute. A classification in broad terms makes practicable studies from various points of view upon this data. Not so many, however, have gone into the question of the reality of the experience as a distinct experience, having a place of its own in reality. As a contribution toward this, an analytic study of the religious consciousness is necessary. Such a study is that which follows.

The first question which arises is that of the relation of religion to the will. Can man control it? As a preliminary answer, man can control religion to the extent of being able to seek or not to seek it. Religious influences, as they lie about us from infancy, are not here in question, for these influences do not constitute our experience of religion. When a boy grows up, it only too frequently happens that he deliberately rejects and turns from those influences, and ceases to have the experiences that he would if he remained true to the teaching of his childhood. He can shut those influences out of his life. By the influence of the companions whose company he seeks, a new set of influences and experiences take the place of the old. On the other side, a man brought up with one type of Christian teaching, and

knowing religion through some one type of religious experience, may deliberately, because of some feeling of inadequacy or unrest, seek a fuller or different experience. He may not have clearly in mind just what it is he seeks, and he may never find rest, but he will by his own will change his religious experience. All these cases are cases where the experience is known in some form to the man who seeks to change it. The question might be raised whether a man who knew nothing of the experience, except by hearsay, could by seeking find it. The teaching that no man by searching can find out God seems to deny this. Whatever the correct exegesis of that text may be, we have to bear in mind that we are not at this point saying that in the religious experience man does find out God. That problem will trouble us enough when we are ready for it. Now we are asking the question without regard to its consequences, seeking only the correct answer, whatever it may be. Yet seeing its possible importance, we must consider it. As far as we can define terms, a man can deliberately seek and find this experience. To one who has seen the devotion, especially in public worship, of some loyal church member, or has seen some evidence of loyal service to man which seems to come from the religious experience of the one under observation, then it is possible for the observer, wishing to induce in himself the same spirit of worship or of service, to seek and to put himself under influences that will bring to him the same experience. It is as possible as the effort, which may be crowned with success, of an admirer of art to attain some appreciation of true artistic spirit.

Consequently, man can, by effort, at least partly change and control his religious experience.

The consequences of this may be stated in the form that man can induce the religious experience, or can bring about a new form of the experience as he wishes. In so far he can create the experience. It is not something that will hide from him, and come to light only of its own accord. Not all religion, therefore, is of the type of sudden conversion, or what a surface reading of the New Testament seems to give as St. Paul's experience. Religion takes normally and as a possibility its place among the other experiences of life, whose lack we can correct by seeing the experience. As we can seek to gain the experience of heat or cold, so we can seek religion. To this extent it is like ordinary perception.

The case to which we referred, of a boy turning from home influences and with that, from religion, might really fall under our next heading. As man can change, so he can reject religion. Yet as this problem is so much wider than this particular instance, it will be well not to dwell on this one case. The real point at issue is whether religion is so all-powerful that whether a man will or no he must submit to it. It is to be conceded that he may not act according to its impulses, and yet he may have the experience. The boy leaving home can not take out of his life that home experience, even though he prevent any return of it in the future. If the conception of the religious experience is that of the incoming into man of God's all powerful grace, which a man may disobey, but which he can not reject as an experience,

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then he is not free to reject it. A man may shut his eyes and refuse to see, and be able under ordinary conditions to refuse to look at the scene before him. If he cannot do this in religion, then religion is a different sort of experience. We must remember that it is not necessary to claim that when once the experience is upon a man, that then he can not avoid it. When a man's eyes are open, very frequently he cannot help seeing. Yet if his attention is distracted, and he is thinking of something else, he may not perceive the scene before him in any conscious way. It would seem that at times, at least, religion is like this. While if a man lets himself go, his religious consciousness may become more acute, whether emotionally or intellectually, he may ordinarily, by turning the current of his thoughts in other directions, prevent the coming into consciousness of this experience. In a crowd a man may remain impervious to the mob spirit if his interests are centered elsewhere, while if he lets himself be swayed by the mob, he may go the full distance of approval of their acts, and share in their experiences. Such is the case with religion. The spirit which a man brings to worship, all devotional writers recognise, is crucial for the experience of worship. If he comes in a prayerful spirit, the full experience may come to him, but if he is distraught, the words of the familiar prayers fall meaningless on his ears. So by rejecting the religious experience we mean that its entrance into consciousness is dependent on what is already there. The man may, by allowing other interests to precede, shut out religion.

Religion is therefore not always so compelling that it can force its way into consciousness against a

man's will. Whatever bearing the doctrine of election may have on this point, if it means that God forces those whom he elects to salvation to have sense of assurance of his presence, we must question it closely. It may not mean this, but if it does, the doctrine must be changed to allow for the rejection by man of the religious experience. The arguments on which predestination is based start from the idea of God. Since we are trying to arrive at the idea of God as he may prove to make himself known in experience, our discussion must take logical precedence, and if we are wrong we must be met on our own ground. If we find, as we have, evidence that man may refuse and succeed in the refusal, by staying away from religious influences, or by opposing other interests, then any doctrine of God's nature must be made to explain this. It can not succeed by dogmatically denying facts. If God is made known to man in an experience which man may reject, then we can not define the religious experience as always prevailing. There is this to be said, though, that we are not seeking to prove that man may always be able to reject religion. Just as there are times when a man may not refuse to see what is before him, under the impulse of surprise, perhaps, so there may be moments when, taken by surprise, a great wave of religious consciousness may sweep over him before he can make the attempt to shut it out. Still this does not make religion any different from vision. Again, religion takes its place in this regard among normal experiences.

As man can by seeking find religion, and as he can reject it when it comes to him unsought, so when he

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is conscious of religion he is able to modify it. Even St. Paul, whose experience we have been taking as a type of the irresistible religious experience, tells us that he was not disobedient to the heavenly vision. (Acts 26: 19.) He also tells us that the expression of the religious state, such as "speaking with tongues" should be controlled. (I Cor. 14.) This is not merely a matter of the expression of religion. Just as religion may be shut out if what is already in consciousness holds the attention too strongly, so it can be obscured in consciousness by other ideas and experiences. As a man grows older those things which enshrined for him religion come either to mean more to him, or else gradually lose their meaning. The tendency, which many have pointed out, for conversion to occur near or at the age of adolescence shows the very considerable influence of a man's nature and surroundings upon his religious experience. That it may also be modified by direct effort of the will is true in at least some cases. A man who deliberately makes the effort by prayer to increase and build up in himself a sense of God's presence, is changing his consciousness of religion. Whatever truth there may be in the emphasis on sacraments and outward forms made by the great mass of Christendom rests on this possibility. The church teaching insists that through the outward form man can change the inner experience. Men set apart one day out of seven in the belief that only by forming deliberate habits can one continue, ordinarily, in touch with divine forces. Only so will most men continue to have any consciousness of religion that is at all definite. Man

may, therefore, if he will, modify his consciousness of religion.

The results of this possibility of modification are to differentiate religion somewhat from perception. What a man sees he sees, and while he can be indifferent to some details, he can not really change those details. Blue remains blue, if he sees it at all, or if it changes, the change is not due to his willing it. It is evident that we are dealing with something more like insight, or artistic perception. As a man may increase his ability to perceive beauty, so he may, we have found, increase his consciousness of religion. This results in the conclusion that religion is more a matter of internal mental life, and perhaps has to do, as art does, with values, rather than with material objects. It at least opens the way to this result. It does not prove that such a result shuts out the possibility that in the religious experience it may be some new type of objects that are perceived. The importance of the possibility of modification lies rather in the question of the relation to the will. We are plainly dealing with something that is man's own experience, over which he exercises some control. It is not an entirely passive experience which comes to him like a dream, going its own way independently of his will, but something which claims from him the necessity of exercising on it his will power. It thus comes into the real world of action. Not merely real because it is in consciousness, it is also real because man may make it the object of desire. In this it does not stand alone among human experiences. As a man may desire and work to gain a conscious-



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ness of history or science, so he may desire and work to gain a consciousness of religion. We are dealing with an experience which is vital, which seems to many among men something to be striven for with all their strength. The anchorite in the desert felt religion to be very real when he gave up all for it. Not only, then, do we find it really in consciousness, we also find it known and real in so far that men consciously seek to bring it to fuller focus in their lives.

These three points that we made are arguments only for the possibility for control by man's will. In many cases we find religion proving itself above such control. In human life religion came so early both for the race and the individual that we are not conscious of any will to receive or reject it. It is a part of our life. This is very often true also of those sudden crises which to many are the main examples to be studied. Whatever may have been the underlying train of events when St. Paul was struck blind on the Damascus road, it came to him as a totally unexpected experience. The same is true of St. Augustine, and many who could be mentioned. Every conversion, even if it has been long desired, comes with this shock of surprise. Frequently also, on the emotional side, there arises in man's mind during worship a type of consciousness of which he has had no forewarning, and which often it is difficult to keep under control, much less to put out of his mind. The revival spirit sweeps one away sometimes even when the sober will is somewhat opposed. The quieter influences of religion, too, affect a man without his effort. The solemn service often at the most unexpected times brings to the worshiper a greater

depth of feeling than he has known before. Also, at times, when he seeks that feeling, he can not find it. All other things may seem as usual, yet the experience does not come. Whether it be sin, or lack of faith does not matter, man can not always, by simply willing it, get religion. In both ways, therefore, in coming without man's will, and at times in eluding that will, religion proves itself above complete control by man.

So far this gives to religion the right by the second of our tests to be called an experience. It is not simply a creature of man's will. This also differentiates religion from morality. Morality concerns entirely man's will to act. If it came upon him without his will, his action would not be free, and so, not moral. But religion, in coming or staying independently of man, is shown to be different. It is therefore not dealing with values as morality deals with them. This point is of importance because it leaves open the question of the origin of the experience. If it were a product of man's own will, then it could not possibly reveal objects beyond man. As it is not, in its origin, man's creation, we may find that it does come from a source outside of man. It may be more like perception than fantasy.

A man may reject religion, but reckon with it he must. In rejecting it he must recognise it as a force which he can keep out of his life, but not one which he can destroy by the mere fiat of his will. The methods by which he succeeds in thus barring it show this. When he turns from religious associations, and avoids church going, or refuses to go to the church where the experience which he shuns holds

sway, he recognises the impulse to the experience as something exterior to himself. When he shuts it out of his life by centering his attention and energy on other and conflicting things, he does not control it as he does his desires, but as he does the view of a scene he does not wish to see. He erects barriers against it, so that it can not enter. There are times when a man deliberately stifles any appearance of religion within him by sheer force of will. He forces his attention away from it, and sees that no expression of its presence goes forth into action. Yet even here, the most that can be said for will power is that it called forth something which requires the utmost power to destroy. Man may, at times, if the experience is not strong, turn from it as he does from a dream. This proves only that religion may not always be a real experience, that it shades over into something else. Yet we have to notice that even here we use the expression, "he turns from religion." What he does, in our ordinary idea, is to refuse to give religion a place. It is not that he refuses to create it. He may turn from it as from a dream, but we do not usually think of him as putting it aside as he does a possible action. A dream is in some sense, as not completely controllable by man, an experience. So our analogy has not hurt the claim of religion to be an experience. There is still the possibility that it is more like a waking dream, called forth or not as man wills. This may be true in some cases, and rejection not involve giving to religion any other reality than that of a rejected possibility. This does not, however, affect those other cases where its rejection implies that it is something to be strug-

gled against, if it is to be destroyed. It is possible that religion may not always be what we have described as an experience. But those cases where it is not, where it remains a rejected possibility, are not cases of the presence of religion but of its absence. Where we have religion, frequently even in rejecting it, a man finds it to be real, and that it makes its effect on him despite his will. When a man who has fought against all "tenderness," and sought to immerse himself in the struggle for self-betterment, finds that sometimes, in spite of his growing coldness, he is tempted to do some act of kindness, when he realises, as Dickens' Christmas story portrays, that he has not conquered, he knows that in rejecting religion he has not destroyed it. In spite of him it has proved its claim to existence.

Because it can not be blotted from existence by the mere arbitrary will of a man, religion may at times, even if not always, be a real experience. It is real in the sense of exerting, whether passively or actively does not matter here, some force in opposition to being willed out of existence. This does not mean that it is necessarily of the type of the will, nor does it prove at once that it is identical with the social will. For perception gives cases where, especially if they are painful, we find an experience persisting in spite of all attempts to ignore it. As this quality of opposition to control is a characteristic of any real experience, we have not proved more than that religion is such, by showing that at times it resists the individual will. Again, it does not necessarily imply that we are dealing with a power in man alien to his nature, and therefore of divine origin. All that we

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have done is to find the way still open to discover the source of the experience.

The last of the three points which we examined in regard to the power of the individual over his religious experience was that of the ability of the believer to modify his experience. We need not discuss the fact that not always can he so modify it. That is really included in our conclusion that he can not always reject it. If he can not always reject it, then there are limits to his power of modifying it. The more important thing is to realise that religion can modify the rest of life, or change the will itself. Of this we need little proof. The story of the life of John Bunyan, to take a classic instance, illustrates the great power of religion to change the whole course of life. The Inasmuch mission in Philadelphia, founded to help men who have fallen into evil so far that only despair remains, by men who have themselves been in that state, and who attribute the change to religion, is a modern instance. Again and again, though by no means always, has conversion, the coming into man of religion for what he regards as the first time, meant a turning point in his life. To say that while the change is attributed to religion, yet it was really due to something else, is not a valid objection. What is in consciousness is that the religious state and the change are related as cause and effect. It might be shown that the religious state was only itself the result of a third something which produced the change. This is to go behind the experience in a way which we have not as yet attempted. As we are not attempting to say how the experience has its effect, one theory here is as useful as another,

and no theory of how it works takes away the fact that some change is effected in connection with the religious experience. Religion has taken this definite place in the real world. The consciousness of religion is a consciousness of something that is able to affect and change man's life. It can exercise power over him as well as he over it.

This gives us the complete result necessary to asserting that the religious experience is a real experience. As the experience of pleasure or pain from the perception of some object can affect us, so can religion. It therefore takes its place alongside of perception as a mode of experience. It can be focal in consciousness, and by its power to change consciousness can claim that focus for itself, often suddenly, as in conversion, sometimes in the quiet power of religious habit. It is an experience that can affect and hold its place in consciousness. Yet in all this it remains possible to man to control it. It is his experience. It is therefore real by any test that we can apply. Real because it is in consciousness, as a possible object to man's will, as bringing power to bear on man, and, in the combination of these qualities, being as truly an experience as any experience of life. Religion therefore is real. It is not the idle creation of man, nor the by-product of some powerless unimportant nook, to be disregarded as of little moment. Experience itself, since this is also truly an experience, can not be adequately described without reference to this. Religion must be explained before we can rest satisfied with our understanding of life or reality.

In thus giving religion a place in the real world, we

have also made possible a definition of that place. We find that at times the consciousness of religion can be very definite, that it has often definite direction in that it moves men to definite things, and that it very frequently can be dated; also, that it has very often very distinct emotional color. Yet we also find that at other times what we call equally exactly "the consciousness of religion" is indefinite as to its object, has no one direction to the resulting impulse, or works out in conflicting directions, that with great bodies of men the time element does not enter into the experience, and that the emotional tone is variable, sometimes religion being passive, and sometimes active. It has however further become evident that, while some of the categories which apply to perception apply here also, many do not. The chief difference is found in the fact that definiteness does not seem to be a characteristic of religion. From a survey of the field no clew is given us by which we may be entitled to conclude that the indefinite forms are less typical. As far as ordinary presumption goes, it is equally the indefinite, especially some of the mystical experiences, which give us the typical forms. Perception must be definite in all its clearer forms. Man strives, if his perception is indistinct, to obtain clearer and more certain knowledge. If we see indistinctly, we approach nearer to the object, or consult an eye specialist. With religion, not only is such an attempt not usually made, but we have from many the idea that to make it distinct would destroy the religious element. Such would seem to be valid interpretation of the Buddhist doctrine of the abolition of desire. This applies, it is to be noted, not

only to definiteness as to the content perceived more or less passively, but also to the emotional content. It is therefore evident that if we are to do justice to religion in all its forms we can not define it as we would perception. Definiteness cannot enter as a term in our description. Religion therefore stands apart not only from perception, but from the moral forces, and also from emotion. It may be connected with any or all of these, but not necessarily so, so far as our study has thus far shown. We have to be careful, therefore, as we go on, that we do not carry over into our study of religion ideas and presuppositions based on our conception of any of these other kinds of experience. Religion must be judged by itself, for it is unlike the other ordinary type of consciousness.

Our discussion has had to do with the relation of religion to man's will. Again we found a great indefiniteness. At times found when sought, rejected at man's pleasure, and modified by him as he willed, within certain limits; in other and no less typical cases, it came without being sought, or when sought did not come, it came even when the man sought to exclude it, and it resisted change by man's will, but instead changed him according to its own working. Again it does not fall under the usual categories, as it refused to be found within the limits set perception, morality, and emotion. In coming to this conclusion, in view of the fact that it has a certain independence over against man's will, it was difficult not to use language that would imply that in the religious experience we have to deal with another will. As we were careful to point out, the bare fact of a



certain independence of the will was common to any real experience. Yet such experiences also point, usually, to some source outside of the individual will. What a man perceives is either his will, or something that is not his will. Religion is very evidently, since it resists his will, not identical with it. It therefore takes its place in the other class of experiences. Its likeness to perception differentiates it from the products purely of men's desires. In passing, it might be interesting to note that this would seem to discourage attempts to get men to desire religion, and the description of heaven, etc., in terms to awaken desire. So far as the desire is met by religion, and no more, religion is not religion. It is not what we have found people to mean by the term. It is an experience which opens to man a realm which he can not completely control. Since, however, it is not a perception of that realm, for it is not in its nature the same as perception, we can take it as an ordinary way of gaining knowledge about a new field. We can not go to religion as we would to our sense of hearing, or our knowledge of emotion to learn of this new region of life. We have to go in another direction. It is this difference not likeness to perception, that makes our present inquiry into the form of the experience necessary. The primary object of a study of any experience must be to gain more knowledge of that experience. The fact that on the very threshold we are balked by the seeming inconsistencies of religion forces us to avoid the direct attack. Before we can adequately describe this experience, much less answer any question as to its value, we have to further examine it in order to find in what its possible value

may consist. We have to gain fuller knowledge of the experience. Our result so far has had this value, that it has given to religion a place in real experience, and has raised problems beyond what might at first appear.

### LECTURE III

#### THE SOURCE OF RELIGION

Having given religion a place in reality, the inevitable question faces us as to its meaning and significance. This is preliminary to the question of validity. Before we can examine the truth of its implications and the value of its revelations of reality, we have to ask how far those indications go. The query comes to us first as to the source of this experience. If it is an experience, we tend immediately to assume that it must be an experience of something. Our next task is to search and see whether there appears to be anything beyond, which can be experienced, or whether in this also religion is unique, that, while satisfying the rest of the definition of an experience, it does not justify the phrase "the object of experience." This can not be assumed one way or the other, but must be carefully studied. Our first impression is that the negative position is nearer the truth. An experience which is infinitely variable in its form, which will not submit to any definition in terms of contents, would not seem to have any object or fixed content. Where, with perception, we look for the object, we find it in a general agreement both between experiences of our own which differ in time, but agree more or less in content, and between the experiences of different people. The physical object given or experienced in perception

is or can be described as the focus of agreement of a certain group of experiences. No such focus appears in religion. If it exists, it is so hidden that it has as yet eluded the most industrious search. The most that we can say for the god in whom we believe is that we are convinced that he is the one revealed in what is the highest type of religion. We do not attempt to claim that the great mass or even the majority of religious people feel and know him as the same being. Instead, we assert that wisdom rests with a minority, that the individual is as likely to be right as the crowd. Even where this individualism is losing sway, we have, instead of the idea that the individual experience will of itself approach the norm, the idea that it needs direction by some authority, educational or ecclesiastical. As no focus appears to help us in defining the perception of the source of the experience, so none is seen to indicate its direction. If the source were not similar to an object but to a center of energy, then the focus would be in terms of direction, either carried backward into the past, or directed forward toward some one future end. Neither seems to exist. Religion tends neither toward some one goal, nor does it seem due to one existing cause. Hence here also, no indication of source appears. Yet we can not at once seek refuge in the negative conclusion as proven. Rather we must seek a guide and look more carefully.

The negative conclusion as to source came from the attempt to apply the usual tests to this experience. With an unique experience, however, we should be ready to expect that either an unique source will be

found, or that the exciting cause will reveal itself in an unique way. As we have already plainly seen, religion is not like perception or morality. The methods, which with those experiences give valid conclusions as to the source or object or cause, would not be expected to yield valid conclusions for religion. To give valid results, there must be shown to be a nucleus of some kind. It is possible that what we call religion is not the product of one source or object, but of several, which differ among themselves. In such a case the justification for a common name would be that the differing sources made known their presence in somewhat the same way. All perception is not the perception of the same object, but because the different objects come into consciousness in similar ways, we put the various modes of perception under one head. If this is true of religion, the diversity of content may be due to the difference in source. The fact that no one focus appears would therefore be no argument that there was no source or existence revealed in the experience, but only that different objects or sources were revealed at different times. Then there is the other possibility, that there may be a common source or object, (I use the two words in order not to assume anything as to the character of the source), a common cause which reveals itself in different ways. The diversity is then due to the mode, and not to the cause. With this uncertainty, we have to forsake the beaten trails. It is to the failure to do this that a great deal of the unprogressiveness of certain periods in theology is due. The god who is revealed in religion, since uniformity of content does not exist, must be sought

by an unique method. As we do not know even to what the diversity is due, whether of modes or objects, we must look elsewhere than to foci of experience to guide us to the source of the religious experience.

There is one other possibility, which might be put under the head of the one source manifesting itself in different ways, but which deserves separate treatment. The one source may be perfectly consistent in its actions, and the appearance of differences be due to our reflection on the experience. The pure experience may be different from our account of it. What we have been calling the contents of the experience, which differ so from one another, would then not really belong to the experience, and we should have to seek further to find the experience, and even further to discover its source. With this possibility, in addition to the others, we must go to the bottom of the experience, and seek any indication that appears to point to a focus. If we can find it, it will lead us out, so that we will not need to take up in detail the three possibilities which we have been outlining. The truth is, that our first preference for the negative or agnostic conclusion as to the possibility of revelation in the religious experience was due to the fact that our analysis has not yet gone deep enough. We have yet to find the first indication of anything in common in the various types of the experience. Nothing that we have as yet found justifies even the ascription of these various types to a common class. It is in the possession of a common source, in type if not numerically, that we must look for this.

The most convenient way to find whatever common element there is in the varying types of religion is to take those things in which the types differ, and try to find if even in these differences there may not be something which is constant. The first respect in which the religious experiences differ among themselves is that of content. We found that there may be felt religious states which seem to have almost no content, and also those of very sharply contrasted and, if taken at their full value, irreconcilable, character. These two classes, the definite and the indefinite, have to be considered apart. We take up, first, therefore, the case where there seems to be no definiteness to the experience, as far as its content is concerned.

Since the experience is in these cases indefinite, the accounts which the believers give are even more various than is true of the more sharply contrasted cases. St. Paul many times uses paradox to describe his experience, and once tells us that no description can be given. (II Cor. 12:4.) Yet even here, he too, or the one he is describing, is spoken of as caught up into the third heaven. Even though he is not quite sure whether this is outside the body, he is constrained to mention it as outside of man's normal mental life. In some way or other it is exterior to man, and objective to his will and consciousness. The experience points beyond itself. It implicitly claims to reveal things which are not to be spoken of, things which do not enter sufficiently into the ordinary life of the self-conscious will and ordinary perception to be rightfully classed under the same terms. The one who has the experience is by

it led beyond what he would call his usual self. Another realm is opened to him. That to many to-day this is easily disposed of by calling it the region of the sub-conscious, of the subliminal self, is no valid objection. Whatever is subconscious is not in any conscious experience, and if religion has its roots in the subconscious, it has a foundation outside of conscious life, which means, since it is a conscious state, outside of itself. In the "*Theologica Germanica*" (ch. viii.) this mystic state is called "a glance into eternity." The mystics seem to alternate between the description of it as an insight into the eternal and as the coming of the light of God, or of the eternity of God, into the life of man. Always, with the insistence on passivity, they claim this state as one that leads beyond the individual. Man lets himself be lost in God. The passivity of the Buddhist when he attains Nirvana is indignantly distinguished from annihilation. It is the realm of pure being to which he has penetrated. It does not matter that he or the Brahmin believes that what he then sees is what in truth he always should have known, for it is his true self. The conscious experience is not the thing known. Neither Nirvana nor Brahma can be known in terms of conscious thought. The conscious experience is constantly striving to overpass itself. The source, the thing revealed, lies behind. The very effort to escape from definiteness is therefore the assertion that this experience is a pathway to something beyond consciousness, and therefore beyond itself.

When we come to the definite forms of religious life, where the believer asserts that God has appeared



in certain describable forms, or with certain definite commands, or that the experience is one of a very definite emotion centering around some one object, we find that however much difference in the objects there may be, always there is some object. There has been a tendency to deny to some tribes low in the scale of evolution the possession of religion, because like the aborigines of Australia, and in general of many totemistic tribes, they seem to have no object which they worship. This is due to our misunderstanding, for the totem itself is a sufficient object to satisfy our definition. Belief in the appearance of the totem in dreams, the conviction that the tabu will be enforced by death, which frequently is very strong, are forms of religious experience. These forms clearly assert that what is present is an experience, that is, that there is some reality behind the totem. The enforcement of the tabu by social custom and tribal law may from our point of view be all that there is, but even this is going beyond the bare experience. In the experience the believer in a totem feels that he is in the presence of something larger and, though perhaps not universally, usually, stronger than himself. The experience leads beyond itself to something which he can not and does not try to describe, but in whose existence he believes strongly. Where the experience takes the form of definite assertions or appearances, it claims plainly to go beyond itself. If the man believes it a dream and nothing more, he does not give it religious significance. It is only in those cases where he attributes to it a source beyond itself that he calls it religion. St. Augustine or St. Paul con-

sidered the voices that spoke to them at their conversion to be the voice of God, while we, if we do not consider some sound to be from God, do not call it religion. The distinguishing element is the claim to a source beyond itself. With the type of definite as of indefinite experience, there is found the reference to a source beyond and outside of the conscious experience.

The second characteristic which varies is that which we have called direction. There are many experiences, especially some of the more radically mystic, where direction does not seem to exist, while in others it is very prominent, but often directly opposed to the direction of the impulse given in another religious experience. These two types, the passive and the active, furnish each their own problem. We approach first that of the passive experience. We are to find, if possible, something in common with that of the active type. The passivity of the religious man is never, so far as I know, conceived as absolute, or ideally the complete absence of any movement in the universe. The man is to be passive that the god may enter in. The passivity is for a purpose. It is not simply the unwillingness to act. Instead it is to be regarded as the most difficult thing of all. To attain it he who is to be Buddha must be prepared by countless ages of trial and effort. A passivity which can be reached only after excessive effort and strife is not sluggishness. It is not the simple refusal of the normal exercise of the will. Instead it is a striving after something which is not within the reach of any but the exceptional man. It is something which lies beyond

the round of material life in which we are bound. The experience of him who seeks the passive state is that of one who must strive as the mountain climber strives. Peace and rest may come when the top is reached, but the top does not now lie within reach. Even when it is attained, and becomes the "present state," as would be true of a Buddha when he has attained enlightenment, even when it is recognised as the truth of life, and all else as illusion, even then it is sharply distinguished from that illusion. The experience is one that must forever remain outside of ordinary life. It reaches beyond the bounds of normal consciousness. This is true also of the Christian forms of quietism. Here it is plain that the state is conceived as the indwelling of God. St. Paul, when he says that he no longer lives, adds almost as a reason for his first statement, that it is Christ that lives in him. (Gal. 2:20.) The apparent lack of direction of the experience is due to the fact that the human will no longer attempts to direct, but lets the direction be determined by the will of God. The experience looks beyond itself, or rather beyond the normal will, to a power which is not itself.

With the more active experiences, where the impulse seems to be the essence of the religious state, we meet a case which is not so clear. At first sight, and in the minds of many to-day, the moral impulse which is the truest type of religion has its roots entirely within man. In their minds it has no reference to a God or power above man, who implants the impulse in the heart of man. That part of this objection which has to do with the relation of the

source of the experience to man, whether within or without humanity, we have to consider on its own merits later. Here we are only concerned with finding whether the experience has its source in something, whether man or not, which is beyond its own narrow conscious limits. The great modern movements such as the missionary awakening, church unity, and those impulses directly related to organised Christianity we find referred to the voice of God. This might be thought to be the result not of the experience, but of the prejudice of orthodox belief. But we find the same to hold with the great social movements. The prophets of social justice and social reform appeal, not to the authority simply of their own ideas, but to the ideas of natural right, or of man's right to the satisfaction of certain needs. Limiting strictly to the life of man the source of the impulse which they seek to spread, or to the material universe as it has been evolved in man, they by this very claim go beyond the conscious experience. Until they do ground the impulse in some general principle, we regard it not as religion, but as a personal vagary. If the prophet regards it as religion, it is because he is convinced that it is grounded on, and that it comes to him out of, the secret depths of life. Whether those depths be his or another's matters as little as in the case of the Hindu mystic. The source, if found in the basic impulses of life, is other than the experience itself. Consciousness does not reveal to us all the secrets of life, else those secrets would belong to all who are conscious. As we are not claiming that religion is unique in its reference to something beyond itself,

but only that so far we have found it in all its types to possess this character, we do not need to argue that other experiences also do not lead the way to the secrets of existence. If religion claimed to have its origin just within itself, that would not be what we usually call an experience, but rather an instance of creative activity; it would not assert a claim to connection with the physical forces which have produced man. The impulse would then have an origin within that inner experience which makes religion so purely individual. This not even the preachers of the Inner Light claim. They assert in the strongest terms the right of private judgment, but they hold that that judgment is valid for all men. The Light comes from something which is common to all men. Since the experience is itself not common, for the impulses vary and even oppose one another, the common ground lies outside. In this type, too, the experience points outside of itself for its source.

It might seem that the uncertainty in the dating of an experience could have little relation to the question of its source. The uncertainty comes, however, from an element which reveals the character of the experience, and hence it is of importance. With many who have little of what in a general sense we might call the "mystical," it is a question whether religion can be called an event. It reveals itself in such cases as pervading the whole of life, from the baptism as an infant, through the gradual development of youth, to a calm and rather uneventful course in mature life, ending in the quiet of old age. There is, in such lives, nothing to mark the coming or going of the religious consciousness.

At times it may be more vivid than at others, but always it seems to be present. Any indications of source are bound to be very slight, for the consciousness, in any form, of religion is here not very sharp. Religion takes its place with the other usual things of life, and is as little to the front as they. Yet so far as there is consciousness, the experience goes beyond itself. The will gives no indication of having created the religious life. That life comes as does physical life. Like physical life, religion in such cases arose before the will became conscious. Its source therefore is to be sought before the rise of consciousness. The origin of the experience in this case therefore lies somewhere outside of the conscious experience. This is not true of the will itself, nor of self-consciousness; man, when he finds no indication of any outside source, calls that state his desire. It may be the result of the influence of others upon him, but so long as he is unaware of this, he looks upon it as his own creation, and the expression of his own will. This is not true of the religion which he has carried with him from his infancy. The creation of habit ground in by his parents he may call it, or the result of early teaching, but not the result of his own desire. Even when religion is merely a pervasive uneventful element in man's life, it thus keeps the character which we have found elsewhere, of indicating that it has a source beyond itself.

In much of the religious experience there is not the pervasive character which makes it so difficult to give it a place in the stream of time, but, instead, a definite indefiniteness. The experience is an event,

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and when it is in consciousness can be given an exact temporal place, but its coming, or sometimes its going, can not thus be dated. The man is converted, he recognises that a change has taken place, but just when, it is impossible accurately to say. As this is usually true also of the will, we can no longer use this uncertainty to distinguish religion from the creative experiences. Seldom does it come to any man to know definitely just when he made up his mind to do any given thing. If therefore this uncertainty in religion shows any trace of a source outside of the individual will, it must be found in some other aspect than the bare fact of our inability to date it. A good illustration of this type is to be found in the case of the confirmation and first communion of children in those denominations where a definite conversion is not emphasised. The change comes, and is associated with the ceremony, but in itself there is nothing to date, and for a child brought up in the Sunday School and Church, there is apt to be no change, but only a heightened emotional state. The change, when it is perceived, which may not be until long afterward, has in itself no intimation of time. In fact the ceremony may not mean a great deal until long after it took place. This is also and especially true of infant baptism, even where the child is old enough to notice and dimly remember. Yet in these cases the ceremony does have its effect, and the life of the child is changed. The uncertainty is therefore of a different kind from that of the creative will. There are other cases, where men in mature life, through outward influences or study, come gradually to find themselves

changed in belief. Here again the cause is plainly exterior, and the uncertainty due only to the gradual nature of the change. The impossibility in certain cases of dating the coming into the life of the believer of religion does not by any means, therefore, prove that it has come in from outside.

The variation in the religious experience does not prevent every case considered from indicating a claim to have something outside of itself as its source. These claims would all be invalidated, however, if the objection would hold that because religion is in part subject to man, we can not postulate a source outside of the individual. This objection we may consider in each of the three cases of control which we found, the possibility of man's rejecting religion, the possibility of his modifying it, and even of searching for it.

In the assertion of the power on man to reject the religious experience we acknowledge that it is outside of man. If it were his own will, and entirely rejected, it could never come into being. What a man rejects, or refuses to do, comes to him from outside. His dreams or ideals which he creates he may not be able to objectify, but at least he creates them as dreams or ideals. He does not entirely refuse them a place in his life. If he refuses anything such a place, it can not have existence unless something else gives reality to it. If it has no existence whatever, it can not be a conscious, even though a negative, will. What the man rejects is something which is presented to him from some source outside of this conscious will. When we speak of his ability to refuse to concern himself with religion, we mean to



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assert that religion has been presented to him in some form, and that he has willed not to allow it entrance into his consciousness. The existence which is necessary to have it brought to his notice must exist elsewhere. To be rejected, that is, it must already have objective reality. Since it is an object of will, and not so by any willingness on the man's part, that objectivity indicates an exterior source.

The same holds true of the power to modify it. This assumes that it comes to him in one form, and that he changes it. The origin is outside. Into the question as to how far in most cases it is changed we do not need to go. What concerns us is not the contents, but the source. What should be noted is that when the experience comes it has form. It is something that is to be changed, not something to which form has to be given. What we are here considering, that is, is a case of full existence coming into a new environment, and there meeting and being acted upon by new forces. It is not a case of the reaction of man upon something which is merely the exciting cause, not the real source, of the resulting experience. A man in a certain sense creates his day dreams. Even though roused in him by some passing event, we can not rightly say that he changed their form, for except in his mind they had no form. The cases which we found it best to describe as instances of modification of the religious experience therefore point us to the existence of a form or of the experience in some form, outside of its appearance in the individual consciousness.

With the remaining instances of control, the problem is not so easily solved. When a man seeks for

something it may prove to be only the creation of his own will. He may be unable to find it, or he may be able to give to his inner ideal objectivity. In either case no exterior source is implied. Again we have to remember the specific instances which gave us this classification. When a man, seeing religion in others, or hearing that it exists in others, seeks it, or searches for a new expression of it, he does so by putting himself under religious influences, he attends services, or converses with religious people. If the experience had its source in himself, he would not need to search for it, for by "himself" we mean the conscious will, which would be plain without search. If a man searches for his ideal, he is looking for something which meets his requirements but which he can not himself create. Objective existence must be given to it from some other source than his will. This is true of those experiences which in themselves are entirely within the mind. The artist searches for the realisation of his ideal of beauty. When found it is entirely within his mind, so much so that often no others see the beauty in it as he does, yet he does not consider that he created, but only that he discovered it. The ultimate cause or ground of the scene is in the world outside. Man may likewise seek religion, but by seeking he acknowledges that by his own unassisted will he is not able to bring into existence the experience which he desires. When it comes, it comes partly at least from forces which he was not at first able to control. The experience, even when sought, finds its root in something which has a place in reality before the experience comes into being. This, at least, is the

claim and implication of the experience. From the typical cases of control by man, as well as the instances of extreme variation, we find the same result, the religious experiences imply a source exterior to themselves.

In the midst of the disagreement in many details between the various instances of religion, we find one constant factor. Man finds certain experiences or states of consciousness which differ in most respects, but, together with other likenesses with which we are not concerned, all claim to have a source outside of themselves. The source of this conscious state is not present in the state. This is true of other conscious states, such as sense perception, but with them it is accompanied by a greater uniformity in contents. The variation is less. Yet, while the cases are different, one may illustrate the other. In perception the object, however it may be defined, is the something which logically or physically explains the perception. That object is not given in the perception. The perception is itself object of consciousness, but in so far as it refers to something which is not in consciousness, a permanent material object, it does not rest content in itself. It leads beyond to something else, which may be defined as the focus of social agreement about certain sensations varying within certain narrow limits. This social agreement, or logical or physical permanency, is implied in the consciousness of the object which is in consciousness, but meanwhile the sensation of blue or the feeling of roughness is not that rough blue material object. So in religion, all these states which we call cases of the religious experience lead

out of themselves. There is something, they claim, which is not given in full consciousness which is necessary if we are to understand these experiences. Nowhere, in what we call religion, do we find this cause present in the consciousness itself. It is true that it is said that the God appears to the believer at times, but the very word "appears" refers that bit of consciousness to a source outside. The religious experience always has this reference. We never find it complete and self-satisfied.

It is the importance of this negative element that we next need to note. In religion men realise that they are not conscious of the fullness of life. It is the experience which brings them to this knowledge. Just in proportion as men become acutely conscious of the full meaning of their religion, they become restless and seek that meaning elsewhere, or seek to increase the consciousness. Even if they come to believe, as did Gautama, that they have discovered the source, and have it in consciousness, they define that source in terms which are inapplicable to the conscious state, as did the Buddha. Wherever the terms which imply the presence of a god or spirit are used, and this includes the far greater mass of all devotional literature, the experience acknowledges its lack, the lack which exists even in mysticism, whether eastern or western. It may be said to be stronger for the mystics than for those to whom the god must come in bodily form in order to be seen. Always in mystic contemplation we are told that it is necessary to rise beyond the realm of conscious life; we must empty our minds of all images, so that the true light may shine undimmed. Unless we equate re-

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ligious experience with the final state of illumination or union with true being, the mystic experience is one of constant striving to destroy itself, to do away with the consciousness which it has. The final state, which for the mystic is true religion, consists in the absorption of his narrow consciousness in something wider, hence the individual is acknowledged as not the source. In all other cases, where individual consciousness still holds sway, the experience realises that the source is not in the individual. Even the man whose religion is a habit, and who goes to church because he has been accustomed to go, is one of the first to assert that it is not of his own initiative that he goes this particular Sunday. Some power, whether habit or Christian society, constrains him, and he recognises this in the consciousness, when consciousness comes at all, that really to-day he does not want to go. Not only, therefore, is the religious consciousness incomplete in itself, and always implying something beyond, it is also conscious of this lack and of the implication.

This claim and this realisation by the religious consciousness that it does not include its source within itself bring us to the conclusion, which is the same thing put in another way, that the source of religion is not given in the consciousness of religion. Whatever is in consciousness is consciously known. If it is there it is in consciousness, and in the forefront of attention. If the attention is not laid upon it, it is not in consciousness, and whatever it might be does not count. When a change has come we have not the same conscious state. If we adopt the criticism of the followers of Bergson, and identify

the state with the changing stream of consciousness, and give it another name, the matter becomes easier for us, for then it is of the essence of the changing stream not to be content to remain the same, but it must be forever changing. Its source, therefore, since it is past, and its goal, since it is to come, are not the same as that which is now in consciousness. This might be a very fair statement of what we have been trying to state in the terms of the older philosophy. With any such dynamic experience, the continuity lies not in the differing appearance of the surface, but in something which lies beneath. The source or cause may be in the subconsciousness or fringe of consciousness, but if there, it is not in consciousness. In this sense the religious experience is essentially dynamic. It makes its source its goal, for it is always realising its lack, and trying to make itself complete. Acknowledging that its source is outside of itself, it seeks to know it. This seeking proves that the source is not now in the focus of attention.

If the source is not given in the consciousness of the religious experience, it is distinct from that experience. We have to remember that we are not discussing the absolute consciousness, nor even the cosmic consciousness, but are concerned with religion as it comes to us in the experience of the individual. If we do not find some source in that individual experience, but instead, when we come on any trace of it, find the consciousness which we are studying always referring us elsewhere, we have to conclude that the source is not in consciousness. It could be said that although not consciously there, yet the source

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was really plainly known, only not known as the source. The first result of such an argument is the assumption that there must be several different sources, if there is no one thing which is common to all the cases of consciousness of religion. This might be true, and our grouping of all these cases under one head be a mistake. Yet when we turn to the concrete experiences we find nothing which can be the source. Even a dream has a source outside of itself, and religion must so far be given the same character. The mystic experience is again the test, for here the contents are at their minimum. In such an experience, as we have it from many sources, there is nothing which can be seized on for any purpose. As one mystic says (St. John of the Cross, "The Dark Night of the Soul," bk. ii, ch. xvii, quoted in James' "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 407), "*the soul finds no terms, no means, whereby to render the sublimity of the wisdom and delicacy of the spiritual feeling with which she is filled. . . . We receive this mystical knowledge of God clothed in none of the kinds of images, in none of the sensible representations which our mind makes use of in other circumstances.*" The non-mystical forms of religion, if we can rightly call any such, plainly give us nothing. Where religion is mainly conceived as social service, the feeling is of a common humanity, and this common humanity can not be in consciousness. We can recognise it, but one individual by himself cannot create it. Where religion is habit, as was said before, the consciousness gives nothing which will explain the state without recourse to something other than itself. When the mystic state, the most

individualistic form of religion, finds no place in itself for its own source, we shall look in vain to the less individualistic forms for such an individual source. The individual experience gives no place in its consciousness for the source of religion.

We pass now from what the experience claims in itself to the result of these claims. Or rather we have just passed this point. However much the religious mind may or may not seek the source of its own experience,—and when the consciousness of religion is dim, the source is little sought,—the work to which we have set ourselves is to find that source if possible. The claim of religion that it takes its rise in the individual from something beyond or beneath individuality therefore lays upon us the duty of examining the truth of that claim. When to the experience itself, and to the outsider as he enters so far as he may into the experience, there can be discovered in that consciousness no cause for its existence, one can but conclude that the experience is not self-existent. It is, as has been said, a dynamic experience. It is incomplete, in spite of its own efforts to reach completion. Since we can not force it to self-completeness which it does not possess, we must take its incompleteness for one of our foundation facts. As we have here gone over from the field of description to that of implication, we can only say that we are dealing with a kind of consciousness which sets us a problem, and gives us no hint of a solution within its own borders. It does, however, set us very distinctly the problem. In itself it warrants no explanation of its existence. Taken just by itself, we can give it no meaning.



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Even the mystic, who declares that no meaning can ever be given to it in terms that we will understand, at the same time give it a meaning by relating it to a larger sphere. In and by itself, even for him, it is meaningless.

The result of this is that we must conclude that the source of religion is not to be found within the individual. The experience of religion is that it points beyond itself. Without this implication of the relation of which it is the mark, the experience has no significance. But more than this, unless these implications are correct in some way, the very existence of these forms of consciousness is left unexplained and unexplainable. If we are to find an adequate cause or reason for religion, it must be sought outside of the individual experience. Not only can we say that we must look outside, we can be sure that only outside of the circle of human individual consciousness will that cause or source be found. In this field we can no more assume agnosticism, and say that perhaps there is no explanation, and then rest content, than can the student of natural science. A source and an explanation we must assume, or else prove limits to our reason. Since these limits can not be proven, neither for religion nor for science, our conclusion remains that, since the source of religion can not be found within the individual consciousness, it will be found outside. The whole superstructure of "revealed theology," for this is what "revealed religion" really means to those who use the term, assumes the very thing we are arguing, that the source lies outside man. It can not therefore rightly interpose the agnostic position that maybe we can not

find any source. As it assumes a source, and we do not find it in one place, on the basis of its own position we are bound to assume it in another. By reason, therefore, we reach the conclusion of "revealed religion," that the source of the religious experience is to be found somewhere else than in the individual's consciousness of religion.

The result of this, the fact that the religious experience does not reveal a source within itself, brings into the effort to explain religion an unknown factor. If the source were plainly revealed, either within the experience or unmistakably placed in the exterior world, our work of description and explanation would be easy. As it is, there is this imperfectly known something, whose existence seems necessary to explain the experience, yet is itself not given or indicated by any focusing of the contents of the various types of religion. If there had been such focusing, a drawing or tending in one direction of the religious experience of mankind sufficient to indicate where the source lay, we should not have the varieties that we have. Even within one religion, such as Christianity, there is more diversity than uniformity in the idea of God, so far as that idea depends on experience. Yet we have seen that something does enter into consciousness which can not be explained by that consciousness nor by our conscious life. There is this unknown factor to be dealt with. It is rightly described as a factor, for in no other way have we as yet been able to describe it. Not objectively in the consciousness of the religious man under any one identifiable form, yet constantly asserted to be there by varying types of religion, and in varying forms,

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we may rest content for the present with calling it the "as yet unknown factor."

With not having in our possession even one character important in the description of this "factor," it is evident that we learn of its presence mainly through the effect it produces. The god of the savage and of the Christian seem to differ so much that we can not say that either is true to the exclusion of the other. (Can not, I mean, on the basis of this study.) Yet there is the similarity which we have considered, of possessing in common the claim that the consciousness is the result of something beyond itself, and have found this claim to be true so far as the fact of the presence of an unknown factor goes. There is something at work here which we do not understand, but we do see that it, or something, is at work. To this extent, the consciousness of religion is dynamic; it reaches beyond and is not satisfied in itself, and gives no ground for believing that that search comes from within itself. This is not the same as saying that religion is caused by a power not ourselves working in us. The source may not be a power, but only the occasion. Just as the flower does not cause us to see, but gives the opportunity for the sunlight to strike it, and when an eye is present leads to the mental vision which we call the flower, so the source, as we have been calling it, of religion may not be the cause but the occasion; still it is the effect of the presence of this something which forces us to acknowledge an unknown factor. Not any definite thing, but the very indefiniteness of the experience of religion has brought us to this positing of a cause or source. In some way or other there

has entered into consciousness the result of the presence of this something. We want to bear in mind that it is this, and not any definite revelation of the character of the unknown, which has resulted from our study. We are dealing so far with something known only by the fact that it affects consciousness.

In the analysis we have so far made we have not only found differing descriptions of the religious experience, we have also not obtained any clew as to the nature of the source of it. That no conclusion is readily given is evident, by the varying explanations which we meet with in these days. More than this, we can say that any indication that may be given will not be through definite description. Unless we deny the name of religion to great masses of what we would usually call religious phenomena,—and that is not a justifiable beginning,—we find a divergence so great, as, for instance, between the exponents of social or ethical and those of mystical religion, that the very nature of the source of religion remains indescribable in any terms common to the differing types. Where definite contradiction exists, we are not at liberty to accept either statement as the guide to truth. Yet of one thing we may be sure. The cause or occasion will be adequate. It is this assurance which is the basis for our present conclusion. Not because we know what the source is, but because we know the experience, are we sure that the source lies outside. Within the experience we have found nothing adequate to explain it. Part, at least, we conclude, of the factors entering into the coming into existence of this consciousness lies beyond. The total factors must be adequate to solve our problem.

Confronted with the lack of agreement in content, this is the only path left open to us. In treading it we can be sure of the adequacy of the solution when found, but our assurance comes from the general assumption that everything must have an adequate cause, not from anything inherent in religion. Men, in striving to prove the existence of God, have sought an infallible proof. As long as human minds are fallible they can not succeed. The proof for God's existence must rest on the same general ground as does any proof. Invoking the principle of the existence, necessary existence, of a sufficient cause, adequate to explain, we say that there does exist, outside of the religious consciousness, something which is an adequate cause of its existence.

That our conclusion rests on the assumption for any existent thing of a sufficient cause means that our argument from henceforth must be "formal." This procedure is forced on us. We find it useless, in a search for the source of religion, to ask what, in detail, religion says of itself. Getting no agreement in reply to such a question, we have had to make independently our own study. This means that our conclusions will and must be formal. Concerned with the form, deduced from it, they become more general than if they were dependent on the statements or contents of the religious consciousness. So long as we depend on such statements, there is open the objection that even if in all cases agreement were found, there might be error. Modern psychology tells us of the divergences, usually disregarded, in our perception or even sensations of ordinary physical objects. Accuracy is only a question of degree. So

long, therefore, as we seek assurance of this sort, so long shall we be disappointed. We turn to a "formal" proof to escape this uncertainty.

Certainty is in its essence logical. Practical certainty, which is the desire of science and ordinary life, is an approximation along what we might call pragmatic lines. We disregard what experience shows to be the negligible error. Where the result to be obtained is numerical, where an approximation to within one-thousandth of an inch is just as good and useful as the attainment of the exact measurement, this practical certainty is all that common sense strives for. When, however, it is a question of existence the issue changes. At times we may have, as always with the past, to weigh the balance of probability as to the truth or falsity of existence, but this is only because we are content with such probability. Either Julius Cæsar did or did not exist. With a social agreement as to the facts, we can use probability, but if the question has no general agreement behind it, if we do not agree to act on one or the other assumption, we must seek, whether we find it or not, complete certainty. Numerical approximation will not do. In disregarding, therefore, the contents of the religious experience we are merely following the general procedure of philosophy. That general procedure I will not attempt here to defend. It is not necessary to do so, for what we need is admitted by all students of philosophical method. It may be summarised for our purpose thus:—what an object appears to be is a logically secondary matter to the fact of its existence. Any conclusions which are drawn from the fact, the

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“formal” fact, of its existence have therefore a more general application than the details of its objective appearance, which may vary from time to time. This is true whether we establish that existence pragmatically or otherwise. Formal arguments are merely those which are drawn from the admitted existence, or non-existence, of an object. They hold true through all the varying forms which that object may take. They are the logically necessary consequences of the existence of that object. If the existence of God is to be established at all, it must be in this way. Statements about existence do not establish existence. Only one existence can prove another. In using, therefore, the formal argument we are on the road to the only certainty which is possible.

In seeking this certainty we are depending on the incompleteness of the experience taken by itself. Our procedure is not a mere matter of logical juggling, for it has a distinctly practical, or pragmatic, side. As a practical matter we find that the religious experience is not self-explanatory. Its implications of something beyond, the claim to reveal another world, which we have seen to be characteristic of it, is not explained by anything in it. The unknown factor with which we are dealing is something which prevents our dealing with this experience with any assurance of being on the right road. If the claim of the experience is correct, and it opens to us knowledge of a realm beyond the world of sense perception, we should treat the impulses which result from it far differently from the fate which would befall them if we regard religion as merely the idle

dreams of abnormal human beings, or as the insight not into another world, but into the depths of the world of social human life. Our treatment, therefore, of religion depends on our judgment as to this unknown factor. We therefore are not able to decide as to our attitude toward this experience on its own claims. In our treatment of it, it does not stand on its own feet entirely. This not only makes such an inquiry as we are engaged in a matter of practical importance, it also brings us face to face with the results of this incompleteness, or lack of clearness in the religious experience. As incomplete, its reality is defective. That is, taken by itself, it is not completely determined. This is true both logically and practically.

Though incomplete, the religious experience is yet real. It is real in the sense which we found in the early part of our analysis of it. It has a place in the existent world. It is also real in the logical sense of an object of study. Since for us it has a meaning, it has some sort of reality. Finally, it is real for the world of everyday affairs, since the religious impulse, in some form or other, has to be reckoned with by every one. It possesses this reality independently of the fact of its incompleteness. Taking it as it is, more or less of an enigma, it has a place in the world of reality. Into this reality it carries its incompleteness. The experience which comes to us is one that claims to go beyond itself; it is one that is unexplainable in itself. It is just this experience which we find to be real. Its indefiniteness, therefore, can not affect its reality since it is included in it. Whether it comes to reality by its own voli-



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tion is also of no concern. All that is important is that we find here reality. Moreover, it is really existent. As an experience it does not hold a shadowy reality dependent on its relation to the mind whose experience it is. It is not in the same category with day-dreams. Not simply as the object of conception, as the entities of pure mathematics, but in itself it is real. We remember that it possesses the reality of an experience. Although in consciousness, it depends on consciousness no more than does our perception of the table on which we are writing. Whatever reality belongs to the experience of the table belongs to the experience of religion. This incomplete, baffling experience is a part of the world with which we must do battle.

The unknown source, as involved in the experience, is a necessary part of it. Not now merely logically necessary (if *mere* logical necessity exist as a thing by itself apart from life), but necessary to the practical dealing with religion. Religion would not be religion, not exist as religion, without this outside source. Whatever may be what we have called the source, but more accurately the unknown factor, without it the experience would be non-existent. Again this is not a matter of words, but of fact. What the practical man meets when he has to deal with religion, and what baffles him at times is just this claim to a source higher or other than itself or himself. Without this claim it would not be the thing of impulse which confronts him. Something partially like it there might be, but what for him distinguishes this particular experience would not be in existence. We are not, of course, saying that this

proves that the source is higher because the religious man claims that it is. We are only maintaining that the fact that the source is not given in the experience is of the essence of the experience. Without that element, of a source outside of itself, it would not be the religious experience; it would not be what it is. This unknown exterior element is therefore involved in the reality of the experience. In the world of everyday life it has a real part to play in the religious experience.

This unknown element, as the important element in religion, is through this fact in touch with the world of reality, however we may define that world. Deprive religion of this unknown quantity, and you destroy it as religion. This lesson, which not all ethical culturists have learned, is apart from the question as to the advisability of such destruction. It is apart also, for the time, from the question of the possibility of such annihilation. We have now, whether we will have in the future or not, an experience, as real a part of our life as any other experience, which in its essence involves the presence of an unknown, exterior factor. The experience is real; the unknown factor is a very real element in the experience. The unknown element is therefore real. It has this reality, it is true, in its relation to the experience, and we have not proven more than this. Yet in that relation it is real. Through that relation to our consciousness it enters as an important factor into human life. Also as logically necessary to explain religion, it has a secure place in the realm of necessary truth. This means that the religious experience has given us the basis for the assertion of something

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not itself in the religious consciousness. In asserting that reality has been conferred on something beyond we mean only beyond the present consciousness. We do not in this offhand way deny either the presence of God in consciousness nor the possibility that the source may be found to be entirely human. Only we are asserting the necessary real existence of the source or occasion of the religious experience outside of the religious consciousness. In religion God is known as real.

We have been looking toward the source of the religious consciousness; it is now possible to turn back again to the experience itself, and notice what we have learned about its nature during our inquiry. In the first place, we have one side of a relation. Since this consciousness is incomplete in itself, and reaches rational completion as well as practical only when we take into account the unknown source, this relation, of which the religious consciousness is one term, becomes a way of characterising the experience. This we have already done several times. We need to notice here that what we have is one term and the relation. These are inherent in this type of conscious life. It is a true experience, having its meaning because of this relation to something not given within it.

Not only, however, have we one term and the relation, the relation is such that we are sure that the other term is real and exists. Religion is therefore to be taken as a relation to or consciousness of reality. This may be a truer phrase to use than the one we have made use of. "Source" covers the ground only because we did not want to prejudice our case

by speaking of the object of the religious consciousness. Nor do we want to do so now. Making the situation as general as possible, we only say that we have a relation between two real and existent terms, one of which, and the relation, are given to us in consciousness. So far as consciousness is concerned this is a one-sided or one directional relation. Our work must be done from the side of the religious consciousness, working back to the other term of the relation. The relation itself, since without it the consciousness is incomplete and non-typical, is essential and given. Its absence destroys what we call religion. From these we have deduced the existence of a something as the other term. We have already, then, been working from the experience out to the unknown. From a real experience we have deduced a real occasion or object of that experience.

What we have done in general may be done in detail. So far as the religion is not one-directional, what is true of its relation to one of its terms will be true of the other. So far as it is one-directional, that is such as the relation of the lamp to the consciousness of the light of the lamp, we can infer directly from the consciousness to the object or cause. What is true of the relation, whether applying in both directions or in only one, has a connection with both terms. We are dealing with two real existences, such that they can have this relation between them. This fact defines to a certain extent the nature of each. Since we know the nature of the consciousness, a certain line is open to us by which we may obtain information about the unknown term. It must be such that it can enter into this relation with

this experience or type of consciousness. The relation in which these terms are to each other not only establishes the reality of the one not in consciousness, but also determines or defines its character. The relation, we must remember, is in consciousness as well as the term. That is, the religious consciousness is not simply one term of this relation, it is one term *and* the relation. The term is the concrete case, the mystic trance, or the voice on the road to Damascus; the relation is the conviction that this voice or trance came from somewhere beyond. Knowing therefore the relation, we have another means of reaching conclusions as to the type of reality which it brings into relation to our conscious life. The relation which we call religious knowledge can and does define its object.

Defining its object or source, from a study of the experience we can learn some, at least of the characteristics of the object of that experience. The relation is in some way to be defined as the determination of consciousness by this object or existence, whatever it may be. As this is a real relation between real things, the consciousness shows in its structure the result of this determination. This turning backward of our procedure, and defining the relation in terms, so to speak, of cause, makes it possible for us to take it in the other direction. Not now, however, as a possibility, and to establish the reality of the source, but to establish the reality of some detailed characteristics of the source. The same procedure that gave us general results will give us more detailed ones. We can use the religious experience as the ground from which to quarry the

foundations on which we may build up our idea of the nature of this source of religion. Taking our stand in the world of reality, we can not too strongly insist that in thus deducing the nature of the object of the religious consciousness we are not building in the air. Indeed we must make the attempt to give to this something which we conceive as real a body of flesh and bones. If real, it is concrete, for it is real as a cause or occasion, as revealed by concrete indications of consciousness. The relation may be general, but it is a relation between terms of the same class. What leads us to give reality to this source is that the reality of the consciousness is incomplete without it. The consciousness becomes concrete and really existent only when the source makes it possible for it. In this sense, therefore, the source is concrete. It expresses itself in definite instances, and, since it is not present in all our minds all the time, it is not present universally. As concrete, it must have certain characters. These characters it is possible to discover partially by a further analysis of the religious consciousness.

Thus we have so far vindicated the validity of the religious experience. As an experience, we have found that it reveals reality. It is such that in no other way can it itself be real. In general, therefore, it is valid as an experience. Without maintaining what we have seen to be impossible, that each implication of religion is to be accepted as true, yet the primary implications of all the types of religion, that they proceed from or to a reality beyond themselves, is a valid implication. There is a reality not given in consciousness, to which they refer. They

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have therefore been proved worthy by this last test to be called an experience. So far as the existence of a source beyond themselves is concerned, the religious consciousness is a valid experience.

## LECTURE IV

### THE TEST OF RELIGION

To each valid experience there corresponds a proper test. The religious experience is valid, but not all experiences are religious. There may well be some modes of consciousness which claim or seem to imply that they are what we have defined and accepted as religious, and yet which are due really to some other cause. To distinguish such, to see whether the similarity to religion is sufficient to put both in the same category, some test is needed. To conclude that religion is valid, and then not to have a standard by which we can find out what is religion, would leave to our work little value. The existence of such a test of validity can not, however, be assumed. We could very consistently conclude that if there existed anything of the nature of what we have defined as religion, that this was, if it existed, a valid and true experience, and yet deny that we could ever be sure that we had found such an experience. To make our argument practical, we must find some way by which to try the types of consciousness we have, and see if among them is one such as we have conceptually found religion to be. This is in spite of the fact that our definition came from an analysis of what men call religion. It might be that men, having the idea of religion, incorrectly apply it. To the



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truth of this, only one who has some standard and has applied it can reply. Historically, many standards have been sought. As before, we ignore dogmatism, and seek only within the experience. This is not to conclude immediately that the test also is to be found within religion, but only that, if it is to reveal truth to us, we must find a test that accords with the religious method of revelation.

With our ordinary experiences, especially those of perception, the objective contents give us the opportunity of judgment. A man who is color blind is called abnormal and his experiences untrue because what he reports as to the objects within his field of consciousness does not accord with what others report of theirs. No two persons exactly agree, but for the great majority there is an approximation toward an agreement among themselves and a disagreement with the victim of color blindness. The object is here the test. The majority say that it is not as the odd man sees it. What they call the real object is this social form of agreement. The test is objective, not because material, but because it depends on the contents of experience, both as to color, and as to the other persons, who are equally objective to the man's will. The reason for some particular focus may be best explained pragmatically, that, independent of metaphysics, we can test the truth of experience, and do so by this social agreement or focus. No object, in the ordinary sense of the word, can exist unless there is this focus. Ordinarily, also, we mean not merely an agreement that something exists, but that something on whose appearance and character we are all well agreed, is in our consciousness.

Objective detail is detail of the contents of experience. Persons are objects so far as they present to any who see them the same appearance so that they can be recognised by their photograph, clothes, or general character. In so far as they do not present common features to all, we do not call them objects. It is this very difference from a stone, that a man may be in very different relations to different people, so that he does not appear to be the same, that makes us call people persons. So far as an object enters into these different relations, we do not call these particular relations part of the object. The spot to which we alone are attached, by reason of some personal memories, is to some one else nothing out of the ordinary. The world denies, in such a case, the particular interest to that object, and says that it is due solely to the man. Only those characteristics which may be common property are called objective.

The religious experience we have found to be peculiar in that there is not found any such social focus, or point of approach to agreement. Outside of the bare formal agreement as to an exterior source, no consensus of agreement is reported. The source, since all acknowledge it, is objective; it is a focus common to all types of religion,—but nothing more than this can be concluded. There is not found any approach within the field of consciousness to the ascription even of an equivalent, much less of the same qualities, or to description in the same objective terms. There is, therefore, no objective element other than the bare externality of its source, to be found in religion. The apparent willfulness of religion under objective standards is to be explained

by this lack. When an object is assumed, whether a semi-materialistic god, or an abstract yet objective statement of truth, some or many, not finding such in their consciousness, yet believing themselves to be religious, protest. The volume of such protest has, in many ages, led to religious revolution. Some agreement there is at times, but never to the extent that is claimed. The more carefully the experience itself is studied, and not reported in terms taken from a fixed vocabulary, the less the agreement is seen to be. The fact that agreement is apparently greater among the uneducated, who are more influenced by one another, and grows less as we advance up the scale of those better able to accurately report just what is in their consciousness, is proof that the apparent agreement is due to imitation rather than to the experience itself. The agreement we mean is agreement in exact description, such as is asserted in regard to the appearance of the angels, not the general agreement as to type. We are throughout this part of our work concerned with the contents of the experience. The similarity as to contents, which might be reported, gives no focus. The Mormon, and the Christian, the Mohammedan and the Buddhist, no one of these would agree to what any other claimed to be the divine revelation of God's nature. There is no majority vote for any one description. Either most men are defective, or there is no object given in the religious experience, no focus or point to which the descriptions tend.

Since there is no agreement as to the proper contents or revelation of religion, we can not with success seek an objective test. The test as to perception

is based on, though not quite identical with, the agreement of the large majority of men. The focus of such agreement, studied, and brought to a point, determined with reference to certain individual variations, such as the position of the spectator and the source of light (in vision) gives us the test. The wood is really brown because the great multitude of those who take care to observe their experiences of color so report it. All experiences which report it as brown are therefore called normal. When, however, we have no such preliminary agreement as to who are the experts, when there is not even any consensus of opinion as to what direction these experts should turn, when there is no common view to be refined and standardised, there is no starting point. It is as if in relatively equal numbers the reports came in that the wood was green and red and white as well as brown. The more experts studied the different types of consciousness, the less would agreement result, unless we said that none had seen the wood. This is the case with religion. The experts of each religion, so far as they assert objective revelation, deny any validity to any of the other religions. No focus exists to be brought to a point. The work of the expert is to lead the lines of convergence to a center, a norm. Where there is instead divergence, there can exist no center. Hence there is no test. An objective test, therefore, can not be found for religion. We are unable to test the validity of a man's religious experience by what he reports of the contents of his consciousness at that time. We can not say that, because he asserts that a voice proclaimed many wives or one wife, he is not truly religious.

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We must remember that this is all that the test means. It is a test of the truth of the experience,—whether it is what it claims to be, that is religious,—not a test of what it claims to reveal. Such a test, of revealed truth, so far as religion is concerned, we have just seen to be impossible. Since there is no focus to the objective side of religion, no agreement, there can be no test which we can apply to its contents.

From the contents of the religious revelation there comes to us no test of its accuracy. Yet we can not rightly conclude from this that the source of the religious experience, the object which is experienced, is a formless thing, without definite nature. If it were formless and structureless, it could not give birth to religion. An absolutely undetermined existence can not enter into any causal or source relation, for that relation determines it. If it is the occasion of an experience, that to which the particular consciousness points, it is so far determined. It is something to which that consciousness can point. In the case of religion it is so far determined that we can say of it that it is not within the field of the religious consciousness. It is something which does not depend on that religious consciousness for its existence. From the religious experience we concluded that it did exist, but only because the experience was not sufficient to give existence to itself by itself. The source gives, partly, at least, existence to the experience, not vice versâ. Its existence, then, undetermined so far as the field of religion is concerned, is nevertheless deducible from that consciousness. The type to which it gives rise, though variable in content, is of a defi-

nite type. The relation between the source and the religious experience is such that we are conscious that there is a relation. This relation, moreover, is one-directional. The source bears a different relation to the experience from what the consciousness does to the source. It is source or object, the consciousness is subject or perception. Putting it in the terms of our definition of an object, we have on the one side the focus of religious agreement, and on the other the lines which are converging. Since the experience is not completely self-determining, in part at least the determination comes from the object or source. Whether by self-determination or otherwise, this source has a determinate character. It acts under these conditions in this way.

Having a certain character, the source has qualities which may be described. Qualities are our description of the nature of an object. When an existence becomes for us an object, exterior to us, and known as the focus of converging experiences, the ways in which it acts or appears are described as its qualities. They are the means by which we communicate our judgment as to its nature and behavior. Just as soon as we conclude that there is a certain type of behavior, just so soon we make the effort to describe its qualities. Having determinate and definite modes of behavior it will therefore have qualities. It is not necessary that these qualities be themselves physical, or in themselves existent. Electricity is itself never perceived, hence we can not describe it in terms of light or heat or sound, though it shows itself in all these ways. Its nature and qualities are given in terms of its behavior, and the results which

come from its presence. Electricity is just as objective as though we could see or feel it, and its qualities are just as fixed. Because it has certain modes of action, it has certain qualities, which we cannot perceive, but which we deduce from the phenomena. In so far as religion has certain definite modes of action, in so far as the source reveals itself in typical and recognisable forms of activity, it has certain qualities, and it is possible for us to describe them. This is altogether apart from the contents of the experience, as the qualities of electricity are not given in terms of the brilliancy of the lightning. Since there is no focus of content in religion, and since there is a focus of behavior, at least to the extent of occasioning religion, in the behavior of the source, it is to this behavior or activity that we must look for our description and test of the validity of our description of the object of the religious consciousness.

This definition of the character or nature of an object gives us the basis for our test as to the contents. Though the contents in themselves furnish no criteria by which we may judge among them, there are tests which we can apply which can be deduced from the necessary qualities of the object, necessary to the object as the occasion or source of the experience. When some experience, claiming to be a true revelation of the object of worship, reveals of that object some quality which is inconsistent with its nature as the object of worship, we have the right to reject the claim of that experience to validity. The ground for this is that determination has a negative as well as a positive side. When something is determined as ex-

istent, something else is determined as non-existent. We do not want here to be mixed up with the arguments of the lack of determination for the meeting of opposites in the Absolute Being. So far as these arguments are valid, they do not concern us, for the source which we are studying is the definite source of religion, revealing itself in certain particular ways. If in God falsehood is done away because all things are equally true or equally false, that is itself a quality, and its denial is untrue. So we have come to the familiar *reducio ad absurdum*. For our purpose, and by our definition, that would be a mode of behavior, and, as found only in the Absolute, a definition of Absolute Being, and therefore a test of truth as the revelation of ultimate reality. Whether valid or not, therefore, it does not affect our argument. Since if under any circumstances falsehood is true, the assertion that always it is false, is itself false, and our argument is upheld. Any determination implies that its denial is untrue. It carries with it, therefore, the denial of existence as well as its affirmation.

When in any experience we find the claim to know something as existent, especially if that something be a quality of the object of the experience, it can be put to this test. If the quality is such that, if it is truly part of, or belonging to the object, that object can not be the object of that experience, then the claim to knowledge is untrue. If a man says that he sees and knows of water flowing uphill, we refuse to accept his statement, because water does not behave in that way. To be water under any circumstances known to us, it must obey the law of grav-



ity. Not until it ceases to be water and becomes vapor can it flow uphill. To take a plainer case, if a man claims to see a round-square, we refuse to believe, because the nature of a square is that it shall not be round. We do not wait to examine his mind, or the object he claims he sees; we are sure beforehand that there is no such quality as roundness possible to a square. So when a man asserts that he knows of a god who is unknowable, we equally quickly reject his statement. If in the religious experience he knows God, then the quality he claims is untrue, that God is unknowable. This is not the position of Agnosticism, which bases its conclusion as to the existence of the unknowable on other than religious grounds. It does, however, come near to some of the cruder statements of the mystics. For the religious man to claim that God can not enter into relations, that he is the infinite unrelated, is likewise untenable. If God is unrelated being, then He can not be related to him the worshiper as the object of worship. But God is worshiped. Therefore the claim that he is known as unrelated is untrue. These instances, taken because they are clear, might be extended into the field of more exact determination. That is not needed here, but only the understanding that if we find qualities that are inconsistent with the relation of the source of religion to the religious experience, those qualities are to be rejected. So we have a valid test.

On the positive side we do not need to wait until some revelation occurs. It may be psychologically necessary that each idea first occur as a revelation or discovery in some experience, but logically it may

be known by reasoning before it is ever known objectively in consciousness, known in the reasoning about religion, before it is known in religion. Since to terms in relation, as the source and the consciousness are, there are definite qualities, so for us, once given the relation, the qualities which are logically involved become necessary qualities. Again we parallel our reasoning as to the existence of the source. Whatever may prove to be necessary to the source in order that it may be in this relation, and make the religious consciousness what it is, may be concluded to exist. What mode of existence belongs to it is not a question that needs answer here; only we say it has such reality that we can say of a statement about it that that statement is true or false. For instance, the source must have the quality of objectivity. It must be such that it can be in the experience, or involved in the experience of many people. The God of religion must be a God of all men, or at least of all religious men, and we stamp as true the assertion that He is equally approachable by all, that is, by all who are religious. As religion is the experience of some objective existence, then that existence or being is such that it can be known in this experience. The qualities which like this can be deduced from the experience furnish a basis for valid judgments about religion.

As they furnish a basis, they give us the chance to further develop our test. When there comes before us the revelation or statement of the contents of religion, that the qualities of God are known to be of a certain type, if that type is one that is involved in the religious relation to God, we are competent to

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judge whether that is a true religious experience, and its statements valid. Since the test does not depend on the statement of the religious man, but, as a good test should be, is independent of it, we do not have to depend on psychological analysis of the experience. Psychology can not in this case take the place of theology, for if the statement is true, our judgment depends not on the way it gained entrance to the believer's mind, but on the fact of its agreement with the logical implications of his experience. Not all qualities can be brought under this test, for not all qualities are directly necessary or directly opposed to the implications of religion. Those which are not so directly involved, can not be tested. However as a type they may be. If in a study of religion it should be found that all imagery is from physical sources, at once all imagery of God could be thrown out as no true revelation. If it were found that religion involved always an effect on the will, all claims to this effect could be at least partly accepted. So could the test be broadened. It is clear, therefore, that we have a means which is capable of use in the discrimination of the true religion from the false.

In this, though we have constantly made use of the conception of an object as a focus of social agreement, our test does not bear this social character. There are agreements in which only the weight of numbers counts. No logic can distinguish between red and blue, nor between cold and heat. Which is which is a matter for the social mind or common perception to say. Tests of perception are always of this character. The value of the test is the certificate it gives that the given experience agrees

with the normal experience. When a man finds that to him two objects are alike in color, and finds that to others they are also alike, he knows that he can act on his perception as a guide to what his fellows' perception will be. The validity of his perception comes from the fact of this agreement. That which will not stand the test is the abnormal. A man who sees no color where another sees red may, if he is a railroad engineer, fail to act on the danger signal. The fact of his difference from others affects the validity of his experience. In itself, if only the others shared in the lack, the experience would be as good as any other. But when the great mass of men have differing color vision, the test of agreement is important.

This is also true where it is not a case of perception, but is still the consciousness of objective truth. The classic idea of revelation, that to the seer truth may be revealed in terms that he fails to grasp, but which nevertheless to another, rightly gifted, yields its full meaning, is of this type. The truth is thought of as enshrined in some formula, which the prophet repeats blindly. To God who originates, and to the man who understands, the meaning is the same, while to the prophet, the medium of revelation, the meaning does not come. The consciousness, so far as the words or letters or message go, is the same, only the understanding differs. The prophet has not the key. Once the key is known, or agreed on, the full meaning is known. The test of this sort of objective revelation is the same as with perception. Only here the parties to the agreement include God. As words have meaning according to the agreement or use common to the speaker and hearer, so truth is re-

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vealed in so far as God speaks in terms men may understand. If there is no agreement as to the meaning of the words used, no key common to speaker and hearer, they are not words but gibberish. The test of speech is the test, again, of social agreement. Hearing a language which we do not understand, even though we may be sure there is meaning, there is no test which we can apply. So far as God speaks in terms which we do not understand, there is no test which we can apply to a claim to be His spokesman. True and false sound alike where neither is understood. Since there is no agreement as to the language of religion, no common dialect, there can not be a test. Having no test, we are unable to either accept or reject objective revelation. In one sense this means that there can be no objective revelation. Having no agreement as to the meaning of the words and images of religion, we do not have objectivity. Dependent as objects are for recognition on social agreement, where there is instead divergence, there is nothing to be called a focus, or object. Lacking any agreement as to details, we have no objective qualities in religion. Neither have we, therefore, a test of objectivity. Truth can not, then, be given to us as an object, or if given, we can not test it, and certainty is impossible. Objective validity, of truth as well as of perception, does not come through religion.

The test which we have outlined proceeds on another basis. Not by agreement, but by reason. Taking the experience, it is studied, and, in another part of the stream of mental life, it is analysed. Those qualities which are found to be necessary to

its existence are acknowledged as true, those destructive of that existence branded as false. It is not an objective test, since it does not depend on agreement. The man who reasons most correctly, and not the majority vote, is the best guide. The validity which comes to any results from the application of this test are therefore due to reason, and not to perception or objective comprehension. The religious consciousness does not, in this case, furnish its own test. The truth which it reveals is recognised as truth, not because all agree to call it truth, but because when tested by our reason it fulfills all demands. It is reasoned truth. The validation therefore comes only after the work of the philosopher or theologian. Not due to him, but tested by him, we owe to the application of this test of reason the validity of our religion. Many times men have sought by the weight of authority to call uniformity in religion the mark and test of truth. Again and again, however, they have failed. Where there is no real agreement, no real objectivity, the objective test of agreement must sooner or later fail. We resort to reason in religion because in no other way is a test of religion's validity possible.

This fact of the necessary use of the reason if we are to give validity to the contents of our religious states, results in a limitation of the field of that revelation. The object of revelation is to assure men. If they can not be assured except by use of the reason, then only such things can be made sure to them as can be certified to by reason. Truth may roughly be classified as *a priori* and *derived*. *A priori* truth is that which depends on nothing else, and comes to

certitude of its own weight. Though it may seem very far from the usual use of the term, the truths of objective perception are of this type. No man may question what I see, and no man, if social agreement exist, may question the reality of any object. It carries conviction by its own presence in consciousness. The truths to which the word is usually restricted are those which likewise make their own way. They are principles on which much depends, but not themselves derived from anything else. Their test can only be the objective test of universality. Time and space are *a priori* because universal. They are for this same reason objective. The test which we are working out can not be applied to such basic principles. Derived as it is from the nature of the religious experience, it is a derived test, and the truths which it validates stand several, at least two, removes from *a priori* universality. It is the lack of any universal element in religion except that of having an exterior source that has forced us, for any description of that source, to this derived test. As a test, it has no business with *a priori* truths. If they come through religion they make their way to acceptance without aid. Such a truth is the existence of an exterior source. But further we can not go. In religion we have found no other universal element. No other *a priori* truth, therefore, can come to us through religion.

The test of validity is therefore to be applied only to derived truth. It is better to put this, that the recognition of anything as true following the application of this test makes it a derived truth. It is well

to meet the objection that this would destroy dogmatic theology, and take from the church all right to put forth dogmas. So far as those dogmas concern a priori truth, they will meet, if true, no challenge. Such is the case with the assertion of the existence of higher powers. Men are so agreed on this that the assertion of it rouses no antagonism. It is the insistence on doctrines which they do not accept which gives to dogma its bad name. The fact that any doctrine needs to be forced on men's intellect, is proof that, if they are normal men, it is not universally accepted, and hence not a priori. Rather the churches have claimed to hold the key to the interpretation of the utterances of the prophets. Such interpretation, however, depends for its acceptance on some agreement as to the terms of that revelation. It must be objective. But as has been already pointed out, agreement on the terms of religion is not found. Hence objective revelation of this type is impossible. Men must test the church which claims infallibility, and that test must be of the type we have found. The reason is the final arbiter as to conflicting claims. Objective truth is truth which is unopposed. The moment it meets any considerable opposition it so far loses its objectivity, and must submit to a test drawn from a consideration of its nature and existence. Such a test is not a priori, for a priori truths in the Kantian sense are deducible from the necessary conditions of experience in general, but not of this one in particular. Dogma can not appeal to them to bolster such particular deductions. As to the place of dogma as a method



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of discipline and teaching within the church we have of course no comment. As a guarantee of intellectual certainty it is useless.

To dogmatism is usually opposed the will of the majority. If truth is not the possession solely of a few or of one, if the guarantee comes not from some one source, then the decision as to what is true would seem to be best made by a majority vote. To the monarchical or aristocratic conception democracy would seem to be the logical opposite. In some respects it is. Instead of declaring that one or a few only possess the key to truth, it declares that all who are religious have an equal insight into that truth. This is the primary assumption of any democracy. The arguments for universal suffrage are based on the assumption that, with the exception of the criminal and abnormal classes, each man has about the same insight into what is best for him. It places all men on an equality in this respect. This is clearly the doctrine of our Declaration of Independence. The justification for the decision as to religious truth by a majority or preponderating vote of a free or representative assembly assumes likewise that each member of that body has an equal ability in judging, if not in discovering, truth. One vote counts for as much as another. This means that the truth is something that can be possessed equally by all. It is something concerning which there is or can be social agreement, and that agreement is decisive with regard to it. In matters of action, a majority vote means that each one voting is assumed to have equal intelligence in judging of the expediency of the proposal. It is something which is to have

objective, social existence. The judgment is made on the basis of the results of former collective actions. We judge of the working of some proposal for future activity by the results of the carrying into action of similar propositions in the past. So the majority vote in this case is based on something which may be equally within the knowledge of all, something objective. With objective truth this method is valid for the same reason. Where the question at issue may be equally well judged by all, substantial agreement among those present will come nearer the truth than the judgment of any one. The decision of the majority is better than the judgment of one because it nullifies the presence of personal peculiarities. So a court of law prefers as many witnesses as is possible so far as they are of equal intelligence and equal opportunity for observation, to aid in a decision as to fact. So also the use in our courts of the jury. The judgment of twelve men as to matters of fact is thought better than the judgment of one. To turn to the decision of numbers as to truth is valid if all have had equal opportunities for the perception of the truth under discussion. Certain truths or rather facts in religion can be so decided. Whether there is or is not agreement as to the contents of the religious experience can only be decided by a consensus of opinion. Whether that experience is a pure matter of feeling, or purely of intelligence, or purely "mystical," is a question of fact, and every religious person has equal opportunity of arriving at a true judgment. In these cases, therefore, agreement among numbers of people is a guide to truth.

The test of truth by numbers, equally with the test

by agreement with dogma, rests on the assumption that the truth is given in objective terms. When the truth is not so given, there is a serious question whether the decision of even all but one of mankind is a guide to the truth. It is just the religious man who asserts that numbers do not guarantee truth, and that he is justified in standing out against the world. In so far as he believes the truth to be a priori and objective, equally given readily to any one, he is wrong in this, for what is the possession of all is best judged by the voice of all; but in so far as religious truth is as we have found it to be, derived and not objective, he is right. The facts of gravitation were known to all, but Newton was justified in setting his judgment against the judgment of the rest of the world. The facts were common property, but the theory, which is derived from the facts, was due to the insight of one man. The man untrained in scientific methods and scientific deductions is not as well qualified to judge as is the scientist. The parallel here to our courts of law still holds. While the judgment of the jury as to the facts of the case is taken, the interpretation of the law is made for them by the judge. Since that judgment as to the law in the case depends for its validity on a trained judgment, not every man is equal in his judgment concerning it. It is true that our highest courts decide by a majority vote, but it is a vote of those thought best qualified among all the nation to decide such questions. The decision is by those trained in the law. It is an intellectual decision, of deduction from legal principles. The illustration applies to the test of religious truth. In so far as that truth is de-

rived, we can not trust the decision of the man unskilled in the deduction of religious truth, but must rest our assurance elsewhere. Even among experts, however, numbers do not assure truth. Some new light may come to a man outside the ranks of the professional theologian, and he be found right and they wrong. That is only a further proof that numbers or position do not guarantee the validity of an intellectual deduction.

Authority, whether of power or of numbers, does not guarantee the truth of religion, for the religious truths are those which we deduce from our experience, and numbers, as we have just seen, can never give such a guarantee for reason. This means that the test of the accuracy of our deduction is to be sought elsewhere. It is not to be found in any social agreement, nor in any external authority. Since such social or external authority can be valid only for objective truths, it is not valid for us. The test must lie, therefore, within the individual experience. Each judgment must meet the standard of individual judgments, and it must be made by the individual. This does not mean that it is necessarily capricious. The individual judgment is subject to its own test of validity. Science does not reject a theory because it comes from one man. Each scientist as he accepts it makes the same judgments as did the author of it. He accepts it not because his fellow scientist proposed it, but because he himself judges it to be true. There comes to be a consensus of opinion among scientific men, but the value of that rests on the value of each individual judgment, and again and again this consensus of opinion has been proven to be in error. The

validity of the doctrine or theory rests for each individual on his own ability to form correct judgments in regard to the deduction of the theory. He does often submit to the superior wisdom of a master, but only because he makes the judgment that the one he follows is better able than he to form correct decisions. It is not position or numbers, but personal ability that is concerned. The authority still rests in the individual judgment. This is the basis of the freedom of religion, as it is of science. The right of every man to his own opinion of God does not depend on his right to a private revelation of God, for such a revelation has no standing in the experience of others, but in his right to make his own deductions from a common objective experience. It is the freedom of science which the theologian claims, the opportunity to express his individual judgment that it may meet the criticism of other individuals, and through the mutual friction, the truth shine more clearly. It is not the freedom of the individualist to disregard his neighbors and go his own way. This freedom is the freedom of open discussion. The man who dogmatically asserts his right to his own opinion, and his right to propagate that opinion, and refuses to stand the test of meeting his fellow seekers after truth, has no valid claim to that freedom. Not because every man has an equal insight into truth is he free, for then the majority, which is against him, would be right in forcing its view on him, but because some one may have a clearer insight, and a greater ability to discern the truth, should each be given freedom of expression. This has nothing to do with freedom of action. A man may or may not have the right to act as he

thinks. Only he should be able to tell what he thinks.

Where no self-evident truth furnishes us with a sure and certain test, and where agreement among some great number is no guarantee of correctness, we must turn to the experience itself. This is what is done in the development of every scientific theory. The facts are observed, and determined by the usual methods of objective observation. They are certified to by agreement among careful observers. The deductions from these facts are then made by the individual judgment, and checked by other individual judgments. It is no longer a question of every careful observer seeing exactly the same things, it is possible to have several theories to account for the same facts. Each theory must be a logical deduction or induction from the known facts. It is often forgotten that a theory is really no more than a test. Where any one of several tests will equally well pass judgment on alleged facts or alleged deductions from the facts, any one of these tests is in so far an accepted theory. They must be of use in this testing. By pointing out what are the qualities necessary to account for the facts, and what qualities can not be present so long as the facts are as observed, the theory furnishes a test to save time in future inquiries. The theory is correct or incorrect according as it rightly or wrongly makes this analysis of the facts, according as the reasoning in the analysis is right or wrong. The accuracy of the theory depends, therefore, on the correctness of its logical procedure. If we have a correct theory of some physical phenomena, we have the description of the things whose presence or absence is necessary to account to those facts. This enumeration becomes

test is and what forms of religion it would call the truer, we shall therefore not attempt to say. Limiting ourselves to the task of proving the necessity of a scientific test for religion, we leave to others the use of such a test. We are thus kept outside the whole realm of theory, and so outside of the science of religion, and have to deal only with those things which may be proven. This latter field is by no means unimportant even for the science of religion, for until a basis such as we are striving to give to that science is reached, the results of its work will have no more validity than the dogmatic pronouncements of ecclesiastical authority. Except where dealing with facts, as in the history of religion, scientific study in the religious field has not met with the recognition among church people that it has deserved, because of this apparent opposing of dogma to dogma. When it is seen that the scientific theory of religion has a valid and a necessary place in theology, we shall find theology making more use of it.

The use of scientific methods in the study of religion must be based on correct observation. Yet the process of analysis is not derived from that observation, though the analysis itself is. The process is that worked out through long ages as the correct logical method. The process is thus independent of religion. Its validity depends on something else than on the religious experience, and would be valid even though there were no religion. To call such a science merely the application of a theoretical test is therefore not to do it justice. The test which is applied is the result of the same methods which have made possible our great advance in the control of the forces

of nature. Similar methods are giving us, at least so it seems to the optimist, control of the social and economic forces in the world. It is because of this general validity that the application of such a test to religion opens the way to a practical development. It is theory that has led the way in the advance in these other fields of natural and economic science. It is to theory, scientific theory, that the religious world is turning more and more in search of a solution to its problems. The very part of the process which is least subject to guarantee, the mental process of reasoning, is the means, in these other fields, of our modern advance. It is evident, therefore, that advance can be attained in religion, if the analogy with the other fields of human endeavor has any value, by the use of theories and tests which are not absolutely beyond error, but which can be used until greater certainty comes. By their use greater knowledge is attained, and thus greater certainty made possible. Just as the search for the process that would transmute the baser metals into gold has led to modern chemistry, so even an incorrect theory, if used, may result in a greater and fuller knowledge of the religious experience, and of its revelations.



## LECTURE V

### HUMAN AND SUPERHUMAN

In a survey of the different types of religion we find that they all agree in placing the source of the religious experience outside of that experience. In approaching our problem we have to attempt a narrower definition of that agreement. The whole outside is a large field. To place more carefully the source of religion, we need to know its relation to other divisions of life. The chief of these fields of life is human life. So we have to find out whether there is agreement as to the position of the source of religion within or outside of human nature. To do this most easily, it is well to have a brief outline of the position of the various religious types on this point. To make a beginning where religion is least clear, we shall start with animism.

Animism could not well be used in an effort to prove directly the existence of God. It is probably to some animistic religions that reference is sometimes made in the statement that some tribes have no conception of superhuman powers in the universe. It is true that neither that nor the next highest religion, totemism, gives us clear ideas on this subject. One thing they and especially animism do present, however, is the belief in forces, if not superhuman, at least not inherent in man. The belief in sacred

stones or trees points to the attribution to these things of some power. The savage knew as well as we that the stone was not a man, and in his fear or worship of it he differentiated it from himself. It is true he did not understand its inorganic nature as we do, but neither did he have any clear idea of human nature. He did, however, believe very strongly that there was something in that particular stone which could affect him in some very practical and important way. He was convinced that it was not merely with men that he had to deal, but with powers beyond. Whether he identified these powers with the physical tree or stone he himself could not say. But his attitude toward them, the attitude of primitive religion, shows that his experience had reference to something which was not like his fellow men. It is true that at times he may have held this same attitude toward a fellow man, as shown by the tabu which often surrounded king and priest. At such times he regarded them as different from the rest of mankind; something had entered or been born in them which was not the common lot of man. In this case too, he differentiated between his nature and the nature of the being he worshiped or feared. The very center of his attitude was that the priest-king, the tree or the stone, was different from himself. The source or object of his experience of these objects and of his relation to them is therefore, in his belief, to be found outside of ordinary human nature. The religious object is conceived as superhuman.

At times it has seemed that the result of our study of totemism would be to conclude that it was not religion at all, if we define religion as worship. The

totem hardly, according to some views, seems to be worshiped, so much as coerced by formulæ, or bargained with by the performance of the proper rites. With the definition of worship in the narrow sense we are not here concerned. Whether the totem is worshiped or bargained with equally proves it something apart from the normal idea of the clan or tribe. While it may be thought of as the ancestor of the clan, and said to have initiated the ceremonies which the clan performs now as worship, yet the totem is different from the clan. The totem is in relation to the clan, but even when most personified, it is through that relation that it has a part in the clan life. The lion or the corn does not cease to be non-human when it becomes a human totem. Perhaps it is the qualities of physical power in the lion or of nourishment in the corn which is the purpose or practical effect of the relationship for the clan. It is because the connection with the totem brings something that the clan can not get through its own human power that the totemic ceremonies are so carefully continued and so exactly performed. In all ages, especially where the struggle for the first necessities of existence presses as hard as it does upon the savage, not much time is put on things which could be attained more easily in other ways. If the savage believed that he got nothing from his totem except what he could get from himself, his totem would no longer be of interest to him. But because he is convinced that from the totem come powers which he himself does not have, he prizes his relationship to it. The object of his religious attention is in his mind clearly outside of humanity.

Taking its beginning from the formulæ of animism or the practices of totemism, prayer and especially sacrifice is common to all the higher forms of religion. As mankind advanced, the sacrifice,—mainly at first in its form of the offering of the god in the sacrificial meal,—and invocations to the god, came more and more to take the form of petitions. Probably there always remained some element of the magic idea that the god, if the proper words were uttered, his true name spoken, must answer. Still, in the earliest hymns of the Aryan invaders of India, as in the worship of Babylon and Egypt, and even more clearly in that of Greece and Rome, it is a power beyond man which is addressed. Sacrifice, which had been the offering of the god, came to be an offering to the god, as we have it in the prevailing idea of the Old Testament teaching of sacrifice, so prevalent that it almost hides the earlier idea of the sacrificial meal. The primitive worshiper may have thought that he could compel or constrain the god, but to do this required methods which were not the ordinary methods of human intercourse. It was not as he constrained men in daily life, but in a far different way, that the priest sought to obtain from the god his request. The god was in closer relation to that ordinary life than many to-day believe God to be to us, but still the god was not the same as man. So easily was any deviation from normal or ordinary manhood looked on as divine, that those men whose exploits made them seem different from other men were called the offspring of gods. It is the deviation and not the likeness to men that characterises the god. For all “natural religions,” therefore, we may be sure that

the object of religious pursuit was conceived as super-human.

Among the more advanced religions Buddhism may seem to offer an exception to this agreement. With its teaching that god and man are alike caught in the round of rebirth, the distance and distinction between them is reduced very low. If, however, we look, not on the worship of the gods, but on the pursuit of Nirvana, or of enlightenment, as the special religious experience of the true Buddhist, for around this their whole doctrine of the Buddha centers, then this Way or Path becomes the object of their religion. Whatever it may be that constitutes Nirvana, the Buddhist asserts strongly that there is something. And he as strongly asserts that that something is to be attained by the annihilation of all human desires. Only by ceasing from those activities which we of the west call the essence of human life can this enlightenment be attained. It is therefore not what we would call human. The power of this Way therefore takes its rise not in humanity, for to tread it we must leave our humanity behind, but it comes from something or is something which is not our seeming and ordinary self. The Buddhist religion therefore claims to be a relation to something even more different from human nature than are the gods. They share some human characters, they are creatures of time but true religion and true salvation are to be found in a something having about it still less of this world of time, still less human. It is true that for some forms of Brahminism allied to Buddhistic reasoning this which is found by self-abnegation is the true self. That is only to say, as the Christian often does, that the

ordinary man, the man as he lives in the world, is not true to his calling. It is however, this ordinary man from whom we take our category of "human." The abnegation of this normal manhood which is necessary for these forms of Brahminism and for Buddhism points clearly to the fact that the goal of endeavor is something beyond the normal manifestations of humanity.

The remaining type of religion, under which may be grouped all the forms which we have not considered separately, is theistic religion. This might not seem to require more than passing notice, since the very thing that gives to these religions their character is that the theist believes in a god. The problem is not quite so simple as this, for it is not belief that we are concerned with, but the religious experience, so that what we care about is whether the theist attributes to the god the origin of his religious attitude, or regards the god as the object or end of that attitude. It is possible to believe in a god and do neither of these two things. The man of to-day who is intellectually willing to believe in God as a primal force or essence, but who feels no religious emotion or will centering around that belief, is a theist, but not religious. With him and with that type of intellectual theism we are therefore not concerned. Religious theism takes two forms, which we may conveniently call deistic and mystical. The deistic, as most clearly theistic, confronts us first. To the deist,—and that term probably includes the mass of people who have an interest in the churches, yet could not be called devout, the occasional attendants,—to them God is a power, rather removed from their everyday life, with

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whom it is well to keep on good terms. At times he interferes in their life and must be taken account of. I do not mean that they necessarily believe in miracles, but they believe that at least at great crises God touches the lives of men, and is more or less present in the social and moral movements of the age. Yet because they do not feel that power in any direct way, they tend to ignore it. They may attribute the social reforms to some spirit of progress in humanity, and so put the source of their religious experience elsewhere than in God. With these it is not so much, however, that they deny the presence of God in religion, as that they have little religion. The pursuit of other ideals, even though those ideals are tenement or labor reform, leaves little energy or time for them to develop the religious side of their nature. Little time is found in which to ask the question as to whence came the impulse that led them into this reform movement. In a certain way they are religious, but their religion, their consciousness of some power outside of momentary experience seldom comes to consciousness. They seldom have, therefore, that conscious experience which we are studying. Yet with all there are moments when they feel that the power that sweeps over them is more than their ordinary limited will could accomplish. They come to feel that they are the spokesmen for the fundamental powers of existence. So far as the religious Socialist claims that his activity, his social experience, is the result of his awakening to the fact that such principles are fundamental to existence, are larger than the mere will of man, he attributes his experience to something beyond man. The few indi-

viduals who directly deny this do so, probably, in the heat of conflict against the pressure of orthodoxy and the "rich man's" religion, and do not call their experience religious. For the deist, so far as he is religious, his religion is a relation to a power which is not limited to man.

The other type of theism and of religion is the mystic. For the man who experiences the mystic trance there can be no doubt that he has a religious experience. The question comes as to his belief in regard to that experience. At times we seem to have the practice of Buddhism without its positive teaching of a goal. To outsiders at least, devotion to a religious object seems to be more for the emotion or trance than for the good of the object worshiped. The ecstasy seems, whether in trance or in the stress of emotion, to be an end in itself. To a certain extent the mystic does seek to induce the trance, as the revivalist seeks to rouse the emotions in order to reach the religious experience desired. It is the negative aspect of mysticism which proves to the mind of the mystic that the outsider is wrong. The more the mystic state is sought as an end in itself,— we are no longer speaking of revivals,— the more is the insistence on self surrender. The mind must be emptied. It is not even a question as with Buddhism of enlightenment. The way may be similar, but the Christian mystic sometimes has even less of a goal in sight than has his eastern brother. Equally though, does he insist on the abolition of desire. To reach the desired state, the world must be left behind. With the Quaker it is the Inner Light which points the way. Here too, then, a power or object beyond normal



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humanity is sought. That not always is this object clearly identified with God need not bother us, for "God" is usually in such a case thought of in non-mystical terms, due to the pressure of orthodoxy. As the mystic is not very much interested in the intellectual outcome, not at all if the mystic state be his sole concern, he does not stop to correct the ordinary idea of God. The object of his religious endeavors, however, is not the God of the populace around him, but the power, superhuman, which he finds by divesting himself of his humanity in the mystic state. For the mystic too, then, the source or object of religion is believed to lie beyond the limits of human personality.

Such is the claim of religion in all its forms. It is, in the minds of those who experience it, a relation to something beyond their individual life, and beyond the sphere of human limitation. In understanding this claim we must have a clear idea of what we mean by individual and supra-individual, of human and superhuman. We can most easily start with the idea of individual. And first the logical concept. Our first understanding of a thing when we think of it as an individual thing is that it is concrete. In some way it is unique. Even if there are thousands of other pins so near like this one that we can not tell them apart, still they do not have the same relation to space, to you and to me and to one another as this one has. Though alike, they are not this one. Whatever may be in common, this pin is itself not shared by any other pin. In its tin no other pin has any concern, though the other pin be tinned from the same piece of ore. Concreteness is not synony-

mous with "given." The shape of these pins is equally "given," but being the same for many pins, it is, in relation to the pins, not concrete, because it is something which two distinct individuals possess in common. In relation to other shapes, however, it is concrete, because it is just itself, and is not in common shared by itself and something else. So far as it is concrete it is not shared. It must be recognised also that concreteness is equally with its opposite a concept. It is something which is common to those objects we call individuals. Concreteness is therefore not itself an individual, except in the world of concepts. Whether a given fact or thing is an individual depends therefore on our point of view. If we find in it, and emphasise, its complete unlikeness in some particular to anything else in the world, then it is concrete, and in so far is an individual.

A human individual as a concrete being is in so far unlike any other human being. He is an individual by reason of this partial unlikeness. Whatever he may share with others is not concrete and individual. The detective uses the thumb prints to prove the identity of the individual because they are never just the same for any two persons. The individual characteristics are those which a person does not share with others. Breathing does not make a man an individual, because there are other beings who breathe, but being in this part of space at this time does mark him off, for no other material object is here at this time. In a given assemblage, if the one is seated and all the rest standing, that one has an individual character. From this point of view an individual experience is one which is not shared with any other being.

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A concrete experience is by its concreteness different in some respect from all other experiences. Whether there are any but concrete experiences we need not ask at this point. If when some other person looks at an object it is seen differently, with a slightly different color, and from a different angle, then we have an individual experience of that object. Each of the two differing perceptions is concrete and individual because of the difference. The individuality is shown in the contribution which is made to the experience by the perceiver. Each experience, since it is never in just the same relation to the object or to the other perceptions within the same field of consciousness, is so far unique. Its concreteness and individuality consist in the quality of not-to-be-repeated. The human individual, then, is that existence whose parts will never be found in exactly the same way in any other human being. He is concrete and individual because of this unlikeness to all else.

Concreteness is sufficient to define individuality, but there are other characteristics which are important. In a sense they are the result of the individual's concreteness, but it is easier to draw out their meaning independently. Chief among these is the determination of the individual. What is individual is fixed and unchangeable. The things about an individual which may be changed are not what constitute him an individual, for when changed, the resulting being is different from the preceding, and so is another individual. We then have two concrete beings, not one. We say that the individual persists in spite of change, and that his individuality shows itself in his persistence. A typical case is that of the

number series (1, 2, 3, etc.). The terms of the series, if given one by one in successive moments of time, are in constant change, yet the series remains constant, and would not be a series without the change. In so far, however, as the series is something common to its terms, it is their common law, it is not concrete and individual. It is only when regarded as differing from other series that it becomes concrete, as from the series 1, 4, 16, etc. Any one member of a class is an individual in respect to the class. The law of the series persists and shows itself as individual even though the terms change, but only as individual compared to other changing systems. In relation to them it is determined by whatever is the difference between them. If we define a concrete series, we have a series which will not satisfy the requirements of the definition of another concrete series. The series of even numbers can not be so defined as to be identical in all respects with the series of odd numbers. Their concreteness, their individuality, shows itself in this fixedness or determination. It is not subject to our will. Not because it is a fact, but because it is a fact held in by limitations so as to be always partially unlike anything else, is it an individual.

Applied to the human individual we see that his limitation is important. It is the persistence of the unlikeness of one man to another throughout life that marks the individual man. Because there is this fixedness, there is limitation. One individual can not completely transcend the limitation and enter into another's experience.

Especially, however, is the logical limitation important. Because he is an individual, the definition

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which will completely designate him can not be the definition of any other man. An individual experience can not be defined adequately by a definition which will also adequately define another experience. Because of this determination, the individual is logically a fixed quantity. Whatever causes him to be regarded as an individual fixes him in some one quality, at least. Because he is unique the thing which constitutes that uniqueness can not be lost and he remain an individual. A grain of sand on the seashore can remain an individual grain of sand only so long as it is not dissolved in water and its shape and position lost. Since its individuality consists in shape and position, once these are gone, though chemically it may be the same, it is not a concrete individual grain of sand. So with the human individual. He must keep certain things which no one else has, and the more of these limitations he possesses the more individual we call him. Individuality therefore shows itself in limitation and definiteness.

The individual is concrete, and determined or definite. Because of this definiteness he is also limited. In whatever constitutes his individuality he not only can not change that, but also he can not take on other qualities inconsistent with it. While this is an evident consequence of the idea of the persistence of definiteness in the individual, it needs consideration by itself. As an individual I am not free to go on expanding and seeking larger experience wherever I desire. As a member of the individual race called man I can not see the ultra-violet rays of light. As a Caucasian I can not have the experience of a negro. As one sitting in this room I can not have the experi-

ence of one sitting in the next room. I may go into the next room, but I can not know just what is happening there now. A series is concrete because it can develop only in certain ways. The number series can not include fractions so long as it is an individual series and concrete. This logical limitation becomes actual the moment the individual tries to perpetuate himself. When he tries to keep his particular peculiarities, and at the same time accomplish something which will destroy those peculiarities, one of two things must happen, either the larger experience does not come, or he becomes more like other men, and less of an individual. When we are dealing with logical individuals, as in a number series, the limitation is also actual. So long as according to the rules 2 and 2 are 4, we can not in truth make their sum any different. We are limited in power over what may be called our own creation because we have created individuals. Individuality, so long as it is preserved, gives fixedness, and this fixedness means limitation. Instead therefore of calling the logical individual free, he is in a certain sense self limited. In some direction, whatever it may be that constitutes him an individual, he can not seek change. He has not absolute freedom.

So far as the human being is an individual he is thus not free. This means that his individual experiences are limited. Because of their individuality they can not go on indefinitely expanding in any and all directions. If I have an individual experience of an object, unless that experience can cease to be individual and be shared by someone else, it is called an hallucination or imagination. All objects which are

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social experiences, common to many people, are objects whose experience for different individuals has not much individuality. Only when many people see some object in very nearly the same form and with the same qualities do we call it a material reality. So far as an experience is individual it is limited in its scope. Of this the social agreement is the opposite. So far as we agree in our experience with others we are not having individual experiences. So long as our experiences remain individual, they can not change in a way that will destroy these differences. The logical limitation is here an actual one if the individual is striving to perpetuate these differences. By striving to be distinct from others, he must work against those things which he has in common with them. His experience will thus be limited by his own will.

The field of limitation will vary as the qualities which mark the individual vary. All individuals will be concrete, determined and limited in part. With reference to any of the categories of experience which are not included among these limitations, no general rule can be laid down. A whole number has no fixed or limited place in space, but only in the number series. Partial limitation does not prevent indefiniteness in every other direction but the one. For further definition of the individual experience we have therefore to turn to the closer study of experience itself. The one point which, in view of the controversies about the existence of God, is important for us, is the relation of individual experience to time. Experience comes to us so far as other categories are concerned, and so far as the present is involved, in one

mass. So we speak of the field of experience. When taken with reference to the flow of time, it is not so continuous. There is the time span, or specious present. Though the boundary lines may be dim, we experience a difference between our past and our future. The individual experience has a fixed place in this stream of time. It may entirely fill our consciousness, or it may share our attention with other experiences, but as an experience it must occur now, at this particular hour and day, or have occurred at a definite time. It is the experience of last week or of to-day. When the waning or waxing is gradual, we may not be able to put definite limits to it, but at its maximum, if it was clearly in consciousness, it has a definite time place. That is to say that experience is a stream, and an individual experience is some definite part of that stream. Just as the number 3 has a fixed place in its series of whole numbers, so my present experience of this room has a fixed place in its series, the stream of my mental life. As this stream is a temporal series, experience to be individual must be limited in time. It may extend over all time, if it is the experience of an eternal being, but it does so by being his experience at each moment of time. It is like a series of 1, 11, 111, etc. Each term is composed of ones, which form the series, but they do so only by forming each term. So each individual experience has a definite time place. This definiteness in time is not always prominent, but if our memory is good, looking back on it, we can date it, or in any case we can partially date it as past or present. A thing to be given in individual experience must therefore be given definitely in time.



What is true of our perception of our own experience holds true of our experience of another individual. For us a human being is not a logical individual simply, such as a number or a star, but a being with whose experience we may come in touch. That experience, like any experience, has a fixed place in time. Not in our time series is it to be found, it is true, but it may be correlated with ours. To-day you are having such and such experiences and I such and such others. Both have place to-day. To realise an experience as belonging to another individual, we must recognise it first as being an individual experience. There must be something in it to distinguish it from our own experiences. As an individual experience partly in our consciousness, it has a definite place there in the stream of time. We know when we first met or heard that individual. So in the perception of another human individual we give or find that individual in a definite place in the stream of time. So far as human individuality goes, individuality means definiteness in time. Those experiences which bring most clearly another personality to our attention thereby fix themselves definitely in our life at a definite point.

In general, that which is extra-individual is the logical opposite of the individual. Yet, because the same thing may be both individual and extra-individual, a careful definition is necessary from the basic point of view; that is, we will approach the definition of the extra-individual without reference to our definition of individuality, except as that may guide us to the prominent points. First, what is extra-individual is what is general or common. The general is usually

defined so as to be the logical opposite of the individual. In one sense extra-individual and general are synonymous, but there are other qualities in the extra-individual which the word "general" does not bring out. But that word is important. The general is to be found in more than one experience. It is something held in common by two or more individuals. It is thus a tie between them. By it we may form those particular individuals into a class. The general character of man, his upright attitude, and so forth, make it possible for us to distinguish between mankind and the lower animals. That which is extra-individual is so because it is thus common to more than one individual. Logically the general experiences are the basis of all advance. The common tie, if contrasted with other general experiences, becomes itself an individual. Man is one individual race among the higher animals. The animal kingdom itself is an individual part of the universe. So the extra-individual may become individual. It is general, however, only so long as it is recognised as something found in common in several experiences. In relation to these it is not an individual experience. The extra-individual is therefore that which is common to two or more individuals. As the individuals which interest us are experiences, we may say that what is common or general in experience is extra-individual. It is the common tie or bond.

As a tie between individuals, the "general" partly defines those individuals. If their individuality consists simply in what general terms apply, and what their arrangement is, these general terms or qualities taken together will completely describe the individual.

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In any case they partly describe it. Logically they partly determine it. It is on the basis of these common qualities that we group individuals into classes. On this account the general or class terms form the basis, and give us the possibility of conception, and so, of reasoning. So far as it is general, the class term is free. It is the limiting common factor in the group. By use of it all that do not come under its sway are not influenced by it. That is, those individuals which do not have this character are not related to other individuals by it. Its influence is this relating of one to the other. The limiting is not merely static, but logically determinative. Without this common quality, there would be no class grouping and without the class conception we would have no relation. The forming of the relation is a result, since the relation appears in the mind, of the recognition of this common factor. Or we may regard the relation as existing before recognition of it by the mind, then the relation determines the perception by us of its existence, as we recognise this common factor. Whether we start with the relation or with our experience of it, at the end with which we start we find logical determination. Either the relation brings to pass the form of perception as a general quality, or the common quality forces us to conceive the relation. In either case there is a one-directional relation. One term to this relation is the logical explanation or gives that explanation for the other term. A general experience is related to the individual experience in this way. It is the string which binds them together. One such string is the self, the human individual taken as a whole. The common

quality rests here perhaps in the body, but wherever it is, it shows itself as a determining factor. Our idea of the individual is built upon those experiences, it is those experiences bound together. The type of the individual therefore depends on the common character. To our perception it is determined by that character. General concepts are thus the reverse of static. Taken in a static form, the individual is fixed, he is determined as different from other individuals. Taken as dynamic, the character of the individual is the result or cause, whichever way we read the relation, of the inclusion of some, and the exclusion of other, experiences from that group which we call the individual man. The presence of some determining factor marks our conception of general qualities or terms.

To be determinative, the general can not be entirely limited. This we find is the case. A general term, while as one of a class inclusive of itself it may be partially limited, as regards the terms which compose it, can not be so limited. If in a line the thing which marks off one individual from another is position, or distance from the starting point of the line, then the line itself must be unlimited in direction. As a quality common to all the individual points in the line, it can not itself have any individual position so far as distance from the start is concerned. It must include all such distances. The general or extra-individual term must be unlimited in just those directions where the individual is limited. For those qualities which are common to all human individuals, there can not be limits formed by the individual characters of men. Walking can not rightly be lim-

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ited in conception to any one kind of walking, but must include all the differing individual gaits. Being thus partially unlimited, the general characters of men must be somewhat indefinite. In the direction where the common qualities must be all inclusive, there can be no boundaries. We must remember that as regards the concrete and distinct experiences that make up our personal life, personality or character is a general term. It is the common factor in all these various types and instances of mental content and mental experience. It is, therefore, as regards these smaller bits of experience, unlimited. While vision must relate itself to material facts, and has to do with experience of the physical world, and muscle sensation has to do with a feeling of activity in that world, the personality has no such necessity laid upon it of relation to a world found only in space. Because it is general, it is not bound by those limitations of partial human experience. So of those things which are common to all human individuals. What is human can not be limited to any one type of humanity. A human being as such is neither black nor white nor brown, and a picture of him can not be made. In these directions the concept of humanity is unlimited and hence indefinite.

The mark of the human concrete experience is its place in the stream of time. Each individual or distinct experience is such largely, if not entirely, by its having its particular place in the stream of our consciousness. The individual personality, since it is the common element in each moment of that stream, can not have any definite place in it. Human personality as such is therefore not datable. Since

this is true as regards the individual experience it is even more evident when we take into account all human individuals. A man can not bring to his mind himself as non-existent just because he does not give to his self, that is to his personality, any place in the series of time. Having no place, it can not lose that place. It is an element common to all of his experience. Only by reference to things outside his experience, found in the experience of other individuals, can he date his own experience. But as regards his own knowledge, he has always existed and always will exist. The same is true of his conception of personality in general. Since for him personality has no time character, but is to be found in all time, so for all, for human personality in general, he makes the same deduction. We do not need to be reminded that this is the basis for many of the stronger arguments for immortality. Whether justified or not depends on how far our ideas of personality hold true in the world of fact. Of the fact that we do conceive personality to be thus timeless there can be no dispute. If we are to set limits to humanity, it can only be by giving human personality a place in another series in which it will be an individual episode. As general and not individual, it has no definite place in time. The logically *supra* or *extra* and inclusive individuality must have this indefiniteness as to date. To include experiences of various dates, it must itself be indefinite in temporal place. The source of religion, or God, can only be conceived as eternal.

In discussing individuality, we have referred to the human individual, but have not considered humanity

as a whole. This we must now do, because an experience might be supra-individual, found in many individuals, and yet not be found outside of humanity. In defining our meaning of human, we have to define this particular one among the individual types of being. Any individual existence, whether of what we call one being or of an individual class, is regarded as individual because of the possession of certain qualities which other individuals do not possess. Man has to be defined in accordance with this, in terms of those characteristics which are peculiar to humanity. Not every quality that man possesses enters into this definition. He has existence, but so has every real thing, so existence is not a thing we can use in our definition. It is not a mark of human nature, though always present in human beings. In this sense it is not to be classed as human. There may be other qualities, which, though not known to be found in other beings, yet may be. We have therefore no right to be dogmatic in limiting the sphere of some quality found among men, unless that quality is essential to our understanding of humanity. Where its absence would give us a creature unlike man, and its presence in other beings would make them practically men, we have a right to call that quality an essential mark of humanity. There may also be some quality whose absence is necessary to our understanding of human characters. Its presence is therefore a mark of the non-human. In this case, its absence would not make us regard other beings as men, unless again the quality was so prominent that its absence is almost sufficient by itself as a mark of humanity. It is evident that all the ex-

perience which falls to a man is not in this sense human experience. Human qualities are those which mark off mankind from other beings. This use of the term is necessary if we are not to be misled by it, and simply because an experience is found among men claim that therefore it can be found and have its source nowhere else. We shall restrict our use of the word human to those qualities which are limited to human beings.

On the physical side the features of mankind are such as to plainly distinguish him from the other types of animal life. Among the various kinds of physical beings known to us, there is none at all like man. His nearest kin, the apes, are plainly distinguished. Even the lowest forms of man have the upright gait, and the physical characters we call human. Where there comes a nearer likeness to the ape we are so fixed in our usage of the word, that what we dispute is whether these are or are not really human beings. Even if the borderland is vague, human characteristics are so definite that for the mass of mankind there can be no doubt that human beings are distinct in looks from all other animal life. In the social life of civilised man, which we recognise as the normal life, normal even for what we call savages, as shown in some form of clan organisation, in the use of weapons, and in social co-operation, we find features as distinctly belonging to man as does the form of his body. The rudiments may be found among the lower animals, but not as they are found in and mark off man. The ability to recognise and use other beings, whether a stone or piece of wood as a weapon, or a man as an



assistant in accomplishing what he wants, is distinctive of man. This holds only with the general class of physical beings. Coöperation among angels, if they exist, is not in question, for such coöperation is not physical. The human being is thus one among physical beings, and marked off from them by this social coöperation. We may perhaps condense the statement to the form that one distinguishing mark of humanity is its social life. Not by gifts of sight or hearing, or scent, has man won his rule over the animal world, but by this willingness and ability to have assistance in the contest. The human experience, as distinct from what is not especially human, is therefore preëminently a social experience.

This social life is to be attributed to man's intelligence, so that intelligence may be said to distinguish man from all other physical beings. Bearing in mind our purpose to reach some conclusion as to the justice of the claim of religion that it proceeds from an intelligence beyond man, our principal concern must be with the distinctive features of the human intelligence as compared with the intelligence of possible higher and non-physical beings. Man's intelligence on its positive side is marked by what may be called the power of self-control. Some have argued that intelligence and consciousness arise only when action is halted by some inner conflict, and that consciousness and intelligence come in to solve the problem and allow action. The human being is able to weigh results, and we call that man the highest type of man who does exactly what he intends to do. There is a use of the word human, to excuse the yielding to emotion, as when we say that

some act is wrong, but "human," which seems to contradict this. Such a use, however, does not mean that weakness is a distinguishing mark of men, but only that it is usually found among men. That use may be allowable, but it is not what we are after. So, restricting the word human to mean that which marks man off from other beings, we find this mark in the intelligent will, the conscious judging and forecasting of results, and then the execution of what is planned. Even our emotions we seek to bring under control, and the more man advances, the more he is taught to control his failings. The American Indian was taught to suffer in silence, and we Americans do not weep in public. Man is forced to control his desire for blood vengeance, and moderate his anger. This means that the subjection of the emotions is human. A being without emotions is something that we can not call human. And those experiences where we have no emotions to subdue, are not the ones we call typical. Any intelligence can solve, even more easily than we, our scientific problems and our business worries, but only a being with emotions and with the desire to subdue them can have the typically human conflicts. The human intelligence in its positive work thus rests on this conflict. The absence of the conflict would leave us with something else than a human being.

The positive side of intelligence is this struggle. On the negative side we find the limitations of sense perception. This is expressed by the psychologist by saying that every idea has as content only what we have experienced. The human intelligence is the intelligence of a physical being. As compared with

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possible non-physical beings, this gives it its distinguishing character. Let the conceptual form be what it will, the material of human experience must be from the field of sense perception, that is, from the material world. So far as he transcends that world, man is no longer a physical being. To be human he must be physical. Man is primarily known as one among the types of physical life. If he transcends the physical world, therefore, man transcends his own humanity. The human intelligence is the intelligence which is concerned and is in touch with the physical world. This is true both as regards the lower animals and as regards higher beings. Man's intelligence makes it possible for him to use fire arms and drive off the wild animals, and also to build houses and live with a comfort those animals do not know. As regards higher beings, man is limited to this physical world for his positive experience. Human life is a life lived in the midst of the effort to maintain physical life. If at times men have seemed to put their whole energy into the effort to forget that life, the mass of men has never followed. Asceticism has remained a counsel of perfection, for to the great majority of men, and even to the ascetic, human life is physical. The limitations of that intelligence which is distinctive of human life is therefore that it is bound to the physical world.

The typical man must therefore be one in whom the social life is evident, one whose life contains physical emotions together with the will to control them, and whose intellectual life is centered on the physical existence. To be able to make the assertion

that a given experience must be limited to the bounds of human experience and human life, that experience must show these qualities. There may be other characteristics which mark humanity, but these there surely are. No experiences which do not show these marks can be with any assurance limited to man. If it is not social, it may be an experience of something kin to the spirit of the lower animals, or what we sometimes conceive to be the impersonal attitude of the universe. As the rain falls on the just and on the unjust, so disregard of our fellow human beings may be more fundamental than our social attitude. In any case it can well occur in other beings than in men. If some experience touches a world which is not physical, it may be real, but it can not be regarded as distinctive of humanity. Whatever non-physical powers there may be, share in such an experience. Because man has it is no reason to assume that no other than man is in touch with such a world. But the human individual or typical superman limits his attention to physical life. Perhaps this is wrong, and mankind will grow into something different from what it is now. But now, even for the religious man, it is eat or starve. So we start our religious work in the slums with the giving of physical comfort, and our missions abroad with medical work. If we find some experience limited to the physical world, yet social in its character, and involving a conflict of the emotion and the will, we then would be justified in asserting that its origin must be within humanity.

When we come to the ideal of the super-human,

or extra-human, we have to remember that we are concerned not with what has no place in human experience, the unhuman, but with those experiences which do not bear the distinguishing human stamp. They may have a place in every human being, but since they are or may be found also in other beings, we can not rightly designate them as simply and typically human. The first result of this is that they will not have a necessary connection with the human body. Anything that can apply only to man as a physical being, distinct from other physical beings, is inevitably limited to humanity; but what is not so limited may apply to other beings. This possibility of superhuman experiences by man may, at the outset, be called an impossibility if we interpret the psychological theory that the contents of every experience can come only from the sense world, that we can know only what we see, hear, taste, and touch, to mean that we are thereby shut up to what is limited to man. But it is possible, and a fact, that we do experience through our senses other beings than men. The fact that within our world we make a distinction, as we have, of the human and super- or extra-human, shows that there is some difference, some line of distinction, which we recognise. Whatever is found to be in common to man and the lower animals, such as the possession of a heart, can not rightly be claimed as distinctly human. What is in man, then, but does not refer to his body and physical nature, falls under this other category. As in man and also in other beings we can call it superhuman. It is logically a larger class than humanity, since other types of being are included within it.

The superhuman, then, will be without reference to man's physical limitations.

The superhuman will also not be limited to man's social life. That was, as we have seen, the distinguishing feature of man as compared with the lower animals. Also, since the social life in question is a physical life, it can not apply to any non-physical beings. We must not intrude here the religious idea of a divine society. What we meant was simply human coöperation. What is superhuman can not bear the marks of this physical coöperation. If the superhuman is of such a character that we must call it a social concept, we must carefully distinguish between a physical society and one based on some other principle. The superhuman must have the negative characteristic of not being bound to man's physical life as a man among men. Again it is true that the superhuman may be found in the midst of this life, but in itself it can bear no marks of being limited to that life. Human government, since it seeks and seeks only to regulate this physical life, is necessarily human, but the world of scientific theory, since it includes the world outside man, is not to be classed as human. The theory is of human origin, but the material which is involved forces the theory to pass the bounds of humanity. So far as that theory is the result of forces outside of man dictating the form of the theory, it is superhuman. Physical life, as common to all physical beings, is superhuman. In beings of a higher order, if they exist, and have a social existence, it is this reference and limitation to the physical life of human society that will be absent. The spiritually or logically superhuman,

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so far as revealed in humanity and in human experience, is not subject to the limitations of human physical life or social existence.

The superhuman will also lack the other distinctively human characteristic of the inner struggle between the will and the emotions. There may exist this struggle in those beings which are not human, but if that struggle is absent, we know then that we are not dealing with human individuals. This struggle is a character whose presence makes a man what he is. It is positive and not due to the absence of anything. Devils or angels may equally well be caught in a similar struggle. Only we know that if we find a being who does not bear the marks of this contest within himself, we have passed the bounds of humanity. Again we must guard against the religious conception of the true man as the man at peace in himself. For human nature as we know it, and this only can furnish us our data, no such peace is found. Man may win a peace after struggle, but struggle there must be. If, then, we find some sphere of existence, whether within man or not makes no difference, which is of such a character that this struggle with the emotions is absent, we are dealing with something which may be superhuman. It is not born of that which is distinctive of man. In itself it is superhuman, that is, it belongs to that larger world outside of and free from the limitations of human existence. "Larger" is here meant, as also the prefix "super-," in the logical sense. Where we have a peace without conflict we have something which is not the possession solely of mankind. Such a being or experience brings into man something which

had its origin elsewhere than under human limitations. When we find in man an experience which is free from this conflict, we know that we are in touch with this free world of the superhuman.

On the intellectual side the superhuman may be marked by the absence of the limitation to the physical world. Man has a distinctively human intelligence. So far as his mind is free from human limitations, he has something which as before we may call superhuman. So far as the physical world goes, the intelligence which he shares with the lower animals is thus superhuman, or something which is not limited to mankind. As physical intelligence, or intelligence centered on physical objects, shows itself by this freedom from human characteristics, so an intelligence of a possible non-physical being would show itself in a similar non-reference to the physical world. What is distinctively human in man's mental life as compared with that of the dog is found to be involved in man's social life, which distinguishes man from the dog. We shall find the dividing line in intelligence between physical and non-physical beings likewise in what marks their differences as beings, that is, in the presence or absence of the physical life. If the experience we are studying proves to have reference to a non-material world, then we can be sure that it is not the product of forces which are distinctively human. Those forces may not at present be evident outside of human life and experience; if they were we would not know it, but still they are directed towards something, and are the result of something, which we do not recognise as human. Something which is essential to human life is lacking.



If that experience has no necessary relation to the other experiences of our life, if it can occur by itself, then it is not the necessary product of our human life. It may be human and normal to have this experience of a non-material world, but we can not call that experience distinctively or peculiarly human. That experience which refers itself to a non-physical realm must be explained in other terms than those of our human life.

With these definitions of individuality and humanity, we are more ready to examine the claim of religion that it is a relation to a superhuman object or world. As we examine the religious experience we have to bear in mind what we find to be the marks of individuality and of the super-individual, and also of the human and superhuman, and by this result determine in which category the object of the religious experience falls. Applying this test first in the case of individuality, we have the contrasting characters of concreteness and generality. At first it would seem that many of the religious experiences are as concrete as any which men have. The definite and unmistakable commands which come at times to the religious devotee, the distinctness of the moment of conversion, are surely concrete. Not all religion, however, as we saw in our first analysis, has this definiteness. Not every religious experience is concrete. Whatever it is therefore that gives to religion its character as religion, it is not the necessity for concreteness. The religious element may reinforce or show itself in connection with definite moments, but if those experiences which are not concrete are equally religious, and we have assumed

that they are, then the religious element is independent of whether the experience is or is not concrete. We have found that the religious element is of a general type, that it refers to a source outside of itself. It is this, and not occurrence at definite times, that marks religion. But even in the concrete experiences there is a general element. St. Augustine experienced the command that came to him, and so did St. Paul before him, as the command of God. It was not the occurrence of the definite idea, but with that idea that a voice was heard, the conviction that it was God speaking, which brought in the religious element. It was the presence in the experience of this general element of something beyond the concrete moment which makes the moment of value. The experience as religious, as referring to something beyond itself, is therefore general. As general, it is super-individual. In it the individual experiences something which he recognises and calls not-himself. To him it is not an experience of his individual self, but very distinctly of something else. As surely as he gives any meaning to the word individual, he denies that meaning to this experience which opens another phase of life. By its possession of this general character, of having value beyond the concrete moment in which it occurs, the claim of religion to have its meaning in a relation to something beyond the individual experience is reinforced. The whole significance of the experience lies in the fact that it brings an experience which whenever it occurs refers beyond itself. The religious element is this reference, hence the experience of religion is so far general, and not concrete.

The next two terms which define the individual and the general, are that the individual is determined or passive, and the general determining or active. Remembering that we have in mind here logical determination, we find religion coming more plainly than was the case with concreteness under the less individual category. It is the religious experience, the relation of the individual experiences to something which explains them, that marks religion. It is therefore experienced as something which determines or explains concrete experiences. The vision of Paul on the Damascus Road is felt to be brought about by God, that is, it is explained as the touching of the individual life by a power outside of it. What makes this experience differ from those in which the individual is completely determined is that it is this relation to a something beyond which brings to pass the experience. This relation is therefore logically determinative of the concrete expression of it. The concrete experience is referred to this relation to the outside, not this relation to the experience or to something else. In so far the experience of this relation is an experience of something which is not an individual. As we study this type of experience it becomes an individual type, but in relation to the momentary experiences it is general, and is so experienced. We have here then the experience of a relation, not to a physical concrete object. A relation is very distinctly not an individual completely determined. Again, then, we find the claim of religion to be so far justified. Since religion is experienced as a relation, it is something which is different from an individual experience, and its ex-

planation must be sought elsewhere than within itself. That is, there must be two terms and not merely one, which must be known. As regards this point, then, religion is the experience of a superindividual world.

In regard to the next point our first analysis leaves but one answer possible. Religion takes so many forms that we can not call it limited. It preserves its character as religion in spite of all these differences. Hence it is not so limited in form that it will exclude this difference. A concrete individual object, which is individual from every point of view, can not thus take on forms inconsistent with one another. But religion, varying as it does, is equally readily given the name of religion whether definite or indefinite in time, whether with or without the emotional color. In these respects it is unlimited. In any given moment it must be with or must be without, a consciousness of time or of emotion, but experiences of both types are equally religious. The religious element is one which is not definite on these points. In so far, again, it is not completely fixed and determined as an individual would be. In that first analysis we made we came to the conclusion that we were dealing with something different from the experiences which come to us from our senses. This difference lies in the fact that religion is not, as the senses are, concerned with a completely determined and limited individual, but is a general and partially unlimited relation. Fixed within its limits, so that we can fairly easily decide whether a given experience is or is not religious, yet in these other ways it is very indefinite. Therefore again we have the marks rather of a general than of an individual ex-

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perience. This means that there is another term to the relation somewhere which must be taken into account.

One of the marks which we found in that first analysis to which we have been referring, was that the religious experience had no necessary or fixed temporal character. There are experiences in all of us, and in some types of religion no others, in which this experience carries with it no fixed place in time. There is with some a conception of the ideally religious man as the man whose whole life is so filled with religion that it marks the whole stream of his life and consciousness and has no more a fixed place in that stream than that stream has within itself. All may not accept this as an ideal, but when we find the religious experience as it occurs in one of its types coming rather as an added character to at least a part of the mental stream than as an experience filling, or focusing at, some one moment of that stream, we find that again we are dealing not with the perception or consciousness of something which is fixed in time, but of a general character or relation which may be independent of time. In the various forms of mysticism this is very evident. Time and change seem to fall away, and eternity opens before the devotee. As the Buddhist attains Nirvana, he is freed from the recurring round of rebirth. The world of Nirvana is not the world subject to time. The temporal element is therefore no necessary part of religion. In time, as in other respects, it may be unlimited. It is therefore not the experience which has a fixed place and a necessary place in time. It is not an individual experience, as it is not the con-

sciousness of any individual moment of time. It has its character apart from any necessity of referring to concrete moments. It does not bear the marks of individuality, but, instead, of the supra-individual.

So far we have found that religion is not entirely of an individual type, but, in certain respects, of a supra-individual type. This superindividuality, however, is logical, so that we still have before us the question whether the religious experience is explainable as human, or whether it transcends the limitations of humanity. As before, we have to find which of the opposing terms of our definitions rightly includes this experience. The first two terms were "physical" and "non-physical." The answer here is plain. Even though of necessity appearing in the terms of material life, religion has always as an experience meant something more than the form in which it has appeared. The stone which the savage worships means far more than a stone. The experience is not explicable as the perception of the material object. Also, as before, the differing forms show that the religious element is independent of its material presentation. For great masses of people its significance consists in the fact that it is not a revelation of this physical world, but of something beyond. For the mystic, the fact that his experience is supra-individual carries with it the lack of reference to individual material objects. The whole effort of this great type of religion is to attain to an experience which is not limited by the material world. Whatever it is that for the mystic constitutes his experience, even if he does not completely rid himself of material imagery, consists in something

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which the material form does not explain. That particular imagery means more than the same imagery when occurring in connection with physical events. Hence the experience brings in an element which does not yield to the limitations of those experiences which we call distinctively human. It is of a more general type.

The second distinctively human category which we found was that of reference to man's social life. At first it would seem that religion came closely into contact with this, and so, was human. For the savage, religion is inextricably interwoven with his social life. It is difficult if not impossible to say whether his religion is the foundation of his family and tribal life, or the tribal life the explanation for the social form of his religion. The forms of Western religion, especially Christianity, with its emphasis on the Kingdom of God as coming on earth, in the hands of many to-day bear almost exclusive reference to our social life. It is to be noted that in each case it comes into relation with man's life with a tone of authority. For the savage who continues the religious customs of his ancestors because they did it, that is, feels the weight of custom, and for the modern social reformer who seeks to reconstruct our world in terms of some social ideal, we have equally an experience which seeks to transform the physical world. The savage who seeks aid from his religion to bring rain, and the modern man who from a sense of duty to God and right enters into the effort to change the sanitary conditions in our slums, are equally bringing to bear on physical conditions a force which they believe is stronger than the physical

forces. They are appealing to an experience which opens to them the idea of another world in addition to that in which the sole forces are the forces and results of man's physical life. It is this limitation to the physical life which is the marked characteristic of humanity. Religion appears, when it touches that physical life, as a force free from that limitation, and one which is called on to change and even destroy certain of the physical influences at work on mankind. Religion clearly, even more clearly here than elsewhere, bears the marks of the superhuman world. It belongs with those experiences which are without the limitations of our life as a human being. They are human experiences, but they are the experiences which man has of something which is beyond humanity. Those experiences which are man's experiences of himself, or of humanity, do not include religion.

What distinguishes humanity perhaps above all else, in its inner life where real differences are most evident, is the conflict of will and emotion. Man's desires and passions draw him one way, while sober sense and his intelligence beckon him another. Man is a being in whom intelligence has by no means won a complete victory. Hence the conflict is typical of the appearance of intellect, and also of the fact that it is not yet completely dominant. Into this world of stress religion comes as another disturbing force. With the saying of Jesus in mind that he came not to bring peace but a sword, (Mt. 10:34.) we might conclude that religion only added to the conflict, and hence was typically human. The religious devotee again and again brings conflict and physical strife



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into the world as a consequence of his religious belief, but in so doing he is sure of himself. It is the fanatic who is so sure of the agreement of his will and his desire that he will force it on others at the point of the sword. For him the inner conflict is gone. His desires agree with his conception of duty. This may occur by the training of the desires. Then the devotee becomes a man who desires only what is right. This may force him into conflict with the forces of evil, but the conflict is an exterior one. Within himself, even though he die a martyr in the conflict, there is peace. For the savage who has this conflict, even though he is not able to realise it, religion with its insistence on the wisdom of the elders of the tribe and of his ancestors, with the compulsion of custom, half or more than half, unrealised, his desires are trained to wish what is good for him and for his tribe. Whether by nature a warrior or not, he can not live from childhood in an atmosphere where every tribal influence centers on war without desiring to rival his fellows in warlike deeds. When the demand comes from his religion for him to be a warrior, his desires and his will are so far at one that he will submit readily to often extreme tests of his fitness to fight. So on a higher plane religion trains the desires to agree with the idea of right. Its influence where it touches this conflict is therefore to minimise or destroy it. It tends therefore against this human characteristic. In some form, wherever men seek in the religious experience a sense of peace, of freedom from this conflict, it is plainly an experience directly contrary in its character to man's ordinary life. Because it promises an end to

the inward struggle, men turn to it. In this it is evident as an experience that is superhuman in its character. It tells of a world which is not the world of human struggle.

The last test which we have to apply is that of the relation of the religious intelligence to the material world. It touches that world in many places; the most important the one we have just mentioned, its effect on man's inner conflict. To touch, and to be partly in relation with a physical world is, however, no proof that religion's main concern is with that world. It must touch it, for we live in it, and religion is our experience. That this is necessary prevents it being a possible criterion of the experience. All experiences are ours, and so all come into touch with our physical life, the life which *we* lead. That does not, however, prevent them also being in touch with a life which is different from ours. When we find that the experience is not explainable as simply human, when there remains, after we have applied all possible explanations derived from human life, still some qualities which are not explained, we are forced to the conclusion that there is a relation to another world which will explain this experience of ours. This is our procedure with the physical world. Our memories we can largely or entirely control; we can keep an idea before us, or banish it, but with our back turned we can not see an object behind us. In general, with our eyes open, we have to see what is to be seen. At least in normal health, we can not see what is not to be seen, what is not there. The physical world as we conceive it is the result of this lack of control. It is not due to a formal reasoning, but

to the practical necessity of distinguishing between those experiences which are individual and can be controlled and those experiences of the individual which, because they refer to a world beyond the individual, can not be so ruled. The solecism, and subjectivism, and the ego-centric predicament may be problems for the theory of knowledge, but they do not concern us more than any other inquiry after knowledge. Whatever justification there is for positing a physical and a human world, there is the same justification for positing a non-physical and super-human realm. Thus religion has the same rights as the natural sciences. More we do not need to claim, for, once free from dogmatic denial of its right to accept a revelation of a superphysical world, religion is free to develop its scientific account of that world.

Religion coming into human life in a form which is not the form of that human life points to a world outside, to which we must refer it. Free from the limitations of any necessary physical form, independent of the social forces of man's physical life, a pacifier of the inner conflict, its final difference is marked by the fact of its reference to something beyond. Whether it takes its origin from dreams or from imagination (deceit we need not consider) it refers always to something outside of human life. We do not need to accept all or any of the descriptions of that realm, only, from the savage to the mystic, it is referred to a world over which the human spirit has no control. So by rites of one sort or another, or by prayer, he seeks to influence the spirits. As we for practical reasons differentiate our experiences of the outer world and our ideas about

it, so likewise for practical reasons we differentiate our experiences of the physical and of the superphysical world. Physical laws do not hold in religion, man can not control it as he controls his own life or as he rules over the material universe. Hence it is practical experience and not a theory which forces on him the one claim which we found a common element in all religions, that this is an experience of a superhuman world. Because this experience falls under the type, and has the marks of the superhuman, and lacks those of the human, we must acknowledge that the claim is just. So far the religious experience is valid. Whatever it is that men worship, it is at least superhuman.

## LECTURE VI

### PERSONALITY

Throughout much of the discussion of to-day we speak of the source or object of religion without making any effort to define these terms. Before we reach our end we must make our definition of this source-object more exact, or else make sure that we can know no more about it than the vague fact that it exists. This existence which is bound to us by the religious experience may be in that relation either active or passive, and we in that experience may be active or passive. Since no experience can be an experience and stand still, both terms of the relation can not be passive. The alternatives which confront us are, therefore, that we may be active, and religion be an active pursuit of a passive object; or else we may be passive, and religion be the active influence of a power beyond man working on a passive humanity; or, finally, both man and the superhuman may be active, and a mutual interchange occur. As we take these up in order, we have to consider the unseen term as object, as source, and as personality.

First, then, we have to ask in what sense we can call this existence behind the religious experience an object. In attempting to define the word object its uncertain and general use is confusing; hence we can

not assume, but must work out, a definition. When we speak of an object we think first of material objects, things we can see and feel. The stone upon which we tread is felt and seen, not because it forces itself on us, but because by our activity we come into contact with it. Though not under our control to the extent of allowing us to put it out of existence or lift it without effort, still, unless some force acts on it, it will not be lifted. It can oppose but not originate motion. In our visual world it has a certain fixity of form. Here too it opposes change. These characteristics of an object we may take as the primary meaning of the word. We mean, when we call anything an object, that it is relatively inactive, and also that it does not seek to move, but that it opposes motion. We find other things in existence which meet this definition besides material objects; hence we extend the use of the word. Our imagination brings us images over which we have some control, but yet which, once in our mind, tend to go their own way. As imagined they take a fixed form. In themselves they are the result of mental activity, not its movement. So far as they do take a fixed static form, we come to call them objects of imagination. Also we find that the definition applies in the conceptual world. A square is a fixed form. Never even brought into existence by itself, content to remain always a conceptual entity, yet whether merely conceived or found in some real form, it is fixed, and while it can be used, as it is in geometry, it can not be changed. It is even more fixed than the material object. In addition to this conceptual object, there is one further class which in ordinary

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speech also is called objective. While to the man himself his will is the source of activity, yet to another who seeks to modify that activity it is static and resisting. So far, too, as another man sees in the will of his fellow man something constant, a thread of character through the activities of life, that character becomes an object. Something is there which is not the cause of movement in the life of the observer, but which yet resists his efforts in certain directions. The will may thus itself, for another, become an object. When we come to apply to religion the word object, we have to ask how far these passive elements predominate.

The term which immediately contrasts with object is source. As object implies rest, so source implies motion. We speak of the source of a river while the river is flowing, but if the river dries up, or becomes a series of stagnant pools, the first pool is merely the first pool, not a source. The unicellular organisms are spoken of as the source of physical life only by those who believe that there has been a development upward from them. If there has been no development, then the unicellular forms are merely the lowest in a static series, not the source of the rest. The cloud may be called the source of the rain only if the rain is falling, or regarded as likely to fall. In the material world the principal significance of the term is thus to denote the presence in some object of a force which is active. In the conceptual world of modern geometry we find this idea used in a peculiar way. A line is said in some definitions to be generated by a moving point. The point itself is an object, but the moving point is the source of the

line. The same idea occurs in the conception of a series of numbers related in certain definite ways, such as the whole number series, as generated by the relation. This relation, or law of the series, becomes for mathematics the source of the series. It is evident that we here enter into the world of logic. The law of the series is the relation that explains why certain numbers are included and certain others excluded from the series. This logical conception is spoken of here in order to bring out the fact that this element is involved in any use of the word. The cloud is the source of the rain because the presence of the cloud explains, at least partially, the presence of the rain. So the small lake or spring is a source of the river because by its overflow it explains why we have a river there. The ultimate type to which some refer all ideas of motion from one source is the human will. It is not only the willful person who does a thing simply because he wants to. To a certain extent the will is always its own only justification. There is energy there which must seek vent in action. So the will becomes a source of activity. The source here is the thing which explains why the activity took that particular direction. The motive for the murder is the source of the murder when it is sufficient to account for the commission of the crime. When we come to apply this to religion, therefore, we have to keep in mind these two elements. The source of religion will be that which is sufficient to account for the activity which results in the experience.

There remains the third alternative to be defined. It is not so clearly named in one word. Since we are



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concerned with will action, we may provisionally call it the idea of personality. Here the material world fails us, except by analogy. We can observe the effect of the presence of more than one force in some physical event, but the forces themselves remain beyond our reach. Whether they move each other, or whether they obstruct each other, or reinforce, only through the object on which they act is it possible to say. Still we can, in the conceptual world, get a start. Where two forces are active each is modified by the other. So far as we know, the deflection of certain electric vibrations by magnetic influence may be such a direct mutual action. Whether it is such or not, it will illustrate the idea. Before either force reaches expression in motion, there is a combination, and a motion different from what either of the forces alone would produce is the result. Neither force alone is the source of the motion, since neither taken alone will satisfactorily explain it. Neither is either force or even the combination an object, for the character which the combination has exists only for the moment of the conjunction of the two. We really have an object only with some such relation as that of the mechanical couple, where two forces are related by the constant character of being equal and tending in opposite directions. Since we have with two interacting forces neither source nor object, there is need of a third term. What that should be in the physical world is not our concern. Our best example of such interaction comes to us in human experience. Here we know it as the mutual effect of different wills or purposes. For our limited purpose, therefore, we may call this third possibility

“personality.” If the exterior term of the religious relation is neither source nor object, but an active force, interacting on the human will, we may call it the force of personality.

To the possible objection that such interaction of two wills is impossible, because we can know the will of another only by inference, we would say that we do not need to cross the limits of human individuality. Although I do not feel the force of the objection, for reasons which may have become apparent in the definition we used of the word individual, yet we can well pass by the matter here. Within the human individual there is sufficient evidence of the interaction of will forces or separate purposes to serve us for our illustration. When a man is torn by conflicting desires, and no action, or an act unforeseen, results, the explanation is in the conflict. Within the mind two forces have been in partial conflict, and the resulting purpose, if one emerges, is the result of this inner conflict. In many cases there is no such conflict, and one motive quietly influences another, and again the resulting determination must be explained by the presence of both. When a man plans to go straight to a store, and then, because of his desire to go also to another, goes to the first by a roundabout way which will lead him by the other, his course is explainable only by the presence of both desires. The combination of the two was the source of his roundabout path. As conflict of desires is one of the marks of human personality, it seems proper to call this conflict, or in the more general case, conjunction and interaction of forces, by the name of personality. Only we have to remember that we do

not include under the term all the overbeliefs which sometimes accompany that word.

In a certain sense anything may be an object. The will, or the individual personality, may be the object of our study. This does not prevent its activity. Activity itself, as motion in any of its forms, may also be an object of interest. We may study its direction and the energy involved. The religious experience, and the source of it, are the object of our present inquiry. Hence the terms "object," "source," and "personality" are not mutually exclusive. Our interest lies in the question how far any one of these terms exhausts the meaning or nature of the object we seek to describe. Bearing this in mind, we may ask for the fullest meaning which we can give to the word object as applied to an existence like the object revealed in the religious experience. It may, as we have already said, be active. The fact that we see an object does not prevent us seeing that object in motion. We need concern ourselves neither with the old logical objections, nor with possible psychological proofs to the contrary. Whether able to arrive at a logical conception of a moving arrow or not, we do have such an idea, and are able to tell when the arrow is at rest and when in motion. The moving arrow is different as a perceived object from the arrow at rest in the target. Also it does not matter whether our perception is made up of successive junks of time strung together or the motion perceived by a stream of intelligence which is itself in constant flux. Again our concern is only that we have such a perception, and that the motion of the arrow may so far become an object

that we can calculate its energy, and, as in mechanics, build up a science entirely on the basis of motion. Whatever God may be found to be the object of religious perception, need not, in order to be the object of that perception, become a static, unchanging something unlike all else we know. A God who enters into active relations to man can as well as one who does not act be the object of study and perception.

We may take as our subject motion in some form, or activity, but, as object, that motion is not itself an active element in our mind. What is objective is by definition passive. The motion which is the object of study in a system of mechanics is held as a static idea within our mind. To be objectively real it must be thus held. To a possible Bergsonian objection that this is not reality we have only the reply that whether it is or not is just the problem under discussion. In relation to one small part of our total experience, that part which we call the religious experience, we are asking whether the conception of its source as an object completely describes that source. Just at this moment we are only seeking to draw out just what it is to be an object. That the course of centuries can be presented to us within the page or single paragraph no one can deny. It is such presentation which makes those centuries of the past an object to be studied without influence upon us. Whatever influence they may have had, they do not exert it while being studied. Or if they do, they are then no longer simply objects of study, but sources of experience. The artist is in a different mood when he draws out the technique of the master by patient analysis from what he is when he lets the

influence of that master sink in upon him and lead him in new paths, careless often of the old technique. This is more evident in the case of the historian. There is a far stretch from the American who chronicles the doings of an Alexander in order to trace his military methods to the same man when he exults in the valor of his race and his own time. His curiosity or interest in ancient things leads him in the one case, while in the other the influence is exerted by the deeds themselves. The two are more or less intermixed, except perhaps for the school boy who studies under compulsion. For him Cæsar and Cicero are purely objects, without influence or molding power in his life. In themselves they are indifferent to him, and it is only when forced to spend time in studying them that they become distasteful to him. The moment he begins to feel an influence from the life of these men of old they have ceased to be simply objects. The difference is more plainly marked in the differing attitudes of the scientist and the farmer toward plants. To one interested in the theories and the problems of plant life the plant themselves are merely objects in which these problems arise. For the farmer they are still objects, but embodying an entirely new set of problems. The plants themselves do not influence this study. They are, as objects, passive.

To be passive means that an object is without influence on our will. When the astronomer spends long hours in the study of the stars, at which the poet looks awhile, and at which most men never look but merely glance, the difference is not to be found in the stars but in the men. The astrologist was led

to the study of the heavens by a far different motive from that of the modern astronomer. Yet the heavens are the same to all. When some object arouses our curiosity, it is our curiosity and not the object which is active. At other times the same object has no effect upon us. When the need of food forces a man to devise new sources of nourishment, it is this need, and not the fruit hanging in view, which impels him to seize it. When well fed, other fruits of the same kind would not win more than a glance. The mathematical objects are plainly passive. It is not the square or ideal circle, nor even, as in mechanics, motion itself, which impels one towards the forming of the mathematical systems. First, in the history of mankind, some practical need, and now the desire for knowledge, is the motive. Those centuries past, so far as they merely are objects of study, have no influence on us to-day. It requires a great effort to make them live once more even in imagination. They come to the mind with no motive, nothing in themselves to move us to action. That means that they are without influence on the will. Man seeks them, not they him. As objects of perception, they are what is seen, not our motive in looking; as objects of conception, they are the results of study, not the explanation of it; as objects of will, they are acted on, and not themselves active. This is true even of will itself when it becomes an object. If I seek to change the purpose of another man, I study it, find out what its weak points are, and I attack it. As an object, it may resist, but not itself influence me. So long as it is merely an object, it remains outside of my will. To be more than this it must enter into

my life, and as a motive or influence change my actions. But then it is no longer an object. I may study my purposes and motives, but so long as they are studied as objects they are not influencing me. This accounts for the difficulty of this study of our own intentions. The moment the intention or purpose becomes strong and active it rules, and, ruling, no longer is passive and an object. Whatever can be called an object is so called because it is passive, and, being passive, without influence on the will.

It might be regarded as axiomatic that what was passive could not explain action. Since our ordinary speech, however, does not recognise experience as active, we must make clear the consequences of the restrictions of the objective idea. Passive resistance may explain the limitations of some experiences. We find we can not go straight ahead because of some object, a tree or a rock, in our path. But the tree which changes our path does not explain why we took that path. Explanation, in this as in criminal trials, must be found in the motive. An object is not a motive. As object, as passive, it does not originate anything, and therefore can not be appealed to in explanation of any activity. Experience is due to motion of some sort. To bring an object into the focus of our attention there must be change. No one object is forever in that focus, so that to bring it to focus there must be this change, this coming of the new object into prominence, which we are trying to bring into relation with the rest of life. So in the phrase "explanation of an experience," we really mean explanation of the coming of this particular object into the center of conscious-

ness. This may be by some power in the experience itself, as when an explosion startles us into instant attention, or it may be as the result of our desire, as when we yield ourselves to day dreams. Both the explosion and the day dream are objects, but neither as object explains its own occurrence. The suddenness of the explosion, due to change somewhere, gives the scientific explanation of the one, and our desire the explanation of the other. The explosion can not be explained unless we know the conditions which preceded it, so our dreams need to be related to the desire which allowed them life. The object, which is passive, and can only obstruct change, does not contain within itself its own explanation. The one exception to this is when some experience is itself an object. In such a case, however, as with our will, both the explanation and the experience are objects. Neither explain why we now bring them into question. As objects they are not motives. So far as the religious experience brings us face to face only with an object, we have no explanation of its reason for existence. The object of religious devotion, if merely object, passive recipient of worship, can not give us an explanation of why we seek or serve.

The alternative directly opposed to that indicated by the word object is what we have meant to suggest by the word source. In an object we ignore all activity so far as any influence on us is concerned. In a source we are interested only in the activity. A source may be an object when that object is regarded as the explanation of something exterior to us, and source and result are together in our mind. The source is then an object because of its lack of effect



on us. As source, however, even when objective, it does affect something. Our interest here is in the sequence of source and result. Source is a general word, including mere sequence, as when we speak of the source of a river meaning simply the start of it, or causal, as when we conceive of the desire as the source of activity, or avoiding the theories of parallelism, when we attribute the explosion to the introduction of some new element not present before. In each case the change is referred back to what we call the source. Whether the source itself is regarded as active, or whether the motion simply starts from the source, and has been potentially present in it, the source may be regarded as the origin of the motion. In the physical world the source may not be the cause of motion, but only the object in which or on which the cause operated. The source of an electric shock may be the broken electric light wire, while the cause is the electricity in the wire. The real source is then the electric energy, while the wire is only apparently the source. In this use of the word, source and cause become coincident, except that the word source implies change, and cause may apply to some static condition. Also the source may always be the object of study, and the energy resident in it observable only in its results. To describe something as source, then, means that it is either active or the residing place of activity.

When it is the source of an experience that we are considering this definition becomes more important than when material objects alone are considered. In the physical world the source is the object in which the activity resides, while in the mental world,

where we meet activity face to face, the source is the activity or is more closely bound up with it than in the material universe. The source of my experience of speaking is my desire to speak. The desire is the expression and not merely the residence of the will power which results in the spoken words. Taking it roughly, the desire is the cause of the speech, if we accept the view that every real desire is an effort to do something, and if it remains mere unaccomplished desire, it is only because some other desire proves stronger. Whether this is true or not, the source of an experience is the desire which leads to it. This desire, when carried into action, is what we call our will. I have the experience of being in this room because I willed to come into it and to stay in it. The object of the experience and the source are in this case different. The object is the room. When my desire or will leads me here I find it as it is. The will or desire may be forgotten once I am here, or it may never have been a conscious desire, but in either case the cause of the change, the reason for the change from the perception of the hall to that of the room, is found in the will, whether above or below the threshold of consciousness. When the source is plainly outside of the will it must be one that can control the will. Were I brought into this room tied hand and foot, it would still be will that brought me here, but this time the will of another. Under the constraint of natural forces the same holds true. An earthquake forces itself on my notice only because it is more powerful than I. I can not escape it if I would. For the time being my body refuses to obey my will, because of the presence of a stronger force.

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To be the source of experience is to be a force which controls the will of man.

In the source of an experience, since it is the occasion for that experience, is to be sought the explanation of that mental state. If nothing opposes me strongly enough to affect my action, whatever I will to do is done. The will is a sufficient explanation of the action. When I am passively the object of another's will, then the explanation of the action is to be found solely in his will and purpose. When the experience is forced on us solely by some natural force, then it can be explained only by that force, and that force gives us a sufficient explanation. It is not necessary that we explain the source or its existence. All that is now in question is that the source, whatever may be its reason for existence, furnishes the reason for the experience. When we find an experience which does not yield to this test we can be sure that what we have thought to be its source was not truly or adequately so. It may be like the source of a river, which accounts only for its start, but ignores the fact that each tributary has also a source. In such a case the entire explanation of the volume of the river is to be found only by a study of all its sources. Taken together, they will furnish a sufficient explanation for the volume of water. In dealing with our experience we turn to the source to give us such an explanation. As the source of the river does not explain its course later, when rocky or gravelly banks impede it, so the source of an experience does not explain the objects which are found in it. My purpose which led me to this room does not guarantee the nature of the room. It may, in-

deed will, if the trip is a voyage of discovery, be equally well satisfied by any object. The distinction between source and object holds very clearly. What I find, if before entering I had no idea of what was in here, can not account for my coming in. Only my curiosity can do that. Thus the source and the object may be very distinct. They also may be identical. When I focus attention on my purposes, and strive to bolster up my courage, the object and the source are for the moment identical. The desire to fight, for instance, is the explanation for my desire to have more physical courage, that is, to have a stronger desire to fight. The source of one moment may be the object of the next, or the object of this moment the source of the experience of the next, but it is the same purpose which is alternately source and object. The purpose or desire is the explanation of its making itself its own object. When we describe any influence as the source of an experience we therefore mean that we find in that influence or will a sufficient explanation for the existence of the experience. It accounts for the activity. While a thing merely object can account for nothing but the contents of that experience, the source accounts for the having an experience at all.

When we turn to religion and seek to apply these terms which we have defined so as to seem exclusive we find that the application is difficult. From the ordinary point of view, God is both the object and the source of religion. He is known, and also only in Him can be found the explanation of that knowledge. This use of the two terms forces us to ask in some detail how far religion allows the use, and how

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far it is completely described, by either or both of the contrasting terms, "object" and "source."

That the unseen term of the religious relation is rightly called an object is evident at first sight. This unseen existence is the goal of all religious striving. Whether by the primitive savage with his magical rites, or by the mystic's destruction of desire, as well as by the obedience yielded to the moral code as divine, the unseen is here reckoned with as an object. It is something which can be sought. It is something which can be in some degree known. More than this, in our very first analysis of religion, we found that the experience was largely subject to man's will. Within limits he could change or destroy it. It was object of his will, as well as of his knowledge. To know the will of God, so that it may be reckoned with, may be set forth as the purpose of religion. The savage wishes to know how to influence the god so that he will bring good hunting or good crops. The modern Christian seeks to know God that he may attain perfect peace. However the satisfaction of religion may be conceived, man does put into it his human will. The unseen becomes the object of desire. When, however, we try to completely describe religion as a relation between the human will and an object outside, the difficulties begin. The phenomena of conversion, where a man's will is changed as it seems at times in spite of himself, points in another direction. This object, which, when his will is directed toward it, lends itself to his desires, when his will is not set on the right road, refuses to answer to the summons. Very frequently the man who seeks God believes that he has not found

Him, and while he is regarded by others as very devout, himself deplores his inability to reach the object of his desires. These two facts point in the same direction. As at times the religious experience comes without being sought, so at others when sought it is not reached. In the one case it appears as more than the man willed or desired, and in the second as less. It gives or withdraws itself, at times at least, without reference to man's will. In this connection we must also take into account the fact that when the object of the religious search is attained there comes a renewed activity. The religious fanatic will do deeds of exertion or of self-denial which before his religious mood came upon him he would not have attempted. The Moslem fanatic who hurls himself to death against modern rifles, or the reformed seeker after pleasure who now undergoes many privations under the bidding of his new faith, are sufficient proof that this object, if merely an object, is one whose possession has a very active influence. That this is true of some other objects is no valid objection. The conversion to the search for knowledge may bring similar self-denial in the life of the scientist. The pursuit of knowledge is thereby put in the same class with religion, and we have another illustration of an object whose possession brings new power.

Since we found that objectivity meant passivity, it is evident that with an experience of the religious type we must either broaden our definition of objectivity, or admit that the word does not completely describe the religious object. In the interest of clearness, the latter is the better course. So far as it is the object of desire, or of knowledge, the object

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of the religious experience is rightly so described. It has, however, as we have seen, other aspects. As the man who catches a wild animal and attempts to keep him in activity discovers that he has to deal with something different from a stone, something which can do more than passively resist, so the student of religion finds that the object of religion possesses a certain activity and energy of its own. As in the one case we say that we have to do with something alive, so in the case of religion we must make use of some other category to complete the description. The unseen term of the religious experience is something more than a mere object.

In applying the second of our two terms we find a term adequate for the description of those characteristics of religion which do not fall within the meaning of the word object. As source, the unseen term of the religious relation is recognised as active. It gives full value to the phenomena of conversion. Recognising that from the unknown comes into man's life at times those influences and forces which we call spiritual and religious, it has its place in a proper and full definition of religion. By the energy and activity which come from this something outside of the human individual is to be explained the vigor of the fanatic and the self-devotion of the martyr dying at the stake. To one to whom the power of religion comes, unlocking a new source of strength which makes it possible to endure life whatever that life may be, no other way is open than to ascribe to this unseen power the new life. As an explanation of this force in human life, and also as an explanation of its lack at times even when sought, we can turn only to

this unseen term itself. It is a source of the experience. Yet, as from the beginning of our enquiry, the contradictory nature of the religious facts stands in the way of our yielding ourselves completely to this line of approach, the unseen term can not entirely explain all the facts. Man, in the early stages, worships what god he will. Even in the midst of the dominance of clan worship among primitive tribes there are those who seek to worship in another way than the orthodox. The power of religion at times seems to express itself rather in disunion than in union. The modern histories of religion, in their effort to explain the varying forms by the differing influences at work on religion at different times, move along the same line. Religion, to their view, is modified by its environment. The facts which we mentioned of the ability of a man to reject religion or to change its character point to the will of man as a partial explanation for the phenomena of religion. So far as religion may be an object, a thing sought or known, it is not a source. Whether there exists or can exist a source which is not an object is no concern of ours, for we are dealing with a source which is object. The whole effort to cultivate the devotional life or the mystic state shows that in religion men exercise their wills. In their wills, then, is to be sought a partial explanation of religion. So far as this is true, the source of religion is something waiting to be found and known. It is an object and passive.

Thus neither of the two terms taken alone is adequate to describe the religious object. It is both source and object. Yet we do not therefore need to



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reject either. Both these elements, passivity and activity, enter into religion. The source is something which may be sought, and, when found, modified, so far as man is concerned, by man's will. On the theological side this is the doctrine of the possibility of sin. Yet this object is itself active, at times forcing itself on man, and at other times even found as the result of effort, enfusing new energy into the weary and flagging will. Again referring to theology, we have in this a certain approximation to the doctrine of God's grace. Both these elements are present, and both must enter into any final description of religion.

Any description of religion which is at all complete must be in terms which allow for activity both by the human will and by the religious object. It is not, however, a case of two forces working on the same object, for the existence which is the partial source is also the object of religion. In the experience we have an object which partly explains itself, that is, is a source, and is partly the object on which another force acts. So far the description of this object is not different from that of a physical object which is the source of energy. The electric wire may be handled, and cut, and moved where we will, yet it is also the source or bearer of the electric energy. The difference lies in the fact that our object is not an object of perception. The force is known by its results, and the object is an object as regards our will; we take it into account and will to change or destroy its power over us, but we do not see it as we see the wire. In this case, then, of religion, the term object implies just the opposite of source.

Both terms are within the realm of will activity. So far, then, this situation satisfies our third possibility, that the religious object may be a personality. We have an object which is not an object of perception, which is a source of energy, and which is an object of desire or repulsion. In applying this term we need to notice that the fact that we are not dealing with an object of perception renders some categories which are applicable to physical objects of no use to us here. The problem as to whether the object is simple or complex, one or many, is not a question to be decided by observation. The unity, or lack of it, to be found within those existences which are objects of the will is of a different type from that which marks physical unity. To develop this is another task. Only we do not want to conclude that by saying that our object satisfies the definition of personality we thereby shelve the problem of the oneness or multiplicity of gods. The will can and does include as one object things which are themselves multiple. An army is the object in the general's mind when he issues his commands, yet it is composed of many persons. So we can call the religious object a personality, without jumping to hasty conclusions. We mean only that this non-perceptual object is also a source of energy.

The other half of our definition of personality is that to completely satisfy our third alternative the action must be mutual. The will must be affected by as well as affect the religious object. The will must also be object as well as source. This is true, if it holds at all, in a different sense from that in which it is correct to speak of the will, as being influenced

by physical objects. A tool affects us if, when we seek to use it, we find it dull. It also wakens in us desire when its bright edge suggests its use, and we try it. In each of these cases the desire already exists. The activity is there, and is only thwarted or awakened, as the case may be, by the object. To me, or to a tired mechanic, the tool suggests no use. To me, because I have had no former skill in working with it, and to the mechanic because he has seen all of it that he wants. Whether or not the appeal comes depends on the man. With religion the case is different. The man who in the crisis of conversion feels his will and desires overborne, and his will changed, is always insistent that the change came not from within but from an exterior source. The will itself is changed. The artist remains an artist whether or not the sight of a picture or of a brush impels him to paint, but the religious man who has experienced conversion is not the same; his will and desires are not the same as if the conversion had not occurred. The same is true of the slower processes of religious training. A child trained to pray is not the same as the child brought up with no desire to pray. That this is true also of secular education only puts education of whatever kind in the same class as religion in respect to this matter. Education as conversion consists in training, that is, changing, the will. The will feels the effect of a force and influence outside of itself. It is the object of that force. Just as in education the child feels the effect of the influences brought to bear on him, so in religion he feels the effect of forces which act on him. This direct effect of social forces is not the same as

"education by experience," though in some sense it is true that a man may be educated by opposition. A man may, in the presence of difficulties presented by nature, conquer, and in conquering learn. Yet to do this there must be the will to conquer. Occasions can bring to the front such a will. Many of us have been in a fog on a mountain and found our way safely, and felt only pleasure in the difficulties, on the same ground where a man without the will to persevere lost heart and was lost. So opposition may bring out what there is in a man; it can not put something new into him. The mountain doesn't create but only rouses in us the desire to climb it. But what religion brings is new life. Thus it differs from the physical object. Religion brings to bear power upon the will. We have thus a mutual interaction. As the religious object both acts and is acted on by the human will, so the will acts and is acted on.

This mutual interaction which we have been using as the definition of personality does not complete that description. We did not need to define further at the time, but now that we are seen plainly to be dealing with a force acting on and acted on by our personality it becomes important to be more definite. If the personality which is behind religion is mutually interactive with our personality, then it must be of the same general type. There is a meeting point which is common to the two, or else they have everything in common, for, since they interact, they must meet. Having one point in common, they can be brought under one head. They can be compared within the same universe of discourse. In the case

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of religion, however, we find that the meeting point is the experience. What we call the religious experience is just the consciousness of this meeting of the force of our will and personality and of the other force. These two do not act on some third object, but on each other. In the experience the two conscious forces come into direct relation, or we may put it that in coming into relation these two forces come into consciousness. The relation is essentially personal. Only because it is distinguished as another will, an inner force yet not our own personality, is the religious object referred to a separate source. It is the special mark of personality that it can thus come into immediate relation to our will. Nature acts on us by rousing in us certain emotions, of fear or curiosity. Another man acts on us by the direct effect of his personality. Disregarding the epistemological difficulties of knowing how his will exists,—because after all we are convinced that it does exist,—in our practical dealings with our fellows we are conscious that their will affects and is affected by our will. Of a stone this is not true, nor even of natural forces such as electricity. We may use electricity, but we can not change it. We may throw a stone, but we can not direct its course once it has left us. A man, though, by the written word, or even only by our thought of what he might say, can influence us though he be far distant, or even dead. By the great leader new desires are created and others killed. Will acts on will. So it is with religion. The religious force is one exercised directly upon our will. The only thing in human life to which it bears comparison is personality and will.

## LECTURE VII

### A FOUNDATION FOR THEOLOGY

Other characteristics of that personality which is behind religion could perhaps be deduced from the religious experience, but it is not necessary for us to consider them here. The main points which we outlined as the most important for the proper study of religion have been considered. It remains for us to indicate the relation of our conclusions to other methods of study. As our method has been the philosophical, the one contrasting with it is the scientific. We have therefore to ask how far our results affect a scientific study of the religious experience.

Before attempting to bring our work into connection with that of a science of religion it will be well to indicate what it is that makes a particular method or study scientific. The first mark of a science is that it has reference to some distinct field. While philosophy may analyse the meaning of existence as found in all existent things, or of knowledge as applying to all things known, science limits its enquiries to some definite part of experience and of knowledge. Physics deals with those experiences which are the result of mechanical forces, chemistry with those of a chemical nature. Astronomy deals with the stars, and although it makes use of both physics and chemistry, it is a distinct science because

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its field is distinct. A science takes a concrete experience, one that is distinctly individual, and seeks to explain it. It takes typical individuals, it is true, but only because they are near the average or norm. The abnormal must also be explained if the science is to reach its full extent, but as variations from the type. Each individual case must be accounted for. To do this, a narrow study of a small field is necessary. General laws are the result of such a study, as well as of the general deductions of philosophy, but they are of a different type. Such a method as that which we used in proving the reality of the religious experience would be out of place in the science of religion. Science studies the phenomena, not what people think of it or name it. While for philosophy we must take into account the one who has the experience, science so far as possible ignores him and sees only the field which it is studying. One science is therefore divided from another by the field in which it is working. That field must be distinct.

Since it is the field of study which marks off one science from another, and science disregards the problems of knowledge, it must be certified in some other way that what the scientist is studying has some reality. The type or kind of reality which it possesses must be made clearer, that we may know how far the scientist's work affects the rest of experience. The student of dreams who to-day would treat them as Joseph treated the dreams of Pharaoh would not receive much consideration. Such an interpretation of dreams ascribes to them a reality which we are not willing to grant. The same is true

of astrology. The stars are undoubtedly real, but the connection which astrology presupposes and the experience which it studies have not the same reality. So we reject that science, not because the field of its work is not definite, but because we deny validity to that study. The relation which it assumes is unreal. No science can decide this reality for itself, for its attention is bent entirely on the field of its work, and hence it can not decide how that field is related to other fields. The fields may overlap, as with physics and chemistry or astronomy, but as each of these fields is real, each science pursues its work in the field of reality. Where one was unreal, as with the mediæval search for something to transmute baser metals into gold, no overlapping could give validity to the combination. It is also not a question of the discovery of new instances of the type. A science may discover new electrical phenomena, but only the same reality is given to these as to those previously known. When the experiences are of a new type, or of one previously unstudied, such as the alleged instances of telepathy, the instances must be proven real before the bar of general experience if the student is to be allowed unrestrained to claim validity for his conclusions. So long as we deny, or the world denies, reality to telepathy, so long will the science of telepathy be an outcast. Once granted the reality of the experiences it studies, then its conclusions are at least credible. Since anything which is studied thereby acquires a certain reality, if only in the mind of the student, the question becomes one of the kind of reality it possesses. Whether telepathy depends on



the imagination of the man who tells us of it, or whether it occurs as he says it does, is the question. Reality thus becomes an attribute of relations between experiences, varying in its meaning with our use. The modern student of dreams, who tries to account for their occurrence in the terms of modern psychology is awarded sufficient reality for his purpose, while the Joseph-like interpreter of dreams is denied it. In the latter case the relation to events is denied, in the former it is granted. Before a science can be accepted it must have this seal of approval. In the acceptance of a science this grant of reality is included.

Granted to a science a distinct field and a real experience, the scientific results will depend for their truth on the correctness and value of the method used. For a science to be distinct, this method must be distinct. Where there seem to be distinctions and yet the same method we really have the same science with subdivisions. The science of history is one science, even though it may for convenience be divided into military and economic. The method is the same. On the similarity or the dissimilarity of the method depends the place of the science in the general field of scientific knowledge. On this depends also the degree of acceptance to be given to its results. The conclusions of the historical sciences are not accepted in the field of biology, but are of value to the student of economics. The method is not one chosen arbitrarily by the science, but one forced on it by the phenomena which it studies. What the method is can not be determined therefore by the science itself, for a method, like a man, is unable to

see its own faults. To this is to be ascribed the long time necessary to draw men away from astrology and necromancy, and the vogue of spiritualism even in our own day. Unless one studies the method in relation to the whole of experience, no one can be certain that it is the right one. To have this assurance, philosophy must indicate for each science its general method.

The correctness of a method depends on its validity. Not only must it be distinct, it must also be true. It is evident that a science can not examine into this validity. A method which is proper for studying rocks or metals is not also the method for studying truth. We must have some way of getting the opinion of a third person or principle. We must appeal to the whole field of truth. Such a study of validity is made or implied before we accept the conclusions of any science. The experimental method of physics is granted validity because the phenomena are such that by comparison and trial and error we can arrive at the truth. Astronomy we accept because we have faith in the methods of celestial mechanics, which in turn depends on our belief in mathematics. The methods of the modern experimental psychology have been doubted because some have maintained that physiological experiment did not reveal truth in relation to the mental life, that the relations between mental phenomena were not to be discovered by any apparatus. Only the philosophical study of consciousness can decide such a question. If a science is to be firmly established, its method must have the seal of approval.

Besides these limitations of field and method which

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define logically the science, there are limits, less plain but perhaps even more strongly set. The first of these is the presuppositions of the science. As in mathematics certain principles are taken as axiomatic, so in any science certain truths about its field of work are assumed to be true. Any proof of them lies outside of the science. Not always clearly expressed or even consciously in mind, these yet set limits to the extension of that method of study. Any natural science assumes that the world is an ordered whole, that for every happening there is an adequate explanation. The historical sciences assume the general trustworthiness of mankind. Only when there is an explanation of a deviation from the truth or very good evidence of it does the historian doubt. The modern experimental psychologist, so far as he is simply a scientist, assumes that the theory of psycho-physical parallelism is true. He takes this over from philosophy, even if only as a working hypothesis. The science of psychology comes by this to have certain limits which he does not dream, or does nothing more than dream, of crossing. Political economy assumes that men's actions can be explained in terms of their industrial life. Any other explanation lies beyond the reach of that science. These presuppositions thus lay down practical limits beyond which the scientist does not seek to go. The assumptions may be wrong, and it may be that he should go beyond, but so long as he believes in these ideas he will not try to cross the boundary. These over-beliefs of the scientist thus have a large part to play. They must therefore be

examined if we are to be sure of what are to be the practical limits of any scientific enquiry.

There is another limit of the same kind which must be taken into account. In a certain sense every science is a practical matter. Men go into it with some purpose in view. That purpose may not be very closely associated with the production of food, or the search for new luxuries to ease the burden of life, but even the most detached scientist intends in some way to realise a purpose. He does not simply go out with his eyes open, and wait for truth to fall into his mind unsought. Instead he seeks the truth by the aid of certain methods, and he seeks it in certain fairly definite directions. At the least he is satisfying his curiosity about some special set of phenomena. For the mass of men, however, something more than curiosity is necessary. Those inquiries which we call the great sciences, which are the serious work of men's life, and whose results are taught in our universities, have behind them much more than the satisfying of an idle curiosity. Men put time and energy and wealth into them because they believe that there will be some substantial result, some knowledge which will affect life. Man comes into contact with the mechanical and electrical forces, and seeks to know how they affect him, or can be used by him. He seeks by a knowledge of geology to understand the history of the world, as well as to plan accurately where mines should be dug. But if curiosity were the only purpose, this would limit inquiry to what was new. The old familiar lines of work would be neglected. So whatever

might be the purpose, it would determine what would be the study of the scientist. In determining therefore what should be the problems of a science, we have to determine what should be the purpose of the student in entering on that field. By a comparison with other sciences, by a study of the meaning of the experience which the science is to observe, we can determine in advance something as to what purpose is likely to be met in the course of the study, and what idea it is that leads one to undertake it. These points make more clear what the actual work is to be.

In our study of the religious experience the first point that had a bearing on this question of the science of religion, or to give it its traditional name, theology, is that there is a definite and real field for this science. It must have become evident in our inquiry that there is a very large field open, which has no reference to history as such or to the organisation and support of religion as a financial or organisation problem. The data of religion may be the subject matter of many sciences. The sacred writings of any people may be studied with all the resources of literary study or of philology. That there is a religious literature does not, however, make this a distinct science. The writings are examined and judged as to their history and meaning as we would judge any great piece of literature. As a history may be judged as to its literary quality, and as to its value and significance as prose, so a religious narrative can be similarly judged. In neither case have we a new science. Only here the religious data are in their expression the subject matter of the science of literature. Whether the

given writing is true or not can not be decided by the literary critic, nor even whether this particular form is normal or not. The results of the critic's work are of value only for his own science of literary criticism. It is only the literary problem he has solved. An appreciation of this would have prevented much of the uneasiness over the higher criticism. Religion may also be made the subject matter of historical study. The forms and ceremonies of religion may be traced in their development and spread. This they share with the history of any great influence or organisation among mankind. The problems met here are historical, questions of origin and type, of historical cause and effect. Again the question of whether the given religion is the true religion or not is not considered. If each succeeding form is explained historically, the historian has done his work. The results are of value for the theologian, but they are valuable not as theology but as history. The history of religion is not a science of religion, in spite of some current usage, any more than a history of the development of physics is the same as the science of physics. A man may be a student of physics without knowing any history, and so a theologian might be ignorant of the development of religion, and yet have the insight to make him a great teacher of the science of religion. To the Church Fathers in general no knowledge such as we have of the history of religion was given, and yet their theology is of great value to us. Only confusion can result unless we distinguish as carefully between the history and the science of religion as we are coming to do between

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the literary study of religion and theology. Neither literary criticism nor history constitute the peculiar field of a science of religion.

Each of these studies which we have considered, and also the psychology of religion, deal with the expression of religion. Following the analogy of the natural sciences, there remains another field of effort. Not only the expression of what we have called the source-object of religion, but that object itself can be studied. Physics disregards the problems of psychology, and centers its efforts not on how we know mechanical motion in varying forms, but on what we know. The expression of that knowledge in practical life may be the basis of an economic study, or perused by literary critics, but to the physicist the only things of importance are the known facts. The object which is experienced is his sole concern. So in religion, it is possible to disregard the historical or literary or economic expression of the knowledge of the religious object, and concern ourselves solely with that object. Though we have not been making a scientific study, we have been studying the object which will be studied by a science of religion. We found that that object, while not completely given, was yet definable in certain ways. It acted on the human will in a manner which we call the action of personality. We can say very definitely what things are not this object. It can not be material, for its varying forms are contrary to the nature of matter, as is also its activity. It can not be held within the bounds of the limited human categories, hence what is distinctly human can not belong to or be this object.

Whatever is revealed through the religious experience which corresponds to this definition thus furnishes a definite field for study. If there is no such object, then there can be no science of religion. There may be psychology or history or literary or economic study of the religious experience, but none of these are a science of that experience, for none of these ask what it is that the experience is an experience of. Consequently no psychology, to take one of the possible lines of approach, can say whether religion is true or false. Only a science which studies the object, and ignores the mode of revelation of that object, can answer such a question. Where the object is ignored, as it is in psychology and the other studies of religion, we can not say whether a given form of expression is true or false. Thus there remains a necessary place for a study of the object of religion. This is the field of the science of religion, ordinarily called theology.

It is not enough to define a field. If our science is to be real, the field must be real, else our conclusions will have no place in the real world. Real means, in the first place, existence. This we have seen is true of the object of religion. The religious experience is incomplete in itself. Always referring for its origin and character to something beyond itself, it can be explained only by reference to that unseen object. Hence, as the experience undoubtedly exists, we were forced to ascribe a logical existence to the object. Logically, it must exist. Practically, also, this holds true, for we find the object, or asserted object, independent, in part, of the individual will, and so far as agreement exists as to its existence, a



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focusing of the social will upon it. As our definition of the existence of objects was that they were the foci of individual perceptions, the religious object, meeting this definition, wins its right to be called an existent object. If there are not one but many objects, a possibility which we have not considered, as it falls within the limits of the science, and not of the philosophy of religion, then each object, as sharing in this social focus, becomes and has the right to be regarded as existent. The relations between these objects and with the individual perception become the field of study for our science. This field, since each term, the object and the individual knower, is real, is itself real, so far as existence is concerned. By a process similar to those which have given rise to the conception of physical objects, and forced on mankind recognition of their existence, so is the recognition of the spiritual object forced on us. As the material object, the result of this process of conception, is regarded as existent, so we term the object of the religious experience to be an existent reality, and the science which studies it a study of reality.

The relation which gives the problems to a science must not only be between existent terms, it must also be valid. There might be a science of magic, the rain charm and the rain which by coincidence follows are both real, yet the science would not deal with reality, for the relation with which it would work is not a valid relation. There is no necessary connection between the charm and the rain. Our science of religion must therefore be shown to deal with a valid relation if it is to be fully established as a

science. This is the significance of our proof of the validity of the religious experience. In showing that it is really an experience of something beyond itself, we have established a necessary connection such as does not exist between the rain charm and the rain. Because the claim of religion to a source outside of itself and therefore to a connection with such a source is valid, our science is dealing with a real, and not merely an asserted relation. The field of its study is the world of real relations as well as of real objects. An inquiry into the nature of reality is no more required of theology than it is of physics. Whatever we may mean by reality, it applies to this spirit world as it does to the material world. Whatever may be the inner meaning of validity, and of value in general, it applies here. The field of theology is this definite part of the real and valid world of knowledge.

Though possessing a distinct field for work, a science does not stand on its own foundation unless it has a distinct method. While we have not developed a method proper to the science of religion, we have indicated some of its necessary characters. In the first place we found that it must be a formal method. We are not dealing with an object which can be handled as can a rock or even a man. We know of it only through its relation to man in the religious experience. Its existence, even, is a matter of logical deduction. Thus to study it there is necessary a method which will be able to treat with such a formal object. The ways of the sciences which deal with matter are not ours. Instead of experiment, which may be called the typical method

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of natural science, we are able to use only logical analysis. Theology thus stands with the sciences of history and ethics, rather than with the sciences of nature. As history by its methods studies the great movements of human life in their development, and ethics and economics, from different points of view, study those movements in their inner relations, so religion is the province of the theologian. No more than with history or economics is a method of experiment or microscopic examination possible. The principles which are being studied can not be examined directly, but only through their results. As history with the facts before it, tries to relate these facts one to the other, so the theologian, with the facts of religion before him, has to point out the underlying relation to the source of the experience, and explain the experience in terms of the unseen source. In this sense the science of religion is a formal science.

Theology is a formal science, but it is not an *a priori* science. Again like history, and unlike the normative sciences, or mathematics, it does not study what should be, but what is. Historically this has not always been true of theology. In many ages men have simply deduced from their idea of God what must be his relation to man, and then explained the religious experience in these terms. Such an *a priori* method we have discarded. Theology must be built up from a study of the facts, not brought down from heaven to rule those facts. The test of any asserted revelation is our revelation from God, that is, the expression of God in us. To study his character we must study the revelation which we have.

Our conception of God is then the result of our study of the facts as known to us, a study not of what should be, but of what is. In this its work is not philosophic. In asking the meaning of an experience as we have been doing, we have been laying down necessary conclusions. In a sense we are asking what must be, and so, what should be to make this experience have the reality and validity which it claims. There might be some argument in favor of calling such a study theology, and of giving to the science of religion another name. It is true that the usual conception of theology is that of a philosophy. Since, however, theology has always sought to know God, to give all the information about him which is possible, and it is evident that we have nearly exhausted the possibilities of a method which depends on universal agreement, we should call theology that which gives more information. To go further on the way to the truth, we need a science which will pick out the truth from the falsehood, and be a more exact guide. This is the work of the science of religion, which therefore has more right to the name of theology. This study does not ask what the relation to God involves, but what kind of a God will explain the revelation which we have. Theology then takes its place among the a posteriori sciences.

There is one final characteristic of our science which marks it off from history or ethics. Each of these is in some part descriptive. History has to describe the great underlying principles of development so that we may be able to recognise them. Ethics, so far as it includes morals, must describe

the principles of morality. The same is true of economics, which has largely to do with a description of the principles which actuate mankind in industrial life. These historical, ethical, or economic principles when rightly described are recognisable. We can see the law of supply and demand at work, once it is shown to us. In religion, however, we can never be shown the object we seek. No description can be given which will be accepted by any one else. As we may say, there is no objectivity to this object, nothing which makes it possible to describe it. Our study would have to be entirely explanatory. What we have is an experience which does not explain itself. We find a conceptual object which explains it in its varying forms. But we also find that we have no description of this object. We are in the world of logic, but not as mathematicians, saying what should be, but in a world of concepts saying what must be if what we see to be real is real. Mathematics, while applied to the material universe, has in itself no necessary connection with it. God, on the other hand, as studied in theology, is known only through his connection with a part of that material universe that is, with man. The methods of the theologian are thus distinct; unlike the natural sciences because not experimental, unlike the normative sciences because deductions from facts not from ideals, and unlike mathematics, in having an origin in the material world.

The validity of such a method depends on the existence of a relation which does thus take its rise in the material universe, or is known through that

universe, yet is not describable in material terms, and lies in the field of concepts, where it is known only by its expression or relation to a part of the material world. Such a condition is satisfied in the case of personality. Individual human personality can not be described in terms of objective life, and yet has its expression and value for knowledge only in relation to this realm of matter. My will to throw a stone can not be really described, but it is expressed only when the stone is thrown. We have come to the conclusion for other reasons than the creation of a method for theology, that the object and source of religion is to be found in some superhuman personality. Such a personality can not be really or fully described in objective terms any more than can our limited human personality. Yet we know this personality as we know one another only through its expression in human life. Hence, again, as with our knowledge of one another, our ideas as to the character of this personality must be the conscious or unconscious result of the relation of that personality to us. Since we are dealing with the only type of reality which can be studied by such a method as we have outlined, that method is valid. Because we are dealing with personality, the proper and valid method is based on that fact. Since, moreover, it is a superhuman or formal personality, it can not be described as can man. Theology thus is distinct in method even from those sciences which study human personality, for it must have a more general method. They can be in part descriptive, as concrete, but since we know of no class to which

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we may refer this superhuman person, we can not use description. Theology thus stands entirely by itself with a method purely its own.

No science fills entirely the whole of its field, nor uses to the full extent its methods. Something is neglected that something else may be more fully developed. Within its field of work, too, it is not only the formal logical presuppositions which set limits. There is, besides, the pressure of practical life. Chemistry turns to those problems which have most relation to the practical problems of life. In the same way theology is not completely described in the formal terms we have been using. The religious experience does not stand by itself, isolated from the other interests of life. The rich variety of that life finds its echo in the manifold forms of religion. Theology has to guide it not only its own historic development, but the expression of the religious emotions and will, as well as of religious knowledge. The background of any theological study must be this varying and changing religious life. For the Church, taking it as a whole, the main interest of the religious experience is not any increased knowledge of God,—this it feels it has already,—but a deepening and strengthening of God's influence on man. As back of the interest in theology thus stands the interests of the practical religious life, theology feels this influence, and turns to problems which arise from the complexities of the world of religion. The emphasis of the western world for centuries on the doctrine or problem of human salvation was due to this pressure of man's anxiety as to his fate. The scientific spirit of our own age has re-

sulted in an emphasis on the life of God in himself as that life is revealed to man. The search for knowledge, as in the Greek world, has come to its own. Whether from a belief that man's fate is not as important as he thought, or for some other reason, the problems which confront the theologian have changed, and this change is the result of the change in the problems of the religious life.

Besides the religious life, theology, since it deals with man's will as well as with his emotions, has to face the realm of man's will acts, that is, of morality. While it does not have to explain morality, and is thus distinct from ethics, it can not ignore the moral nature of man. Where religion leads to what ethics concludes to be a low standard of morality, theology must take this into account. Here again problems are set, and emphasis given, not by the science itself, but by the world with part of which it has to do. The effort is sometimes made, as we have done, to define religion in terms which are independent of morality. This, in the practical development of the science, does not mean that we would ignore morality. The formal limits of the science do not include the moral codes, it is true, but no explanation of religion can be true which would render untrue or unreal the moral development of the race. Those things which man has won by great struggle he will not lightly let go. A theology thus can not represent its god as immoral, as urging men to licentiousness or murder, and be regarded as true. Theology can not hope to stand if pitted against truths which man is determined to hold fast. Therefore, though it might conceivably be that theology could teach



that religion is best explained by an immoral deity, practically this could not happen. Such a theology would be immediately rejected, and if it gave the only explanation of religion, that is if religion was proven to be immoral in its tendency, religion and theology would be rejected together. The only theology which men seek or will have is one which does not teach immorality. It might not be possible to have a theology which is moral, but a moral theology or no theology at all is what mankind requires. Because of this, theology has to justify religion to man, by showing that the power behind it is moral. Unless this can be done, religion is not justified in the minds of the human race. Theology is therefore held within the limits of morality by this presupposition.

More plainly than by the background of religion and morality is theology influenced by the motives of those who center their attention on it. The historical development has been mainly in response to the demands of a system by which the Christian doctrine might be easily taught. The lack of a theology in many religions may be due to the absence of this motive. Where the teaching is mainly concerned with the ritual acts, and the learning of the correct formulae, no system of explanation of the religious experience is required and so none is evolved. So far as the need is felt, it is met by the use of myths or fables or stories. Where the need of real explanation is felt, as among the Hindus and Buddhists, we find a theology. There the things to be taught are the experiences of the religious life, hence those experiences must be systematised. From this

comes the analysis and explanation which we have called the science of religion. With Christian theology, from the time of Origen, and the great catechetical schools, down to our own day, where theology is the possession almost entirely of the official teachers of religion, it has been the teachers of religion who have been the theologians. This need and desire is still powerful. The effort to explain religion arises from the desire to instruct others. Whether the instruction is intended to increase or decrease religion or some particular form of it, does not matter. The effort to influence others by instruction as to the true nature of the religious life is the mainspring of the interest in theology. This search for a system which may be easily taught has its effect on the science. The problems considered, and the results aimed at, are those which the teacher needs. The nature of God is defined as loving, as perfect justice, as omnipotent, because these are the qualities which concern man, and which the teacher desires to impress on man. In an outline of theology this element must be recognised. The direction of the development of the science will be determined very largely by the needs of religious instruction.

Another element not so evident, but even more powerful, is the direct influence of the religious experience itself. The devotional spirit, as we call it, constantly interferes with the course of theological argument. The man who takes most interest in a theory of religion is apt to be a religious man. He is then not merely examining an experience as an impartial judge, but he is constructing a theory for

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an experience of his own life. He knows that experience better than he does any theory, even though that theory be his own deduction. The reality and the coloring come to the theory from the devotional life. The interests of that life will largely determine, therefore, the development of the theory. Men tend to turn from a theology which would put God far off, because that idea arouses no devotional enthusiasm. If such a theology results, then it is neglected, and search is made for some explanation of religion which will more nearly touch the devotional life. Even if false, a theory of immanence has more weight than one which would put a myriad beings between the devotee and his god. The victory of monotheism over polytheism, is not entirely because of its logical correctness, but because it gives more assurance to the individual believer that his relation to God is worth while. Where there are many gods, the service of one may not bring any reward, for another may be stronger. So in times of crisis we find Rome importing a foreign worship in the effort to gain assurance of help. Where there is only one God, the faithful worshiper is assured of help, because none can defeat the will of the god. We have to recognise these influences in theology. They do not determine any one theory to be true, but they do fix the line of development, for they point the way along which the search is to be made. The interests of the religious life thus play a large part in the development of a science of religion.

We have brought to an end the task to which we set ourselves. There was needed, we said in the be-

ginning, a study of religion which would have no pre-suppositions and no theories at the start except the fact of the existence of the phenomena called the religious experience. We may not have seemed to accomplish much. No system of theology has resulted, and the great differences between the various religions have not been even considered. Yet something has been done. The conclusions we have reached are at least as free as we could make them from assumptions, unconscious or conscious. We took the experience which men call religion, and examining it, found that there was enough agreement amid all the differences to justify the giving of the one name religion to these various experiences. From this agreement we found those elements which were common to all experiences of religion. If there were any unnoticed assumptions, they were in our use of the general ideas of truth and reality, as well as of knowledge. As however religion is only one among man's experiences such a use is justifiable. So far as religion itself is concerned, we did not assume that one type was above another, or that one religion was at a higher stage in its evolution than some other. Within the field of our study, all religions have stood on an equality. Also we have not sought to either exalt or depress religion above or below in importance man's other activities. Any conclusion reached depends therefore on the standing of the experience itself, and its character. The definition of the source of religion as personal does not assume that God must be personal because personality is the highest thing in the universe. Our result, not depending on any such evaluation either of personality

or of the source of religion, has a validity which such popular arguments can not have. Because of the freedom from assumptions, and the adoption only of such conclusions as the facts warrant, what we have stands on a firm basis.

Our method, the study and analysis of the experience, and the deduction from these facts, gives a reality to our conclusions which does not belong to results which are based on deduction purely from some other theory. The analysis which precedes gives to the method a foundation. We know that we are talking about the real world, and not about a world that might be. We did not deduce, for instance, the idea of God's personality from the conception of God's perfection. This is as much a matter of method as of presupposition, for it has a certain validity which comes to it from the conception of the ideal of human existence, even when not assumed. Yet it is then an idea as to what a perfect being must be if he exists, not a description from experience. The being or beings whom we have defined as personal are such because an analysis of experience reveals them to be such. The being whom we have described and defined may not be known absolutely to be perfect and omnipotent, but what we do know is a valid knowledge. Using only an analysis of facts, and not an a priori method, we give to our conclusions a certainty of a place and importance in the actual world. Since after all the main importance of religion in men's minds is not that it gives knowledge of God, but that it helps them to live, now or hereafter, any knowledge which results, if it is to have value, must connect itself

closely to this life. Validity thus becomes not merely a matter of logical accuracy, but of practical value. This value, because we have kept our feet on the ground, belongs to our results.

This value of the conclusions we have reached, though the actual results are meager, has enabled us to point out the line of a further scientific enquiry. In the first place we have been able to define the science of religion. In this we have divided the field which theology has traditionally claimed for itself, and may have seemed to take from it its ancient proud prëeminence. Such prëeminence as belongs to a study of the ideal it does to a certain extent lose. Instead it comes to have value as indicating the goal toward which man is looking and moving. The God who is now its concern is a God known to man, and in close relation to man, not a being so far off, and so much in the world of what might be, that the main problem is how could he come into contact with man. In our study we start from that contact, hence it is not a problem for this science as we have defined it. Monotheism, and God's perfection, usually assumed, are, however, serious problems. They have been such in the history of the development of religion, and it indicates that our science comes nearer to reality when for it too they become important problems. Theology as thus more accurately defined represents the interests of the religious life. Unconsciously to themselves, theologians have always been influenced by their religious experience. We have now made this influence explicit, and given it a rightful place. This being taken into account, errors which were due to its being ignored

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can now be avoided. Thus, while perhaps we have defined theology in terms less lofty than those to which it has been accustomed, so defined, it becomes a study whose importance to man is evident. Based on man's experience it tries to solve the problems of this human life.

To this source of religion there is given a valid method of study. Valid not only in the conceptual world of perfection, but also in the world of actual experience, any loss in logical certainty is more than made up by a gain in concreteness. The recognition of the fact that many of the conclusions of historic theology have not the value and certainty which is ascribed to them is of an importance which religious people can not afford to neglect. A sentimental regret at the loss of a false sense of security should not blind us to a very real gain in the knowledge of our limitations. In general, one of two contrasting methods must be chosen. If God is an ideal, then we may deduce from our ideal certain qualities necessary to that conception, or we may take our experience as it is, and ask not what should be, but what is. While in the second method we lose the ideal so far as it is merely conceived, in the first and traditional method we lose the assurance that what we conceive has actual existence. The two unite to a certain extent in the conception which we defined as that of personality. The ideal is here that which is man's will or which influences man's will. The method which makes this conclusion valid takes its stand in the experience, which it finds is that of a personality. The ideal thus has a basis and a part in reality which the mere conception of the


perfect can not give it. The idea of God remains an idea, unless it can be shown to affect, not as an ideal, but as a personal power, the actual world. This, since we have been asking the meaning and implications only of this real or actual world, this the method which we have used makes possible. Whether God be one or many, perfect or partial, remains for further study, but whatever the results of that study may be, they will relate to a being whose existence is already known and assured.


















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